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Abstract
Many computing systems today are written in weakly typed languages such as C and C++. These
languages are known to be “unsafe” as they do not prevent or detect common memory errors
like array bounds violations, pointer cast errors, etc. The presence of such undetected errors has
two major implications. The first problem is that it makes systems written in these languages
unreliable and vulnerable to security attacks. The second problem, which has never been solved
for ordinary C, is that it prevents sound, sophisticated static analyses from being reliably applied
to these programs. Despite these known problems, increasingly complex software continues to get
written in these languages because of performance and backwards-compatibility considerations.
This thesis presents a new compiler and a run-time system called SAFECode (Static Analysis
For safe Execution of Code) that addresses these two problems. First, SAFECode guarantees
memory safety for programs in unsafe languages with very low overhead. Second, SAFECode
provides a platform for reliable static analyses by ensuring that an aggressive interprocedural pointer
analysis, type information, and call graph are never invalidated at run-time due to memory errors.
Finally, SAFECode can detect some of the hard-to detect memory errors like dangling pointer errors
with low overhead for some class of applications and can be used not only during development but
also during deployment. SAFECode requires no source code changes, allows memory to be managed
explicitly and does not use metadata on pointers or individual tag bits for memory (avoiding any
external library compatibility issues).
This thesis describes the main ideas, insights, and the approach that SAFECode system uses to
achieve the goal of providing safety guarantees to software written in unsafe languages. This thesis
also evaluates the SAFECode approach on several benchmarks and server applications and shows
that the performance overhead is lower than any of the other existing approaches.
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Many computing systems today are written in weakly typed (or unsafe) languages like C and
C++ that provide weak semantic guarantees due to the presence of undetected memory errors like
bounds violations, pointer cast errors etc. The presence of these undetected memory errors is the
primary reason for poor reliability of software today. Despite this, increasingly complex software
continues to be written in these languages because of performance and backwards-compatibility
considerations.
Safe (or strongly typed) languages such as Java and C#, on the other hand, provide strong
semantic guarantees. Consequently, there are three main benefits of using safe languages:
• They improve system security by preventing common sources of vulnerabilities such as buffer
overflow attacks
• They improve software reliability by providing better error-detection at development time
• They enable sound static analysis techniques to be used in compile-time tools.
Unfortunately, current techniques that achieve some of these benefits for C/C++ programs gen-
erally require expensive run-time checks (see Chapter 2.4), limiting such tools to be used primarily
for oﬄine debugging rather than for production code [4, 37, 55, 50].
The third benefit mentioned above is essential for checking program properties in compile-time
tools. Compile-time array bounds checking algorithms (e.g. ABCD [7]), static checking tools
(e.g. ESP [18]), and many security checks performed by virtual machines [49] rely on program
analysis that would not be sound if applied to C or C++ programs. In particular, memory errors
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in C programs like dangling pointer references, array bounds violations, and undetectable type
conversions, can violate the semantics assumed by most non-trivial static analysis algorithms.
Optimizing C/C++ compilers simply give undefined results for erroneous programs, but this is
not acceptable for program checking tools that aim to provide guarantees about error detection or
prevention using program analysis.
To appreciate the difficulty of enforcing the third property, consider previous error detection
tools for C [4, 66, 37, 72, 54, 71, 50]. Most of these tools simply do not provide any guarantees
because they use heuristic techniques to detect certain errors, especially dangling pointer errors,
and these heuristics may not detect some memory errors. The tools by Xu et. al [71] and Patil
and Fisher [54] can reliably detect memory reference errors, including dangling pointer errors. But
this comes at the cost of high overheads (2x-6x) in many programs. These tools also require use
of extensive metadata that complicate interoperability with external libraries. Furthermore, they
do not prevent type violations on certain legal references. To our knowledge, none of these tools
provide a sound semantics despite their high-overhead run-time checks.
An alternative solution is provided by systems like Cyclone [29] and CCured [13], both of which
aim to guarantee safe execution and a sound semantics for C programs. Both systems, however,
disallow explicit memory deallocation and instead, use automatic memory management, require
porting effort (syntactic or library compatibility), and incur potentially high run-time overheads
in memory and time (further discussed in Chapter 2.4). When programmers are willing to accept
these requirements both systems provide an attractive method for achieving the three benefits
discussed earlier. We believe, however, that there are many existing applications in weakly-typed
languages like C and C++ that will not be modified to meet the requirements of these systems.
To our knowledge, there is no existing system today that can provide these three benefits for the
vast base of existing software.
1.1 The SAFECode Approach
This thesis describes a system called SAFECode (Static Analysis For safe Execution of Code)
provides a subset of each of the three benefits of safe languages, including useful sound semantics
for nearly arbitrary C programs. First SAFECode enforces memory safety (defined in Chapter 2.1).
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Second, SAFECode detects many programming errors normally prevented by a safe programming
language such as uninitialized pointers, array bounds violations, pointer cast errors, etc. SAFECode
attempts to detect these errors at compile-time where possible and uses run-time checks for the
rest. It limits the run-time error detection in such a way that no metadata is needed in individual
pointers or objects.
Third, and perhaps the most important technical contribution of this thesis, SAFECode pro-
vides a foundation for sound static analysis techniques to be used for nearly arbitrary C programs.
In particular, SAFECode ensures the correctness of a call graph, fairly aggressive interprocedural
pointer analysis information, and type information for a subset of the data objects in a program.
Compiler analyses can build upon this foundation to perform reliable static analyses and trans-
formations of programs. In fact, we exploit this capability to perform aggressive static checking,
which greatly reduces the run-time overhead of SAFECode by eliminating many run-time checks.
We also give examples of other static checking techniques and external tools that could be applied
on top of SAFECode and guaranteed to be sound. To our knowledge, SAFECode is the first tool to
enable sound and sophisticated static analyses for ordinary C programs, despite the possibility that
such programs may cause dangling pointer references, array bounds violations, and undetectable
type conversions.
The basis of our approach is to use a pointer analysis to partition heap memory into fine-grain
pools (or regions) [42]. We use type-homogeneous pools containing objects of “known type” and a
combination of static analysis and run-time checks to enforce isolation between the pools, prevent
memory access violations, and guarantee the correctness of the points-to graph and the call graph.
SAFECode does not require source changes and does not impose any changes to the explicit
memory management model of C. First, it requires no annotations whatsoever with all its trans-
formations and analyses being automatic. Second, SAFECode programs allocate and free memory
objects at exactly the same points as that of the original program, minimizing the need to tune
memory consumption. Third, SAFECode uses novel techniques to avoid the need to associate
any metadata with individual pointer variables, memory objects, or tag bits with pointer values.
Such metadata or tag bits are undesirable because they complicate the passing of values between
a program and external libraries.
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1.2 Contributions of the Thesis
The contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
• We present a new system called SAFECode for guaranteeing memory safety with very low
overhead for weakly typed languages.
• SAFECode guarantees that memory errors do not invalidate the points-to graphs, call graph
and type information for a subset of memory objects at run-time, thus providing a platform
for doing other high level static analyses. Our approach shows how to refine existing pointer
analysis and heap partitioning transformation and combine them with new techniques to
provide the above guarantees with lower run-time overhead than previous approaches.
• We show how the SAFECode approach can be formalized as an extension to the type system
of the weakly typed languages to include a new kind of region types. We then formulate the
operational semantics for SAFECode in such a way that, in the absence of memory errors,
the semantics are equivalent to the standard semantics of weakly typed languages. More
importantly, for any well typed program in this system (including the ones which contain
memory errors), the semantics guarantee memory safety, sound points-to graph, sound call
graph, and sound type information for a subset of memory.
• We show how SAFECode semantics enable many static analysis algorithms, which are oth-
erwise not sound in the presence of memory errors. We propose a new interprocedural array
bounds check algorithm, which is sound in the SAFECode framework and show how it can
be used to reduce the run-time overhead in SAFECode.
• We present a backwards-compatible bounds checking solution that can be used as a part of
SAFECode and has very low overhead.
• We present a new technique to detect all dangling pointer references (uses of pointers to freed
memory) that incurs low overhead when used for server applications.
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1.3 Thesis Organization
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the SAFECode approach and positions the SAFECode work
in relation to other existing approaches. Chapter 3 gives the necessary background to understand
the rest of the thesis. Chapter 4 describes the SAFECode approach for enforcing sound analysis
information. Chapter 5 formalizes the SAFECode approach as a region-based type system and
gives a formal proof of soundness. Chapter 6 presents a new run-time bounds checker developed
as a part of the SAFECode approach. Chapter 7 describes a novel approach to detect dangling
pointers. Chapter 8 presents the SAFECode version when restricted to embedded systems. Chap-
ter 9 discusses a novel interprocedural static bounds checking algorithm. Chapter 10 concludes
with directions for future work.
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Chapter 2
Definitions, Overview and Related
Work
2.1 Memory Safety : Definition
We define the following collection of guarantees as a “memory safety” guarantee.
(S1) Control flow integrity : An executing program only follows the precise control flow paths
predicted by the compiler. Note that for indirect function calls, the set of predicted callees
(predicted by the compiler’s “call graph”) may be a superset of those intended by the pro-
grammer. Nevertheless, safety is ensured because no unexpected transfers of control can
occur.
(S2) Data access integrity : For a subset of data objects, the executing program respects the object
type and does not execute any illegal operations on those objects. For other data objects, the
object type may be violated but in all cases the program only accesses data memory explicitly
allocated by the program.
(S3) Rendering memory errors harmless: Any memory referencing errors (uninitialized pointers,
array bounds violations, string buffer overruns, or dangling pointer references to heap or stack
objects) are either explicitly prevented or rendered harmless. Harmless here means that they
cannot cause violations of (S1) and (S2).
The root cause of violations of these guarantees are the memory referencing errors listed above
in S3. Note that other errors commonly associated with security violations, e.g., integer overflow,
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are not actually exploitable in themselves; they become exploitable when they produce memory
errors such as an array bounds violation.
2.2 Strategies for Providing Memory Safety to C Programs
In general, providing memory safety guarantees to a C/C++ program using only static analysis
is undecidable. Many previous tools or techniques have adopted different strategies to make this
problem tractable. We classify these strategies for providing memory safety guarantees into three
main categories:
Restrict Place restrictions on the usage of language features (e.g., restrict pointer




Perform exhaustive run-time checks augmented with static analysis to
eliminate the run-time overhead
Annotate Add annotations to programs that will enable powerful verification tools
to check for memory or type safety violations
All of the previous tools/technologies (research or industrial) have used a combination of these
strategies to provide the necessary memory safety guarantees. The advantages and disadvantages
of using each of these strategies is given in Table 2.1.
Strategy Advantages Disadvantages
Restrict Complete static checking Supports only few applications
Run-time Check-
ing
Less rewriting of existing applica-
tions
May incur prohibitively high over-
head
Annotate Support large class of applications May require adding large number
of annotations
Table 2.1: Comparing various strategies for memory safety
The first strategy (Restrict) is useful in specific application domains where the restrictions on
language usage are acceptable (e.g., embedded or control software). The second strategy (Run-
time checking), as the name suggests, relies on exhaustive run-time checking to check for memory
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safety violations. Most of the previous tools that have used this strategy have been either pro-
hibitively expensive or required some changes to the existing software. The third strategy allows
more expressive language features than the first but requires (perhaps extensive) rewriting of ap-
plications in terms of adding annotations to existing code to enable complete static checking. We
consider any wrappers required for library compatibility reasons as annotations.
The strategies adopted by some well known approaches are given in Table 2.2. Vault [19] is a
new restricted programming language derived from C that also uses some annotations to provide
type safety guarantees to programs. Cyclone [29] mainly uses a region based annotation scheme to
provide type safety guarantees to a C like language. CCured [52] is an extension of C type system
that mainly relies on Run-time checking strategy and to a limited extent on wrappers (Annota-
tions), to provide memory and type safety guarantees. SAL/EspX [31], on the other hand, uses a
pure Annotation strategy. A detailed description of the strategies used by different tools is given
later in this chapter.
Strategy Examples
Restrict Vault, Cyclone, Control-C
Run-time Checking CCured , Xu et al
Annotate Vault, CCured, Cyclone, SAL/EspX
Table 2.2: Examples that use various strategies for memory safety
2.3 SAFECode Strategy
In the context of providing safety to legacy code, we believe that the Annotation strategy though
attractive, is perhaps the hardest to adopt for programmers. There have been some successful
attempts at adding annotations to a general purpose language (e.g, SAL/EspX [31]), but in general,
it has been difficult to popularize the annotation schemes among programmers.
In this thesis, we focus on the other two strategies and extend the state of the art in both. We
propose three solutions to the problem:
1. SAFECode with minimal language restrictions to enable static checking (we call this as SAFE-
Code for embedded systems)
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2. SAFECode with memory safety guarantees but without complete error detection
3. SAFECode with memory safety guarantees and complete error detection
Each of these solutions and their properties, advantages, and limitations are discussed below.
SAFECode for embedded systems: This solution extends the state of the art in minimizing
the restrictions that are necessary to support large number of programs. The main advantage of
this solution is that on programs that satisfy the restrictions, it does not impose any performance
overhead. The restrictions in this work have been carefully chosen so that most existing applications
in the embedded world already follow them or can be easily modified to do so. This solution is
discussed in detail in Chapter 8.
SAFECode with memory safety and sound analysis guarantees but without complete error detec-
tion: This solution explores the possibility where SAFECode provides useful but lesser guarantees
than a completely safe language and with very low overhead. The only errors that this solution
does not detect are the dangling pointer errors. However, this solution handles these errors in
such a way that the call graph information, alias analysis information, and the type information
are never invalidated at run-time. In practice, these guarantees are extremely difficult to achieve
for arbitrary C programs. We impose the restriction that referencing pointers to manufactured
addresses is disallowed. This solution, its advantages, and limitations are discussed in Chapters 4
and 5.
SAFECode with memory safety and sound analysis guarantees with complete error detection:
This solution provides a complete safety guarantee with complete error detection. The only differ-
ence with the solution above is that it also detects dangling pointer errors, which is discussed in
Chapter 7. However, as shown in Chapter 7, this strategy might incur prohibitively high overhead
in some cases.
2.3.1 SAFECode Usage
Each of the solutions above can be thought of as a different mode in which SAFECode can be used.
All the three modes provide the necessary memory safety guarantees without compromising on the
backwards-compatibility (no annotations or wrappers are needed). The first mode (SAFECode
for embedded systems) is useful in cases where any performance overhead is intolerable and the
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restrictions are not too onerous as in the case of embedded systems. The other two modes are
used for general purpose software where language restrictions are not acceptable. We envisage the
use of the third mode during development, debugging, testing, and even during deployment if the
overheads are low enough for production use. If the overheads are high, we can always fall back on
the second mode that does not detect dangling pointer errors but still provides useful guarantees.
2.3.2 Security Guarantees
SAFECode (in all the three modes) provides a memory safety guarantee. This means that SAFE-
Code provides “control-flow” integrity and thus has the following important security properties:
• No security attack can subvert the control flow of a program and execute arbitrary injected
code. This prevents many attacks that rely on executing injected code including common
buffer-overflow attacks and heap corruption attacks.
• Attacks that rely on library being loaded at certain program points (“return-to-libc” at-
tacks [68]) are not possible.
• The security provided by SAFECode is stronger than that provided by no execute bit (NX) in
modern architectures like AMD[28] since the NX bit does not capture return-to-libc attacks.
• The security provided by SAFECode is stronger than that provided by techniques that focus
on non-corruption of return address [14, 15].
• Finally, since SAFECode ensures that programs do not deviate from their call-graph, it guards
against many attacks that focus on function pointer corruption.
However, in the first two modes above, SAFECode does not detect dangling pointer errors. In
these two modes, SAFECode may not be able to detect attacks that are based on corrupting data
but not control-flow (called non-control data attacks [11]). As explained later in Chapter 4.3.3, we
believe that with SAFECode these errors become much harder to exploit. Nevertheless, there may
be some situations, especially server applications, where this guarantee is not enough. we expect
SAFECode in the third mode to be used for server applications and guard against such attacks.
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2.4 Related Work
In this section, we contrast several related systems that aim to provide total or partial memory
safety with SAFECode approach. The focus here is more on evaluating the effectiveness of these
systems in realizing our objectives of providing both a memory safety guarantee and a platform for
sound high level static analysis. A detailed description of some of the technical differences between
SAFECode and these systems is given in the later chapters.
A number of approaches have been proposed in literature to provide memory or type safety
to programs written in weakly typed languages. We discuss each of them below including the
strategy that they have used to provide the guarantee (Restrict, Run-time Check, or Annotate).
We group them into two main categories: techniques that use language restrictions or annotations
and techniques that use Run-time checking. We then also contrast the SAFECode work with other
approaches that focus on detecting certain class of memory errors but do not provide any safety
guarantees.
We use the following criteria for comparing these approaches with SAFECode:
• How much effort is required for porting existing programs to these approaches?
• How do the run-time overheads of these approaches compare with SAFECode?
• Can they detect all (or most) memory errors?
• Do they guarantee memory safety?
• Can they be used to support sound high level static analysis?
• Do they retain C memory model of explicit memory deallocation?
In Table 2.3, we compare SAFECode in some detail with three other systems representing three
different points in the spectrum of safety guarantees using the above criteria. These comparisons
will be explained in detail in the following sections.
2.4.1 Language Restrictions and Annotations for Type Safety
One way to achieve type safety (and in turn memory safety) for weakly typed languages is by
imposing language restrictions or adding new language mechanisms (or typically both), which will
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then enable simple type checkers to statically (or almost statically) check for safety. While this
approach provides a better error detection capability than SAFECode, a major disadvantage of this
approach is that it can require a significant porting effort to make the existing systems, written in
weakly typed languages, satisfy the much stricter language rules. Because of this, these approaches
have enjoyed limited success and only in restricted domains. However, with the stronger type safety
guarantee, these systems can easily realize our goal of providing a platform for other sound static
analysis to be reliably applied to programs written in these languages. We compare SAFECode
with few such systems in detail this section.
Cyclone: Cyclone [29] uses a region-based type system to enforce strict type safety, and con-
sequently memory safety, for a subset of C programs. We compare Cyclone with SAFECode in
Table 2.3. Unlike SAFECode, Cyclone disallows non-type-safe memory accesses. Cyclone and other
region-based languages [8, 27, 9, 12]) have two disadvantages relative to our work: (a) they can
require significant programmer annotations to identify regions; and (b) they provide no mechanism
to free or reuse memory within a region. This means that data structures that shrink and grow
(with non-nested object life times) must be put into a separate garbage-collected heap or may
incur a potentially large increase in memory consumption (e.g., Cyclone and RT Java both include
a separate garbage collected heap). Automatic region inference [61, 29] can eliminate or mitigate
the first but not the second, and has only been successful for type-safe languages without explicit
deallocation. In contrast, we permit explicit deallocation of individual data items and thus retain
the C memory model for deallocation. Also, Cyclone requires bounds checks for most array accesses
and has reported overheads up to 3x.
Linear and alias type based systems [16, 67, 19]: Linear and alias types have been used to
statically prove memory safety in the presence of explicit deallocation of objects. They achieve this
primarily with severe restrictions on aliases in a program, which so far have not proved practical
for realistic programs. The approach also requires significant type annotations to be inserted. In
contrast, we require no annotations, permit nearly arbitrary pointer usage, and yet achieve memory
safety for a broad range of applications. One of these languages, Vault [19], also uses such a type
system (much more successfully) to encode many important correctness requirements for other
dynamic resources within an application (e.g., file handles and sockets). It would be very attractive
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to use Vault’s mechanisms within our system to statically check key correctness requirements of
other resources besides memory.
Control-C: In our earlier work [40], we adopted a drastic approach of restricting all casts
between incompatible types, allowing only those array accesses which can be statically ascertained
to be safe, and using a simplified region based annotation system (where only one region is live
at any time) for dynamic memory usage to guarantee type safety. While this restricted language
proved sufficient in the domain of real-time control systems, it is not suitable for more general
programs. The SAFECode for embedded systems approach (discussed in Chapter 8) is an extension
of control-C that allows more general heap allocations and deallocations and is suitable for more
general embedded applications..
Annotations for buffer overflow checking: SAL/EspX [31] uses programmer written an-
notations coupled with powerful automatic inference to statically check for buffer overflows in large
code bases. This approach incurs no run-time performance overhead and eliminates large number
of buffer overflow errors. If the programmers are willing to write these annotations, this approach is
a very attractive option. However, we believe that many existing software may never be rewritten
to take advantage of this strategy.
2.4.2 Systems that use Run-time Check Strategy
Software Fault Isolation: The weakest safety guarantees are provided by runtime sandboxing
techniques such as Software Fault Isolation (SFI) [66], which only aim to prevent a software mod-
ule from writing to memory outside its data space (and optionally prevent it from reading such
memory). SFI works directly on object code, making it simpler to implement than compiler-based
systems, language-independent, and relatively easy to use (it does not require program changes).
SFI does not achieve two of the three goals of SAFECode described in Chapter 1: it does not
attempt to detect programming errors directly, and it provides very weak guarantees that can not
be used by other static analysis tools. SFI also introduces substantially higher runtime overhead
than SAFECode, 25% to 59% when checking writes only and typically over 100% when checking
reads and writes, despite providing weaker guarantees.
Other systems including Patil et al [55], CCured [13], Xu et al [71] have the goal of strong type
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safety and thus can satisfy our serve as a sound platform for other high level analysis. The reported
overheads are 2x-6x for Patil et al [55], and their work is not usable for production level systems.
Xu et al: Xu et al [71] describe an extension of Patil Fischer, which with other optimizations,
can greatly reduce the run-time overhead. But the average reported overheads (up to 133%) are
much higher than SAFECode. Moreover, they currently reject programs that have casts between
pointers of different types. Adding support for such casts could worsen their run-time overheads.
In contrast, SAFECode supports casts between arbitrary types. However, the main advantage with
their system is that they can detect dangling pointer errors without the use of garbage collection.
SAFECode cannot detect dangling pointer errors in the normal mode of operation.
CCured: The CCured [13, 53] system comes closest to our goals of providing memory safety and
partial type safety for C programs, and of using static analysis to reduce the overheads of runtime
checking. The major advantage of CCured is that it provides nearly complete type safety, the main
exception being loads and stores via pointers to memory whose types cannot be statically inferred
(wild pointers). This guarantee is stronger than what SAFECode provides. This benefit comes
at some cost, and CCured has three disadvantages relative to SAFECode. First, CCured requires
a conservative garbage collector, which may not always be preferred by users. Second, CCured
introduces significant metadata for runtime checks, including tag bits and bounds information
associated with wild pointers, bounds information for seq and fseq pointers, and argument
counts for function pointers. This metadata is the primary cause of the porting effort required for
using CCured on C programs, in particular, requiring wrappers around some library functions. In
contrast, SAFECode uses no metadata on individual pointer values as explained in Chapter 4, and
essentially works “out-of-the-box” on existing C programs. Third, CCured has higher run-time
overhead than SAFECode in some cases as reported in Chapter 4.8.
2.4.3 Error Checking with no Memory Safety Guarantee
A number of approaches have been proposed for error checking in weakly typed languages. Some
rely entirely on static analysis for error detection, while several others use a combination of run-
time checks and static analysis. In either case, the main goal of these approaches is to help detect
errors. They do not provide any safety guarantees. Without the guarantees, these systems can not
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Criterion SAFECode CCured SFI Cyclone
Goals






















Support for sound Yes Yes No Yes
static analysis
Language restrictions
Porting effort? Negligible Minor None Significant
Require type-safe code
as input?
No No No Yes
Allow stack addresses
stored into heap?
Allowed Disallowed Yes Disallowed






compatibility? Easier More difficult More diffi-
cult
Easier




Yes Yes No Yes
Prevent uses of uninitial-
ized variables?
Yes Yes No Yes
Prevent dangling pointer
references?




No Avoid via region
type system and
GC
Static Checking and Run-time overheads
Meta-data for pointers? No Yes No No
Meta-data for arrays? No Yes No Yes
Eliminate GC? Yes No Yes Yes
Static array bounds
checks?
Many No No Few
Eliminate null pointer
checks?
Yes No No No
Table 2.3: Comparison of SAFECode against CCured, SFI, and Cyclone. Less desirable features
are highlighted in italics.
(and do not) serve as a sound basis for other high level static analysis techniques.
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Error Detection via Static Analysis
Here we discuss systems focusing on error detection via static checking alone. Since complete static
error detection (without a high false positive rate) is not possible for general programs, some of these
systems [69, 65, 25] focus on one particular aspect of memory errors, namely, bounds checking for
arrays. Because of this, they do not guarantee memory safety. In contrast, SAFECode guarantees
memory safety not only for array accesses but also for all memory accesses. Other systems like
Metal [32], ESP [18], etc aim to detect protocol errors in programs. Some of the safety problems
can be encoded as simple protocols like uninitialized pointers problem, dangling pointers to freed
memory problem, etc, and hence can be checked for correctness using these tools. However, both
these tools can give a lot of false positives (and in the case of Metal can also miss a few errors).
SAFECode, in contrast, provides a memory safety guarantee and a sound frame work for performing
other high level static analysis. Also, when analyzing code for other high level protocol errors, these
systems assume memory safe semantics for C.
Error detection via static analysis and run-time checks
There have been large number of systems for detecting memory access errors by adding run time
checks and meta-data [33, 58, 4, 37, 50, 72] (the work by Loginov at el. also detects type errors [50]).
Again, the main focus of this work has been to check errors in systems or aid in debugging (or
both). These systems can generate some false negatives (i.e., undetected memory referencing errors)
and do not provide any safety guarantees. Furthermore, the reported run-time overheads in these
systems are too high for production use. For example, reported slowdowns are up to 5x for SafeC [4]
and 5-6x for Jones and Kelly [37]. Widely used tools like purify and valgrind have similarly large
overheads. While Yong et al [72] report overheads (43%) that are an order of magnitude better
than others, their overheads are less because they check only writes to memory but not reads. If





3.1 Memory errors in C : Terminology
Using terminology from SafeC [4], memory errors in C programs can be classifieds into two different
types: (1) Spatial memory errors and (2) Temporal memory errors
Spatial memory errors in C programs include array bounds violations (i.e., buffer overrun) errors,
uninitialized pointer dereferences (causing an access to an invalid address), invalid type conversion
errors, format string errors, etc. Temporal memory errors include uses of pointers to freed heap
memory and uses of pointers to an activation record after the function invocation completes.
The basic strategy of the SAFECode system is to use compile-time pointer analysis as a founda-
tion for static safety checks (for both temporal and spatial errors) and if necessary, for supplementing
static checking with runtime checks. In the rest of this chapter, we give the necessary background
for understanding the input program representation, pointer analysis and its representation, and
the Automatic Pool Allocation transformation [43, 42] used in the thesis.
3.2 Program Representation
Although our implementation of SAFECode supports all of C, we use a subset of C as the source
language in this thesis to simplify the presentation. This language, shown in Figure 3.1, includes
most sources of potential memory errors in weakly typed languages including:
(P1) dangling pointers to freed heap memory,





Pointer Type pt := τ∗
Function Type ft := τ −→ τ
Structure Type st := struct { Fld1 : τi, ..., Fldn : τn }
Types τ := int | char | pt | st | ft
declarations decl := |τ x; decl
Statements S :=  | S S | x = E; | store E, E; | storec E, E;
| free(E); | if (E) then { S } else { S }
| while (E) { S }
Functions F := τ ′f(x : τ) { decl ; S }
Expressions E := x | E op E | cast E to τ
| load E | loadc E | malloc(E) | &E[E]
| &(x->Fldi) | &f | alloca(E)
op ∈ {+,−, ∗, /,%,&&, ||, ,ˆ <<,>>}
Definitions d := F | struct x {Fldi:τ1, ..., Fldn:τn }
GlobalDecl gd := τ ∗ ρ x =galloc(E, E)
Programs p := d p|gd p|
Figure 3.1: C like Language
(P3) accesses via uninitialized pointers, and
(P4) arbitrary cast from an int type to another pointer type and subsequent use.
We only include 4-byte and 1-byte integer types (int and char) as primitive data types and use
distinct load and store operations for these types (load E for loading ints and loadc E for loading
chars). The cast, malloc, and free operations are similar to those in C. We use a new operation
called alloca (with arguments similar to malloc) to allocate memory on the stack. Also, global
variables can only be pointers pointing to global memory that is allocated and initialized using a
new operation called galloc, which takes a size parameter and an initializer; this essentially is how
globals in a C program operate. These two features make it unnecessary to apply the & operator
to get the address of a stack variable or global object; & is only used for indexing into structures,
arrays and for function pointers.
We will use a running example, shown in Figure 3.3 (a), to illustrate the steps of our approach.
3.3 Pointer Analysis




new PointerType pt := τ ∗ ρ|τ ∗ (ρ, n)
Function Sets fs := f , fs |
FuncPtrType fpt := ft * fs
new StructType st := stprev |∀ρ.st |τ<ρ>
new Type τ := int | pt | st | ft | fpt | Unknown
new Expressions E := Eprev|&(x->Fldi) |&f
new Statements S := Sprev | associate(ρ, τ)
new Definitions d := dprev | FSET fs = f , fs
Figure 3.2: Syntactic extensions for representing pointer analysis results. stprev, Eprev, Sprev and
dprev are same as st, E, S and d in Figure 3.1.
Intuitively, pointer analysis representation can be thought of as a storage-shape graph [59, 36]
(also referred to as a points-to graph), where each node represents a set of dynamic memory objects
(a “points-to set”) and distinct nodes represent disjoint sets of objects. Pointers pointing to two
different nodes in the graph are not aliased. We assume there is one points-to graph per function,
since this allows either context-sensitive or insensitive analyses. Figure 3.3 (b) shows the points-
to graph for the running example. We do not concern ourselves with how these analysis results
are actually computed; we only assume that they are given in the format described here. In our
implementation, we use the Data Structure Analysis (DSA) [44] to compute the pointer analysis
results.
We assume that the pointer analysis is encoded as type attributes within the program in a type
system analogous to Steensgaard’s [59]. Each points-to graph node is encoded as a distinct type
(although we continue to refer to nodes below). The input to our approach is a program in this
language shown in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.4 shows the running example in our input language. Each
pointer in this language has an extra attribute, ρ, which intuitively corresponds to the node it
points to in the points-to graph. For example, in Figure 3.4, the type of y is int*r2, denoting that
it points to objects of node r2 in the points-to graph. The statement associate(ρ, τ) associates
node ρ of the graph with type τ , denoting that the node ρ contains objects of type τ . If τ is a
pointer type, say, τ ′ ∗ρ′, then associate(ρ, τ ′ ∗ρ′) directly encodes a “points-to” edge from node
ρ to node ρ′. These associate statements are typically listed at the beginning of each function.
Note that there can be only a single target node for each variable (or field of pointer type), which
restricts the input to a unification-based pointer analysis. We discuss the function pointer and
struct representation, later in chapter 4.4.
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int **x, *y, *z, ***w, u;
x = (int **) malloc(4);
y = (int *)malloc(4);
z = (int *) malloc(4);
...
store y, x // equivalent of *x = y
store 5 ,y
free(z) ; // creates a dangling pointer
store 10, z;
...
u = load z; // equivalent of u = *z;
...









Figure 3.3: (a) Running example (b) its points-to graph
Memory that is used in a type-inconsistent manner, e.g., due to unions or casts in C, must
be assigned type Unknown (this is verified by our type checker). Unknown is interpreted as an
array of chars. In the running example, the target of z (node r3) has type Unknown because this
memory is accessed both as an int and an int**. Distinct array elements due to Unknown or an
actual array are not tracked separately.
In the absence of frees and other memory errors, we can check that this program encodes the
correct aliasing information by using typing rules similar to Steensgaard’s. We do not give those
rules here as our approach described in chapter 4.2 is stronger and subsumes this checking; we not
only check that the static aliasing is correct but we also enforce it in the presence of memory errors.
3.4 Background on Automatic Pool Allocation
Given a program containing explicit malloc and free operations and a points-to graph for the
program in the representation above, Automatic Pool Allocation transforms the program to segre-
gate data into distinct pools on the heap [46]. By default, pool allocation creates a distinct pool
for each points-to graph node representing heap objects in the program; this choice is necessary for
the current work as explained later. Pools are represented in the code by pool descriptor variables.
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associate(r1, int * r2);
associate(r2, int);
associate(r3, Unknown);
int *r2 *r1 x;
int *r2 y;





store y, x; store 5, y;
free(z); // dangling pointer still exists
store 10, z ;
...
u = load z ;
...
w = cast z to (int *r2*r1*r3);
store x, w ;
Figure 3.4: Running example with pointer analysis results encoded within the program
For a points-to graph node with τ 6= Unknown, the pool created will only hold objects of type τ
(or arrays thereof), i.e., the pools will be type homogeneous with a known type. We refer to these
as TK (stands for type known) pools and all others as TU (stands for type unknown) pools. Calls
to malloc and free are rewritten to call new functions poolalloc and poolfree, passing in the
appropriate pool descriptor.
In order to minimize the lifetime of pool instances at run-time, pool allocation examines each
function and identifies points-to graph nodes whose lifetime is contained within the function, i.e.,
the objects are not reachable via pointers after the function returns. This is a simple escape
analysis on the points-to graph. The pool descriptor for such a node is created on function entry
and destroyed on function exit so that a new pool instance is created every time the function is
called. For other nodes, the pool descriptor must outlive the current function so pool allocation
adds new arguments to the function to pass in the pool descriptor from the caller.
We explain the pool allocation transformation with the help of a simple example shown in Fig-
ure 3.5. In this example, function f calls g, which first creates a linked list of 10 nodes, initializes
them, and then calls h to do some computation. g then frees all of the nodes except the head and




struct s *p = 0; %%
// p is local %%
g(p); %%




g(struct s *p) { %%










poolinit(&PP, sizeof(struct s)); %%
g(p, PP); %%





g(struct s *p, Pool *PP) { %%






Figure 3.6: Example after Automatic Pool Allocation transformation
tries to access the second node in the list, which has been freed. Figure 3.6 shows the example
after the Pool Allocation transformation. The transformation first identifies points-to graph nodes
that do not “escape” a function using a traditional escape analysis (reachability analysis from
function arguments, globals and return values) and creates pools for those nodes at the function
entry and destroys them at the function exit. In the example, the data structure pointed to by
p never escapes the function f(), so the transformation inserts code to create a pool PP within
f using poolinit and destroys at the function exit using pooldestroy. For a function where
the pool “escapes” (e.g, function g in the example) the transformation automatically modifies the
function to take in extra pool descriptor arguments (see function g in Figure 3.6). Pool alloca-
tion then ensures that all allocations and deallocations for the data structure happen out of the
corresponding pool – it converts malloc and free calls to use poolalloc and poolfree with the
appropriate pool descriptors in the program. This is illustrated by the change of malloc call in
function g to poolalloc. Similarly malloc calls in create 10 Node list() and free calls in
free all but head (not shown here) are also changed appropriately to use the corresponding pool
calls. Finally all function invocations are modified to pass in the extra pool descriptor arguments
(see invocations of g(), create 10 Node list(), free all but head() in Figure 3.6 ).
The Automatic Pool Allocation transformation by itself does not ensure program safety. Explicit
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deallocation via poolfree can return freed memory to its pool and then back to the system, which
can then allocate it to a different pool. Use of dangling pointers to the freed memory could allow
data of arbitrary types to be accessed and violate memory safety.
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Chapter 4
SAFECode: Sound Analysis and
Memory Safety
Alias information, type information, and call graphs are the fundamental building blocks for many
kinds of static analysis tools, including model checkers and error checking tools. For programs
written in weakly typed languages, however, these fundamental building blocks may not be valid
if the program performs any illegal memory operations such as array bound violations, dangling
pointer dereferences, and references using uninitialized pointers, because these unsafe operations
can overwrite memory locations in ways not predicted by the compiler. This means that even tools
that aim to provide sound results with no false negatives [34, 18] cannot guarantee that they do so.
In fact, software validation tools usually assume that such memory corruption cannot occur, e.g.
they assume malloc always returns fresh memory (so dangling pointer references cannot occur) and
that memory allocations are logically infinitely apart (so a buffer overflow cannot trample any other
allocation). This problem is potentially important because many software validation tools today
are used to detect security vulnerabilities or identify logical errors in important system software.
In this chapter, we describe a novel, automatic approach an ordinary compiler can use to ensure
three key analysis results — namely, a points-to graph, a call graph, and available type information
— are sound, i.e., will not be invalidated by any possible memory errors, even undetected errors
such as dangling pointer dereferences. We then later discuss how this also enforces memory safety.
The inputs to our approach are:
1. A program written in C;
2. The results of a flow-insensitive, field-sensitive, and unification-based pointer analysis on that
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program. This includes both points-to information and type information for a subset of
memory objects. The analysis may use various forms of context-sensitivity.
3. A call graph computed for the program.
Our goal is to enforce the correctness of these analyses for all executions of the program. We do
not concern ourselves with how these analysis results are actually computed; we only assume that
they are given in the format described earlier in Chapter 3.3.
4.1 Insights
We first give an informal overview of the our approach, focusing on four key insights we exploit in
this work.
The goal of our work is to ensure that memory errors (e.g., dangling pointer references after a
free, array bounds violations, etc.) do not invalidate the points-to information, call graph, or type
information computed by the compiler. The major challenge is enforcing points-to information;
type information follows directly from this. The call graph is simply checked explicitly at each
indirect call site (see section 4.4 for a discussion on eliminating some of the run-time checks at
indirect call sites).
Note that a node in a points-to graph (or the storage shape graph) is just a static representation
of a set of dynamic memory objects. If these memory objects are scattered about in memory (as is
usually the case), it is prohibitively expensive to check that a pointer actually points to a memory
object corresponding to its target node (i.e., the pointer has not been corrupted by some memory
error). As noted earlier, however, our transformation called Automatic Pool Allocation partitions
the heap into regions based on a points-to graph [46]. This leads us to the following new insight
that is the key to the current work:
[Insight1]: If memory objects corresponding to each node in the points-to graph are located in
a (compact) region of the heap, we could check efficiently at run-time that the target of a pointer
is a valid member of the compile-time points-to set for that pointer, i.e., that alias analysis is not
invalidated.
Note that this insight relies on the property that unaliasable memory objects are not allocated
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within the same region, which is not usually guaranteed by previous region-based systems [63, 29].
Non-heap (i.e., global and stack) objects may be in the same or different points-to sets as heap
objects. We can simply include such objects in the set of address ranges for the appropriate pool
(but many stack objects can be handled more efficiently as described in Section 4.4). Overall, the
operation poolcheck(ph, A, o) verifies that the address, A, is contained within the set of memory
ranges assigned to pool, ph, and has the correct alignment for the pool’s data type (or for the field
at offset o if o 6= 0).
Even with the above partitioning of memory, checking every pointer dereference (or every pointer
definition) would be prohibitively expensive. The second insight allows us to eliminate a large
number of the run-time checks:
[Insight2]: Any initialized pointer read from an object in a TK region or from an allocation
site, will hold a valid address for its target region. All other pointers, i.e., pointers derived from
indexing operations, and pointers read from TU regions (including function pointers), need run-time
checks before being used.
Intuitively, in the absence of dangling pointer errors and array indexing errors, an initialized
pointer obtained from a TK region will always be valid; it cannot have been corrupted in an
unpredictable way e.g. via arbitrary casts and subsequent stores (it would then be obtained from
a TU region).
Uninitialized pointers and array indexing errors are addressable via run-time checks. Dangling
pointer references, however, are difficult to detect in general programs, and we do not attempt to
detect or prevent such errors. Instead, we ensure that such errors do not invalidate the results of
alias analysis by using the following insight:
[Insight3]: In a TK (type-homogeneous) region, if a memory block holding one or more objects
were freed and then reallocated to another request in the same region with the same alignment, then
dereferencing dangling pointers to the previous freed object cannot cause either a type violation or
an aliasing violation.
Essentially, we make sure that, if a dangling pointer to freed memory points into a newly
allocated object, the old and new objects have the same static type and that any pointers they
contain have identical aliasing properties. Thus loads or stores using the dangling pointers may
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give unexpected results but cannot trample memory outside the expected pool.
This principle allows free memory to be reused within the same region unlike other region-based
languages, which either disallow such reuse [63] or allow it only in restricted cases [35, 62]. For
reuse across regions Automatic Pool Allocation already provides us a solution:
[Insight4]: We can safely release the memory of a region when there are no reachable pointers
into that region.
This gives us a way to release memory to the system. Since Automatic Pool Allocation already
binds the life times of regions (using escape analysis), we can arrange for memory to be released at
the end of a region’s life time.
Finally, in order to prove the correctness of our approach, we formalize the key properties of
our regions by extending the previous type system encoding points-to information (described in
Chapter 3.3) in two ways: (1) to encode regions corresponding to points-to sets, with allocation and
deallocation out of these regions; and (2) to encode information about region lifetimes. The type
system is designed to be mostly statically checkable for the correctness of encoded types (i.e. the
points-to relations, lifetimes, and the call graph). We borrow a key idea from Tofte and Talpin’s
work on regions for ML [63] to simplify the type system, namely, we restrict region lifetimes to be
lexically scoped (others have shown that this is not strictly necessary [3, 29]).
4.2 SAFECode Type System
We now give a formal description of the SAFECode type system.
4.2.1 Syntax
Figure 4.1 gives the syntax of the language in our type system. This syntax, which forms the input
to our type checker, includes new constructs for encoding region handles, region lifetimes, region
allocation and deallocation, and separate versions of load/store that require run-time checks.
The associate statement of Figure 3.1 is now transformed to the poolinit statement along with
a lexical scope indicating where the association is valid, essentially creating a lifetime for the
corresponding region. For example, statement poolinit(ρ, τ) xρ{ S }, creates a region named ρ




Types τ ::= int | char | Unknown
| τ ∗ ρ | handle(ρ, τ)
Statements S ::=  | S; S | x = E | store E, E
| storeToU x, E, E | storec E, E
| storecToU E, E | poolfree(E, E)
| poolinit(ρ, τ) x { S }
| pool{S}pop(ρ)
Expressions E ::= var | V | E op E | load E
| loadFromU x, E | loadc E
| loadcFromU E | cast E to τ
| poolalloc (x, E) | (x,&E[E])
| castint2pointer x,E to τ
Value V ::= Uninit | Int | region(ρ)
Figure 4.1: Our syntax
make it illegal to store an object of type other than τ in this region. The type of the region handle
xρ is handle(ρ, τ). Notice that regions in our system are nested and a region can only contain
objects of one type although this type may have to be Unknown for some regions. The lexical
scoping, along with region attributes for pointers, allow the type checker to ensure that an object
in a region cannot be accessed outside the lifetime of the region. Although this seems to disallow
cycles in points-to graph, extensions for handling them are straightforward and discussed later in
section 4.4.
Calls to malloc and free in the input program are replaced by calls to poolalloc and poolfree.
poolalloc takes in a handle to the region as an argument and allocates an object (or an array of
objects) out of the region. The type of an allocated object (or array element) is the type associated
with the region. The poolfree statement frees a memory object and releases the memory back to
the region. Uninit essentially represents the NULL value in C. The castint2ptr, loadFromU,
storeToU are versions of cast, load, store that require various run-time checks. Other than
uninitialized pointer checks, the only operations that require a run-time check are those that take
in a pool handle as an argument.
Everything else in the syntax including pool{(S)}pop(ρ) , region(ρ) are not part of the source
language but needed for operational semantics and are described in section 4.2.3.
The Figure 4.2 shows the running example (Figure 3.4) in this new syntax. The storeToU and
loadFromU operations are versions of store and load that need run-time checks. The associate
is now replaced by poolinit, binding the lifetime of the pools.
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int *r2 *r1 x;
int u, *r2 y
int *r3 z;
int *r2*r1*r3 w;
poolinit(r2, int) r2handle {
poolinit(r1, int *r2) r1handle {
poolinit(r3, Unknown) r3handle {
x = poolalloc(r1handle, 1);
y = poolalloc(r2handle, 1);
z = poolalloc(r3handle, 1);
store y, x; store 5, y;
poolfree(r3handle,z); //dangling pointer exists
storeToU r3handle, 10, z ;
...
u = loadFromU r3handle, z ;
...
w = cast z to (int *r2*r1*r3);





Figure 4.2: Running example in our type system
We use Automatic Pool Allocation transformation to take an input program including the
pointer analysis annotations described in chapter 3.3 and produce a program with region types and
region allocation.
4.2.2 Typing Rules
The type system is expressed by the following three judgments: C ` e : τ (for expression typing),
C ` S (for statement typing), and C ` τ (for type typing).
In these judgments C, the typing context, is a pair of typing environments (Γ;∆) where Γ is a
map between variable names and their types (built up using the variable declarations) and ∆ is a
map between region names and the type of objects stored in the region (built up using poolinits).
We present the typing rules for our language in Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5.
While many of the type rules are similar to those of C, some type rules are unique to our
approach and require further explanation. (SS4) and (SS14) type loads/stores using pointers to
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(SS0)
C ` τ Γ(x) = τ
C(= Γ,∆) ` x : τ
(SS1)
C ` n : int
(SS2)
C ` e1 : int C ` e2 : int
C ` e1 op e2 : int
(SS3)
C ` τ
C ` Uninit : τ τ 6=handle(ρ
′, τ ′)
(SS4)
C ` e : τ ∗ ρ C ` ρ : τ τ 6∈ {Unknown, char}
C ` load e : τ
(SS4char)
C ` e : char ∗ ρ C ` ρ : char
C ` loadc e : char
(SS5)
C ` e : τ ∗ ρ C ` ρ : Unknown
C ` x :handle(ρ, Unknown)
C ` loadFromU x, e : int
(SS5char)
C ` e2 : τ ∗ ρ C ` ρ : Unknown
C ` x :handle(ρ, Unknown)
C ` loadcFromU x, e2 : char
(SS6)
C ` ρ : τ C ` x :handle(ρ, τ) C ` e : int
C ` poolalloc(x, e) : τ ∗ ρ
(SS7)
C ` ρ : τ C ` x :handle(ρ, τ) C ` e : int
C ` castint2ptr x, e to τ ∗ ρ : τ ∗ ρ
(SS8)
C ` τ ′ C ` e : τ ∗ ρ
C ` cast e to τ ′ ∗ ρ : τ ′ ∗ ρ
(SS9)
C ` ρ : τ C ` x :handle(ρ, τ)
C ` e2 : τ ∗ ρ C ` e3 : int
C ` x,&e2[e3] : τ ∗ ρ
(SS10)
C ` e : τ
C ` cast e to int : int τ 6=handle(ρ, τ
′)





C ` s1 C ` s2
C ` s1; s2
(SS13)
C ` x : τ C ` e : τ
C ` x = e
(SS14)
C ` ρ : τ C ` e1 : τ ∗ ρ
C ` e2 : τ τ 6∈ {Unknown, char}
C `store e2, e1
(SS14char)
C ` ρ : char C ` e1 : ρ ∗ char C ` e2 : char
C `storec e2, e1
(SS15)
C ` ρ : Unknown C ` e1 : τ ∗ ρ
C ` e2 : τ C ` x :handle(ρ, Unknown)
C `storeToU x, e2, e1
(SS15char)
C ` ρ : Unknown C ` e1 : τ ∗ ρ
C ` e2 : char C ` x :handle(ρ, Unknown)
C `storecToU x, e2, e1
(SS16)
C ` ρ : τ C ` x :handle(ρ, τ) C ` e2 : τ ∗ ρ
C `poolfree(x, e2)
(SS17)
C ` τ Γ[x 7→handle(ρ, τ)],∆[ρ 7→ τ ] ` s
x 6∈ Γ and ρ 6∈ ∆
C(= Γ,∆) `poolinit(ρ, τ)x{s}
Figure 4.4: Statement typing judgments
type consistent memory (TK pools). They check that the type of the objects in the pool matches
the type of the pointer operand. (SS5) is for loads using pointers to untyped Unknownmemory (TU
pools); note that we get back an int. (SS7) allows a cast from int to pointer type. As discussed later
in the operational semantics, such a cast requires a run-time check to make sure that the pointer
is of the right type in the right pool. This coupled with (SS5) above enables loading pointers from
TU pools safely. (SS15) types stores to Unknown memory. (SS8) types a cast from a pointer to
a region to another pointer pointing to the same region. This helps in supporting arbitrary casts
of pointer types as long as they have the same region attribute, without requiring run-time check;
note that (SS4) and (SS14) require that a pointer be cast back to the type of objects in the region
before use. (SS17) is for creating a region using poolinit; we add the region variable and the handle
to the typing context before checking the body of the poolinit. (SS6) gives a type for the memory
objects allocated in a pool. (SS16) frees objects only when they belong to the appropriate pool.
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(SS18)
C ` int, char (SS19) C ` Unknown
(SS20)
∆(ρ) = τ
C ` ρ : τ (SS21)
` ρ : τ
C ` τ ∗ ρ
(SS22)
∆(ρ) = Unknown
C(= Γ,∆) ` τ ∗ ρ (SS23)
C ` ρ : τ
C `handle(ρ, τ)
Figure 4.5: Well formed types
4.2.3 Operational Semantics
The operational semantics rules for our language provide a formal basis for reasoning about program
behavior even in the presence of problems P1-P4. They essentially describe the run-time checks
needed to enforce the correctness of alias analysis. The rules are listed in Figures 4.7, 4.8. and
4.9.
Figure 4.6 lists the environments necessary to describe the operational semantic rules. The
rules are described as a small-step operational semantics, −→expr for expressions and −→stmt for
statements. Each program state is represented by (VEnv, L, es) where VEnv is the variable
environment (partial map holding the values of variables), L is the partial map of live regions and
the corresponding store, and es is an expression or statement in the program. H, the system heap,
contains the memory addresses not in use by the program. H is a part of the program state but not
included in the notation for the sake of brevity. A program state (VEnv, L, es) becomes (VEnv’,
L’, es’) if any of the semantic rules allow for it. The expression in the box, if any, is a run-time
check that is executed before the corresponding rule. If the run-time check fails, then the program
state becomes specially designated Error state.
We assume that region(ρ) is the handle for a region named ρ. A region (see Figure 4.6) is
defined as a tuple { F ; RS }: F is a list of freed memory locations within the region, and RS (the
region store) is a partial map between memory addresses and their values.
Briefly, the four memory errors P1-P4 listed in Chapter 3.2 are solved as follows. P1 is solved
using the type homogeneity principle, as explained previously. This is implemented by rules R14,
R34, and the static typing rules that check operations on pointers to known-type pools. We detect
problem P2 using the run-time check on rule R40. To detect P3, we initialize all newly created
memory and all local variables to Uninit and check Uninit pointers via rules R6, R14, and R23.
Issue P4 is detected using R31.
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Below we describe in more detail the rules that are unique to our approach.
1. (R15,R17): Evaluating poolinit creates a new region, sets the free list to be empty, and
evaluates the body inside the syntactic construct pool{S}pop(ρ). This construct identifies
when the region needs to be deallocated, i.e., when the body (S) becomes empty. This is
performed by rule R17.
2. (R6): Performs a store via a type-consistent pointers, after checking that v1 is not Uninit.
update(L, v1, v2) just updates the memory location v1 with value v2. Loads via type consis-
tent memory have a similar check for uninitialized pointers.
3. (R10): Performs a store via a pointer to Unknown memory, after checking that the pointer
value legally allows storing of a 4-byte value (an int). Note that our proof below guarantees
that v ∈ Dom(L[ρ].RS), so at run-time it is enough to check for the open interval (v1, v1 + 3].
4. (R14): Frees an object from region, ρ, and adds it to the free list F of the same region.
5. (R34): Returns a previously freed location from the free list. Together with R14, this
implements the type homogeneity principle to make error P1 harmless.
6. (R35): For a poolalloc, when the free list is empty, this requests fresh memory from the
system. poolalloc aborts if it cannot allocate requisite memory.
7. (R31): A cast from int to another pointer type is always checked at run-time using a
poolcheck, i.e., we check that the value is a properly aligned address in the appropriate
pool for the pointer type, and if not, we abort. This detects problem P4.
8. (R40): For array indexing, we check that the resultant pointer after the arithmetic always
points to the same pool as the source pointer at the proper alignment. These checks are not
exact array bounds checks but a much coarser check for the pool bounds. This means some
array bound violations may go undetected.
The complete list of run-time checks in our system are the checks in the boxes in Figures 4.7,
4.8, and 4.9 along with checks on casts from integer to function pointers. Note that the poolcheck
operation described earlier in this section is exactly the same as check given in R31. None of the
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VarEnv VEnv : Var −→ Value
Region R ::= { F ; RS }
RegionStore RS : Int −→ Value
FreeList F ::= φ | aF
LiveRegions L := RegionVar −→ RS
SystemHeap H ⊆ Int32
Figure 4.6: Environments for operational semantics
run-time checks require any metadata on individual pointer variables (usually required for precise
array bounds checks) or runtime tag bits on any memory locations (usually required for RTTI or
to track legal pointer values). The only metadata we require at runtime is available in the pool
descriptor (handle), which is known at compile time.
4.2.4 Soundness Proof
The proof of soundness is composed of two “invariant preservation” theorems — one for expressions
and the other for statements of the program. Since we have not included control flow in our
formalization, all evaluations of expressions and statements terminate. A detailed proof of our
technique is included in the next Chapter 5. Here we just summarize the important invariants that
our approach maintains at each step of the operational semantics and state the soundness theorem
for statements.
First, for an environment (VEnv, L), we define ||τ ||(V Env,L) to be as follows:
||int||(V Env,L) := Int32
||τ ∗ ρ||(V Env,L) := {Uninit}∪ Dom(L[ρ].RS)
||handle(ρ, τ)||(V Env,L) := { region(ρ)}
||Unknown||(V Env,L) := Int8
||char||(V Env,L) := Int8
Intuitively, for a well-formed type τ , ||τ ||(V Env,L) represents the set of values that a variable (or
object) of that type can hold under that context and environment. For example, for a variable of
type τ ∗ ρ, the set of values it can hold is either Uninit or addresses of objects in region ρ, which
is Dom(L[ρ].RS)).
Let `env denote the judgment for a well formed environment. We defined an environment
(VEnv, L) to be well formed under a typing context C (denoted by C `env (VEnv, L)) if and only
if the following invariants hold.
34
R1
(VEnv, L, S1) −→stmt (VEnv’, L’, S1’)
(VEnv, L, S1 ; S2) −→stmt (VEnv’, L’, S1’ ; S2)
R2
(VEnv, L, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’)
(VEnv, L, x = E) −→stmt (VEnv’, L’, x = E’)
R3 (VEnv, L, x = v1) −→stmt (VEnv[x 7→ v1], L, )
R4
(VEnv, L, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’)
(VEnv, L, store/storec E, E2) −→stmt (VEnv’, L’, store E’, E2)
R5
(VEnv, L, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’)
(VEnv, L, store/storec v,E) −→stmt (VEnv’, L’, store v, E’)
R6 (VEnv, L, store/storec v2, v1) −→stmt (VEnv, update(L, v1, v2), ) (v1)! = Uninit
where
update(L, v1, v2) := L’ ∪ {(ρ, { R.F ;R.(RS[v1 7→ v2]) }) } if ∃ρ ∈ Dom(L) s.t. L = L’ ∪ {(ρ,R)}
and v1 ∈ Dom(R.RS)
L else
R7
(VEnv, L, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’)
(VEnv, L, storeToU/storecToU E, E2, E3) −→stmt (VEnv’, L’, storeToU/storecToU E’, E2, E3)
R8
(VEnv, L, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’)
(VEnv, L, storeToU/storecToU v1, E, E3) −→stmt (VEnv’, L’, storeToU/storecToU v1, E’, E3)
R9
(VEnv, L, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’)
(VEnv, L, storeToU/storecToU v1, v2, E) −→stmt (VEnv’, L’, storeToU/storecToU v1, v2, E’)
R10 (VEnv, L, storeToU region(ρ), v2, v1) −→stmt (VEnv, update(L, v1, v2, 4) }], )
(v1, v1 + 3] ∈ Dom(L[ρ].RS)
where
update(L, v1, v2, 4) := L’ ∪ {(ρ, { R.F ; R.(RS[v1 7→byte(v2, 3)]
[(v1+1) 7→byte(v2, 2)][(v1 + 3) 7→byte(v2, 1)][(v1 + 4) 7→byte(v2, 0)])
if ∃ρ ∈ Dom(L) s.t. L = L’ ∪ {(ρ,R)} and [v1, v1 + 3] ∈ Dom(R.RS)
L else
and byte(n, k) := (n << (8 * (3 - k))) >> 24 .
R11 (VEnv, L, storecToU region(ρ), v2, v1) −→stmt (VEnv, update(L, v1, v2) }], )
R12
(VEnv, L, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’)
(VEnv, L, poolfree(E, E2) −→stmt (VEnv’, L’, poolfree(E’, E2)
R13
(VEnv, L, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’)
(VEnv, L, poolfree(v, E) −→stmt (VEnv’, L’, poolfree(v, E’)
R14 (VEnv, L ∪ { (ρ, {F ;RS}) }, poolfree(region(ρ), v) ) −→stmt (VEnv, L ∪ { (ρ, {vF ;RS}) }, )
v! = Uninit
R15 (VEnv, L, poolinit(ρ,τ)x{ S }) −→stmt (VEnv ∪ {(x,region(ρ))}, L ∪ {(ρ, {φ;φ})}, pool{S}pop(ρ) )
if (ρ 6∈ Dom(L)).
R16
(VEnv, L, S) −→stmt (VEnv’, L’, S’)
(VEnv, L, pool{S}pop(ρ)) −→stmt (VEnv’, L’, pool{S′}pop(ρ))
R17 (VEnv ∪ {(x,region(ρ))} , L ∪ {(ρ,R)} , pool{}pop(ρ)) −→stmt (VEnv, L, )
Note that H the set of addresses in the system heap and not used by the program gets updated by H
∪ Dom(R.RS)
Figure 4.7: Operational semantic rules for statements
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R18 (VEnv ∪ {(x, v)}, L, x) −→expr (VEnv ∪ {(x, v)}, L, v)
R19
(VEnv, L, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’)
(VEnv, L, E op E2) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’ op E2)
R20
(VEnv, L, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’)
(VEnv, L, v op E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, v op E’)
R21 (VEnv, L, m op n ) −→expr (VEnv, L, m opInt n))
R22
(VEnv, L, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’)
(VEnv, L, load/loadc E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, load/loadc E’)
R23 (VEnv, L, load/loadc v1) −→expr (VEnv, L, getvalue(L, v1)) (v1)! = Uninit where
getvalue(L, v1) := L[ρ].RS[v1] if ∃ρ ∈ Dom(L) s.t. v1 ∈ L[ρ].Dom(RS)
Uninit else
R24
(VEnv, L, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’)
(VEnv, L, loadFromU/loadcFromU E, E2) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, loadFromU/loadcFromU E’, E2)
R25
(VEnv, L, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’)
(VEnv, L, loadFromU/loadcFromU v1, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, loadFromU/loadcFromU v1, E’)
R26 (VEnv, L, loadFromU region(ρ), v1) −→expr (VEnv, L, getvalue(L, v1, 4) }])
(v1, v1 + 3] ∈ Dom(L[ρ].RS)
where
getvalue(L, v1, 4) := combine(L[ρ].(RS[v1]),L[ρ].(RS[v1 + 1]),L[ρ].(RS[v1 + 2]),L[ρ].(RS[v1 + 3]))
if ∃ρ ∈ Dom(L) s.t. [v1, v1 + 3] ∈ L[ρ].Dom(RS)
Uninit else
and combine(b1, b2, b3, b4) := (b1 << 24) || (b2 << 16) || (b3 << 8) || (b4).
R27 (VEnv, L, loadcFromU region(ρ), v1) −→expr (VEnv, L, getvalue(L, v1) }])
R28 (VEnv, L, cast E to τ) −→expr (VEnv, L, E)
R29
(VEnv, L, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’)
(VEnv, L, castint2ptr E, E2 to τ) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, castint2ptr E’, E2 to τ)
R30
(VEnv, L, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’)
(VEnv, L, castint2ptr v, E to τ) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, castint2ptr v, E’ to τ)
R31 (VEnv, L, castint2ptr (region(ρ), v to τ) −→expr (VEnv, L, v) v ∈Dom(L[ρ].RS)
R32
(VEnv, L, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’)
(VEnv, L, poolalloc(E, E2)) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, poolalloc(E’, E2))
R33
(VEnv, L, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’)
(VEnv, L, poolalloc(v, E)) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, poolalloc(v, E’))
R34 (VEnv, L ∪ { (ρ, {a F ;RS}) }, poolalloc(region(ρ), 1)) −→expr (VEnv, L ∪ { (ρ, {F ;RS}) }, a)
R35 (VEnv, L ∪ { (ρ, {φ;RS}) }, poolalloc(region(ρ), 1)) −→expr (VEnv, L[ρ 7→ {φ;RS[a 7→ Uninit]}], a)
where a is a new address obtained from system allocator, i.e. a ∈ H. H becomes H - { a }.
Figure 4.8: Operational semantic rules for expressions - I
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R36 (VEnv, L ∪ { (ρ, {F ;RS}) }, poolalloc(region(ρ), m)) −→expr (VEnv, Initialize(L ∪ { (ρ, {F ;RS}) },
Uninit, a,m), a) if (m != 1)
where a is a new address for the array obtained from system allocator and Initialize initializes each
element of the array with Uninit. H becomes H - { a , a + 1, ... , a + m-1 }
R37
(VEnv, L, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’)
(VEnv, L, (E, &(E1)[E2])) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’, &(E1)[E2] ))
R38
(VEnv, L, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’)
(VEnv, L, (v, &(E)[E2] )) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, v, &(E’)[E2] ))
R39
(VEnv, L, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’)
(VEnv, L, (v, &(v1)[E] )) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, (v, &(v1)[E’]))
R40 (VEnv, L, (region(ρ), &v1[v2])) −→expr (VEnv, L, v1 + v2 ∗ sizeof(τ))
(v1 + v2 ∗ sizeof(τ)) ∈Dom(L[ρ].RS)
where τ is the “static” type of the individual element of the array, available from the declaration.
Note that sizeof(τ) is a compile time constant.
Figure 4.9: Operational semantic rules for expressions - II
Inv1 Dom(Γ) = Dom(VEnv)
All variables in the typing environment are present in the variable environments and vice
versa.
Inv2 Dom(∆) = Dom(L)
All region names in the region type environment are already present in the domain of region
maps and vice versa.
Inv3 ∀x ∈ Dom(VEnv), if C ` x : τ then VEnv[x] ∈ ||τ ||(V Env,L)
If a variable has type τ , then it must contain only valid values of type τ . In particular, a
pointer variable with region attribute ρ, must always point to an object in that region or it
has the value Uninit.
Inv4 ∀ρ ∈ Dom(L), if C ` ρ : τ then ∀v ∈ Dom(L[ρ].RS), L[ρ].RS[v] ∈ ||τ ||(V Env,L) .
If region ρ is associated with type τ then each memory location in the region store will only
contain values of the correct type.
Inv5 ∀ρ ∈ Dom(L), L[ρ].F ⊆ Dom(L[ρ].RS)
This invariant states that the memory addresses in the free list are a subset of the addresses
of the region.
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Inv6 ∀ρ1ρ2 ∈ Dom(L), if ρ1 6= ρ2 then Dom((L[ρ1]).RS) ∩ Dom((L[ρ2]).RS) = φ and ∀ρ ∈ Dom(L),
Dom(L[ρ].RS) ∩ H = φ.
A memory address cannot be part of two live regions. Also, a memory address cannot be a
part of both system heap (i.e., unused by a program) and live region.
Now assume that a run-time check failure leads to the Error state in the operational semantics.
We prove the following soundness theorem:
Theorem 1 If Γ `S and Γ `env(VEnv, L) then either (VEnv, L, S) −→∗stmtError or (VEnv, L, S
) −→∗stmt (VEnv’, L’, ) and C `env (VEnv’, L’).
Proof: The proof for this theorem is by induction on the structure of typing derivations (Chapter 5).
The soundness result gives us the following invariant – “For a well typed program containing
pointer variable p whose declared type is τ ∗ρ, in every execution state the value of p is guaranteed
to be a pointer to an object in the region ρ”. This holds even in the presence of undetected
memory errors like dangling pointer dereferences and array bound violations, and thus it guarantees
correctness of the aliasing information induced by our type system.
Similarly the function pointer extensions to the type system described in Section 4.4 along with
a soundness theorem for the extended type system guarantee the correctness of the call graph.
4.3 SAFECode Guarantees
4.3.1 Sound Analysis Guarantee
The soundness theorem above immediately gives the sound analysis guarantee, i.e., SAFECode
ensures that no memory error can invalidate the alias analysis, call graph, or type information for
a subset of programs.
4.3.2 Memory Safety Guarantee
The soundness proof also entails that SAFECode provides memory safety guarantee (defined in
chapter 2.1) to well typed programs. This is because SAFECode renders memory errors harmless,
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FunctionType ft := τ → τ |τ → Unit|∀ρ.ft | ft<ρ>
new Types := τ | ft |Unit
Functions F := τ ′f(x : τ) { S } |<ρ, τ> F
Instantiation finst := f |x| finst <ρ>
new Statements := S | call finst (x)
Figure 4.10: Syntactic extensions for some of the remaining C constructs
ensures control-flow integrity and ensure that memory accesses respect the type of the objects being
accessed.
4.3.3 Security Guarantee
As noted in Chapter 2.3.2, the SAFECode solution described thus far, has the following important
security properties:
• No security attack can subvert the control flow of a program and execute arbitrary injected
code. This prevents many attacks that are rely on executing injected code including common
buffer-overflow attacks, heap corruption attacks.
• Attacks that rely on library being loaded at certain program points (“return-to-libc” at-
tacks [68]) are not possible.
However, SAFECode in this mode does not detect dangling pointer errors. Consequently,
SAFECode may not be able to detect attacks that are based on corrupting data but not control-
flow (called non-control data attacks [11]). We believe that with SAFECode these attacks become
much harder to exploit, since any data corruption that can occur in SAFECode is confined within
a pool and on values of the same type. Nevertheless, there may be some situations, especially
server applications, where this guarantee is not enough. We developed a dangling pointer detection
mechanism (discussed later in chapter 7) that we show has low overhead in server applications and
can be used to provide a much stronger security guarantee for such applications.
4.4 Extensions for Full C
Several constructs of C were omitted in the previous section to explain our core ideas. Our type
system and semantics correctly handle all constructs in C and so does our implementation. In
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this section, we informally discuss how we handle the remaining constructs including function calls,
function pointers and support for region polymorphic functions. Some of the ideas for implementing
region polymorphism in functions and structs are directly borrowed from Cyclone [29]. However
it is worth noting that our universal types are quantified only over region type variables (and not
arbitrary type variables). This is sufficient in our domain of trying to retrofit polymorphic region
types to existing non-polymorphic C code.
4.4.1 Structure Types
Structures types are like in C and the syntax for structures is shown in Figure 3.2. A pointer
can point into a structure at an offset n ≥ 0 and we use τ ∗ (ρ, n) to denote the type of such a
pointer (n is a compile type constant). Given this, the only extra safety implications of structure
types are that (a) the poolcheck must use the offset o in checking alignment, and (b) structure
indexing operations for pointers to TU regions need a poolcheck (similar to array indexing). A
notational issue is that it is convenient to include polymorphic type constructors, similar to those
used in Cyclone [29]. These constructors allows a struct type with a pointer field to be used in
different places with the field pointing to distinct sets of objects (e.g., when two distinct linked lists
are created with the same list node type). For example, the polymorphic type struct S<rho> {
Field0 : int, Field1 : int * rho } can be instantiated with a region type variable to get
a new type pointing to a particular points-to set.
4.4.2 Region-polymorphism for Functions
Like Cyclone [29], we support region polymorphic functions parameterized via region names. Re-
gion polymorphism is necessary because it is impractical to duplicate function definitions for each
context in which they are used. Automatic Pool Allocation already infers this region polymorphism
automatically for C programs based on points-to analysis [46]. We leverage that work and only
have to type-check that the inferred polymorphism and instantiation are correct.
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struct Y<rho1, rho2>; //forward declaration
struct X<rho1, rho2> {
Fld1 : struct Y<rho2, rho1>*rho2
}
struct Y<rho2, rho1> {








Figure 4.11: Cycles in Points-to graph
4.4.3 Cycles in Points-to Graphs
The syntax in the core language does not allow mutually recursive types in our languages. This
is clearly not acceptable for supporting general C programs. We solve this by requiring that the
regions for mutually recursive data structures be created at the same lexical level. For this reason,
we add a new construct to our language that enables creating multiple regions at the same lexical
level. An example is shown in Figure 4.11. Here poolinit creates two regions rho1, rho2, such
that rho1 contains objects of type struct X<rho2> and vice versa. Note that we only require that
the region initialization (via poolinit) for these data structures to be done at the same lexical
level, actual memory allocation with in a region is done at the same place as in the original program.
4.4.4 Function Pointers
We represent the call graph in the input type system by adding a function set attribute (called fs in
Figure 3.2) to each function pointer type, making explicit the set of possible targets for that function
pointer. The function set attribute can be initialized using the FSET definition. For example, the
definition FSET fs = func1, func2, func3 followed by a use (int -> int)*fs fptr denotes a
function pointer fptr whose targets are the functions func1, func2, func3. Before an indirect
call, we check at run-time if the function pointer actually points to one of the functions in its FSET
attribute. A number of these run-time checks are unnecessary and can be eliminated using simple
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static typing rules. Essentially function pointers that are read from a TU pool (via casts from int
to function pointers), and function pointers whose targets are more precise than the one used by
the Automatic Pool Allocation, will continue to require a run-time check.
4.4.5 Control Flow
Ordinary control does not require any additional safety checks. Adding typing rules and semantic
rules for control flow to our language is fairly straightforward and we omit the discussion here.
4.4.6 Global and Stack Allocations
We make memory allocation for both global and stack variables explicit using operations alloca
and galloc (the latter takes an optional initializer). These eliminate the need for the & operator
for taking the address of variables. Note that a global or stack object may not have a valid pool
handle if no heap object is aliased to it. To ensure that valid pool handles are created for these
objects, we pretend that they are allocated using malloc at program entry and function entry
respectively, and infer the life times of regions using Automatic Pool Allocation. Globals are still
allocated in the global area just like the original program. We simply register the valid range of
global addresses with the corresponding pool handle if any run-time checks are ever needed for that
global pool. Stack objects whose region is created within the same function (i.e., does not escape to
a parent) are allocated on the stack, like the original program. Otherwise, we allocate them using
poolalloc at function entry and free them at function returns. In practice, we found that most
stack allocations in the original program do not escape and can actually be allocated on the stack.
4.5 Limitations
We now discuss the limitations of the SAFECode work and identify possible solutions where pos-
sible.
4.5.1 Incomplete Error Checking
The key weakness of the work we have described so far, is that it permits few array bounds violations
and dangling pointer errors to go undetected but confined within a pool. To overcome the first
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issue, we have also developed an array bounds checking tool that is backwards-compatible and
achieves lower heads than any of the other existing approaches for run-time bounds checking. We
have integrated the bounds checker with the work here and the overheads continue to be low. This
is discussed in detail in chapter 6. We have also developed a new technique to detect dangling
pointer errors, discussed in chapter 7.
4.5.2 Potential Increase in Memory Usage
A second issue is that in some cases, our system might require more memory than the original C
program since we cannot free memory to the system until a region goes out of scope. We have
evaluated the increase in the context of programs with no type casts and found that the increase is
minimal in practice (see chapter 8). We believe this issue is unlikely to be significant in practice
because we allow reuse within regions, which is quite common for data structures that shrink and
grow.
4.5.3 Restrictions on Pointer Analysis
SAFECode imposes the requirement that the pointer analysis be flow-insensitive and unification-
based. We believe our approach can be extended to enforce non-unification based pointer analysis
as well, by adding meta-data to every pointer that may target multiple pools. However, the
requirement of flow-insensitivity may be much harder to relax (though as discussed in Section 4.7,
sound flow-sensitive techniques can be implemented on top of our approach.) The pointer analysis
algorithm (DSA), uses an aggressive form of context-sensitivity (distinguishing heap objects by
entire acyclic call paths), which compensates for many of the limitations of unification [41] and is
important to distinguish distinct instances of the same kind of data structure [46]. Our approach
could be extended to a non-unification-based pointer analysis, mainly by extending Automatic Pool
Allocation. The primary change would be to track at run-time which pool a pointer points to at
any point in the execution. This requires some metadata for any pointer that may target multiple
pools. With this extension, we believe that the semantic checking techniques (the type homogeneity
principle, the pool runtime checks, and the optimizations of run-time checks) would apply directly.
Extending the techniques for a flow-sensitive alias analysis is more difficult but there are two
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reasons why this may not be a significant limitation in many situations. First, interprocedural
pointer analysis algorithms used in practice are generally flow-insensitive because of the high cost
of flow-sensitive whole program analysis [36]. Second, as discussed in Section 4.7.2, flow-sensitive
techniques can be implemented (on top of flow-insensitive points-to results) in a sound manner
using our approach.
4.5.4 Manufactured Pointers
If the pointer analysis cannot infer an allocation site and consequently a region, for a pointer (e.g.
if the address is “manufactured” or read off the disk), we simply insert an abort before every use
of such a pointer. This could reject a legal C program (other systems like CCured share the same
weakness). A possible solution for the manufactured address case is to use pragmas or compile-time
options or trusted registry mechanism that can recognize such addresses and allow them.
4.5.5 Custom Memory Allocators
Automatic Pool Allocation transformation, thus SAFECode, assume that the source program uses
malloc/free to manage memory. When applications use custom memory allocators instead, the pool
allocation transformation cannot distinguish between various memory allocations and consequently
uses one single TU pool for the entire heap. This means that every memory access in the program
is checked before use, resulting in very high overhead. One solution to this problem is to let the
compiler know the different allocation and deallocation routines using compile time options.
4.5.6 Compatibility with External Libraries
So far we have assumed that we have the source for the complete program including all external
libraries. In practice, we have to deal with cases where the sources for some external libraries may
not available or it may not be feasible to analyze them. Here, we explain how we handle these
external library calls.
Our approach can work correctly but slightly inefficiently for most library calls. Our pointer
analysis marks any points-to graph node reachable from an external function as “incomplete”. We
can treat pools corresponding to such points-to graph nodes as TU pools. Our typing rules then
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ensure that we can only load/store an int or char from/into such pools. All pointers read from such
memory have to go through a run-time check, because of R31, thus ensuring soundness. However,
this means we may conservatively perform more checks than necessary.
One case that deserves a special mention here is that of pointers to memory allocated within
external library and returned to the program. The pool corresponding to such pointer may not
exist (will be null in our implementation) or even if it does exist because of node merging during
the pointer analysis, such a pool does not actually contain the target object of the pointer. This
will lead to a run-time failure if the program ever executes a run-time check on pointers to such
object. To partially solve this problem, we intercept all calls to malloc/free from the libraries.
We store all the allocations in a global hash table and do a run-time check in the global hash
table if a pool is null or if a normal run-time poolcheck fails. However, we can do this only if the
memory returned by an external library call is dynamically allocated heap memory. If the library
call returns stack allocated memory or memory in the static region, which we didn’t encounter so
far in our experiments, we abort the program.
Another problem we encounter is that of call back functions. If an internal function may be
called from external code, we must ensure that the external code calls the original function, not
the pool-allocated version. This ensures backwards-compatibility but at the cost of soundness. In
most cases, we can directly transform the program to pass in the original function and not the
pool-allocated version: this change can be made at compile-time if it passes the function name but
may have to be done at run-time if it passes the function pointer in a scalar variable. In the general
case (which we have not encountered so far), the function pointer may be embedded inside another
data structure. Even for most such functions, the compiler can automatically generate a “varargs”
wrapper designed to distinguish transformed internal calls from external calls. When this is not
possible, we must leave the callback function and all internal calls to it, completely unmodified and
use the unsafe versions.
The third problem is that of incorrect usage of library calls leading to undetected/unmasked
memory errors in the unchecked external code. Though we automatically check preconditions for
some of the standard C library calls before their invocation, the general solution again involves
analyzing the source of the libraries.
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4.6 Implementation
Our compiler system, SAFECode (Static Analysis For safe Execution of Code), is implemented
using the LLVM compiler infrastructure [45]. In principle, SAFECode supports any source language
translated into the LLVM IR, but our experience has been with C.
4.6.1 Type Inference and Type Checking
Conceptually, analysis validation in SAFECode consists of a non-standard type inference step using
Automatic Pool Allocation, followed by a standard type checking step using our pool-based type
system defined earlier, and insertion of the necessary run-time checks described in Section 4.2.3.
The “type inference” phase of SAFECode takes the input program and the points-to graph
as defined in section 3.3 and transforms the program to add the region type attributes and re-
gion parameters of our extended type system. Because our type rules include the region types,
region lifetimes, and lexical scoping of region parameters, our type checker effectively ensures the
correctness of the region inference.
Our current implementation does more run-time checks than those outlined in the operational
semantics; we do poolchecks before all uses of a pointer pointing to TU pool. These checks subsume
checks of casts from int to pointer to TU pool (R31) and checks on indexing of pointers to TU
pools (R40) but add unnecessary checks before uses of pointers to TU pools read from TK pools.
We are refining our implementation to eliminate unnecessary checks.
4.6.2 The SAFECode Runtime System
The key new aspects of the run-time (and some relevant implementation details needed to under-
stand them) are as follows.
A pool in our implementation is organized as a linked list of large blocks. The pool handle
stores the header to this list. If there is insufficient space for a new allocation, the pool requests
more blocks from the underlying system heap using malloc. An allocation request is satisfied by
returning a free chunk within one block or spanning multiple blocks if needed.
One key change in the pool implementation is that heap metadata such as the object header
describing the size of an allocated block and the free list cannot be interleaved with live objects
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in a pool since our approach allows some memory errors to overwrite arbitrary data within a
pool. Allowing the metadata to be corrupted would potentially lead to arbitrary safety violations.
We maintain metadata for the free list at the start of each free block and ensure (as part of the
poolchecks below) that this data cannot be corrupted. To record the size of an allocated block so
that it can be found efficiently, we take advantage of type homogeneity (which we have empirically
found is available for most pools even in C programs) We use a bit vector (with one bit per data
element of the pool type) to track the start of each allocated object (or the start of a free chunk
immediately after an allocated object). Because searching this bit vector would be very inefficient
for large arrays, we allocate each large array in a (contiguous) set of new blocks and perform a
poolfree for the array simply by freeing all the blocks. The hash table used for poolchecks below
allows us to identify quickly when a particular address is a large array.
By far the most important operations, in terms of performance impact, are the pool bounds
checks, which are used either during the array indexing or during cast operations. Given a memory
address, this check verifies that the address is contained within the memory of the pool and has
the correct alignment for the pool’s data type. To make the check efficient, we request memory
from the system in blocks of size of 2k bytes for some fixed k. We maintain a hash set holding the
starting addresses of all current blocks. Given an address to check, we compute the block holding
the address by masking the low k bits and check if the block is in the hash set. If it is, then we
check for the alignment criterion. A check, therefore, involves a mask, two loads, a hash lookup,
and an alignment check.
We can eliminate many hash lookups by exploiting the high spatial locality exhibited by many
memory references, especially array references. We use a one-element cache to remember the block
address of the last successful hash lookup and alignment check. On each check, we first compare with
this cached value; if successful, we can avoid the hash lookup. For example, for an array accessed
sequentially, we only need a hash look up for one in every 2k/(element-size) array accesses.
For uninitialized pointers, we are able to avoid a software check in many cases. Modern operating
systems reserve a set of addresses for the kernel, e.g., Linux reserves the high GB of each process on
a 32-bit machine. A user-level program accessing that address range would cause a hardware trap.
We therefore set the Uninit value to the base of reserved addresses, (and replace the constant ’0’ in
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any pointer-type expression with the same value), so that the hardware does the run-time check for
us for free. This technique is unusable for kernel modules and also for references that may access
a structure type with size greater than the reserved range (which is extremely rare). For these, we
have to retain explicit software checks at run-time.
4.7 Sound Static Analyses Enabled By SAFECode
The semantic guarantees provided by SAFECode can be used to write other sound static analyses.
In this section we first show that a static array bounds checking technique, which relies on a call
graph, can be used soundly for non-type-safe programs in our environment. We then illustrate
how our soundness guarantees about alias analysis can benefit other static analysis tools, using an
existing software verification tool as an example.
4.7.1 Static Array Bounds Checking in SAFECode
We use an interprocedural array bounds checking algorithm, described later in chapter 9, to elimi-
nate some runtime array bounds checks. The algorithm uses the call graph but not points-to-graph
because it does not track values through loads/stores. It propagates affine constraints on integer
variables from callers to callees (for incoming integer arguments and global scalars) and from callees
to callers (for integer return values and global scalars). The algorithm then perform a symbolic
bounds check for each index expression using integer programming. Since SAFECode semantics
guarantee the correctness of the call graph, this optimization is safe (just like it would be safe for
a type-safe language). To our knowledge, SAFECode is the first system for ordinary C programs
(including explicit memory deallocation) where such an optimization can be performed safely.
4.7.2 Static Analyses in ESP
As final example, we briefly describe one software validation tool, ESP [18], that relies on alias
analysis to give guarantees about programs and could benefit from the guarantees provided by our
system. Although we explain this in terms of ESP, other software validation tools could make use
of our guarantees in a similar fashion.
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void KernelEntryPoint(int **o) {
int **q, *r;
char arr[15];
1: r = malloc(....);
2: ... //some computation using r
3: free(r);
if (o != NULL)
4: q = o;
else {
5: q = malloc(..);
6: *q = ... /* *q is initialized with some safe value */
}
7: *r = ... /* dangling pointer error, this can overwrite *q */
8: if (o != NULL)
Probe(o); /* checks that *o is a valid pointer */
9: **q = data1; /* Dereference arbitrary pointer */
}
Figure 4.12: ESP Example – Value flow analysis with memory errors
ESP relies on value flow analysis [24], a static analysis used to identify the set of pointer
expressions that refer to the memory locations that hold a certain value of interest, such as a lock.
These sets are called value alias sets and computed by a data-flow analysis (value flow simulation)
and transfer functions using May alias information provided by a flow-insensitive, unification-based
context sensitive pointer analysis. This approach has been used to verify various properties in
software, e.g., the Probe security property [24], which requires that any pointer passed into the
kernel from user space is checked (“probed”) before being dereferenced by the kernel.
Consider applying ESP to verify the code fragment in Figure 4.12, which is a version of the
kernel code fragment used in [24] modified to introduce a dangling pointer reference. In the function,
KernelEntryPoint, the pointer o is passed in from a user routine and its target needs to be probed
before being dereferenced by the kernel. Because of line 4, ESP tracks q and o as value aliases if o
!= NULL. The newly allocated memory when o == NULL is initialized to be safe. Lines 7 contains a
memory error (a dangling pointer dereference). Since the system memory allocation could allocate
previously freed memory of r for the allocation of q, this dangling pointer dereference could actually
overwrite *q. This violates the results of the May-alias analysis that q and r are not aliased to each
other. In line 8, the target of pointer o is probed. ESP thus transitions both the value aliases, o
and q, to the safe state. Dereferencing *q is hence detected as safe by ESP. However, in reality, *q
could now point to any location in memory and can be dereferenced by the program, violating the
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Probe security property. Enforcing the assumed aliasing properties is essential for the soundness
of the tool.
In our system, the same example would allocate q and r in two different pools as they are not
aliased. This makes sure that dangling pointer error in r is not allowed to trample the memory of q.
While we do not detect the actual error, we make sure that the aliasing property is not invalidated.
The above is an example of a flow-sensitive program analysis that uses an external flow-
insensitive alias analysis and can be easily made sound using our approach. For a more general
flow-sensitive analysis that reasons about loads/stores, we must modify the semantics of malloc
(and free) in the analysis so that the address returned by malloc may be “aliased” to any previ-
ously freed objects in the same alias set. This is a straightforward (and local) change within the
implementation of a dataflow analysis.
4.8 Experiments
Benchmark Lines Execution times (secs)
of native LLVM PA PA + SAFECode CCured
code (base ) non array
checks
Olden
bh 2053 1.449 1.357 1.338 1.361 1.403 1.923
bisort 707 11.740 11.530 11.531 11.531 11.531 11.358
em3d 557 13.960 11.29 14.245 14.245 14.248 20.812
health 725 1.909 1.936 1.296 1.296 1.299 1.710
mst 617 11.259 12.920 12.837 12.837 12.96 16.956
perimeter 395 2.033 0.048 0.051 .051 0.051 2.544
power 763 1.253 0.887 0.934 0.934 0.918 1.408
treeadd 385 5.426 5.457 5.425 5.425 5.425 14.784
tsp 561 1.277 1.270 1.250 1.250 1.250 1.578
voronoi 111 Rejected because of cast from integer to pointer
System
fingerd 338 6.410 6.555 6.617 6.617 6.753
ftpd 26653 1.210 1.185 1.160 1.160 1.190
ghttpd 837 3.723 3.507 3.761 3.780 3.766
PtrDist
anagram 647 12.778 16.084 16.915 17.953 19.742
ks 782 3.554 4.429 4.501 4.501 4.981
yacr2 3982 3.795 3.991 4.398 4.398 5.204
Table 4.1: Benchmarks (telnetd in text) - Execution Times
We present an experimental evaluation of SAFECode for several ordinary C programs and a
few operating system daemons. These experiments have three goals:
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Benchmark Slowdown ratios
SAFECode SAFECode SAFECode CCured
/LLVM /PA /native /native
Olden
bh 1.03 1.05 0.97 1.31
bisort 1.00 1.02 0.98 0.97
em3d 1.27 1.00 1.02 1.49
health 0.67 1.00 0.68 .90
mst 1.00 1.01 1.15 1.51
perimeter 1.04 1.00 .025 1.25
power 1.03 0.98 0.73 1.12
treeadd 0.99 1.00 1.00 2.72
tsp 0.98 1.00 0.98 1.23
voronoi Rejected because of cast from integer to pointer
System
fingerd 1.03 1.02 1.05
ftpd 1.00 1.03 0.98
ghttpd 1.07 0.99 1.00
PtrDist
anagram 1.23 1.05 1.54
ks 1.12 1.11 1.40
yacr2 1.30 1.18 1.37
Table 4.2: Benchmarks - Slowdown Ratios
• To measure the net overhead and different components of overhead incurred by our run-time
checks.
• To evaluate the benefit of using sound static analyses enabled by SAFECode to eliminate
various kinds of runtime checks.
• To compare the overhead of our approach to that of CCured.
4.8.1 Run-time Overheads
We evaluated our system using 9 programs from the Olden suite of benchmarks [10], 3 programs
from PtrDist, and 4 system codes – bsd-fingerd-0.17, ftpd-BSD-0.3.2, ghttpd-1.4, and netkit-telnet-
0.17 daemon. The benchmarks and their characteristics are listed in Table 4.1. We compile each
program to the LLVM compiler IR, perform our analyses and transformations, then compile LLVM
back to C and compile the resulting code using GCC 3.4.2 at -O3 level of optimization. For the
benchmarks we used a large problem size to obtain reliable measurements. For ftpd and fingerd,
we ran the server and the client on the same machine to avoid network overhead and measured
their response times for client requests. We successfully applied SAFECode to netkit-telnetd
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but this is an interactive program and we did not notice any perceptible difference in the response
times. We do not report detailed timings for this code here.
The “native” and “LLVM (base)” columns in the table represents execution times when compiled
directly with GCC -O3 and with the base LLVM compiler using the LLVM C back-end followed by
GCC -O3. Using LLVM (base) times as our baseline allows us to isolate the overheads added by
SAFECode. The “PA”, “PA + non-array checks”, and “SAFECode” columns show the execution
times with just pool allocation, SAFECode without array indexing checks, and SAFECode with
all the run-time checks respectively.
We give the slowdown ratios in Table 4.2. The column “SAFECode/PA” (the ratio of SAFE-
Code time to pool allocation time) shows that the run-time checks added by SAFECode have a
relatively small impact on performance over and above pool allocation: less than 10% in all cases
except ks and yacr2, which have 11% and 18% overhead. The latter two overheads are entirely
due to pool checks for array references, as seen by comparing the “PA+non-array checks” vs. the
“SAFECode” columns.
Comparing the columns “SAFECode/LLVM” (ratio of SAFECode time to LLVM base time)
with “SAFECode/PA,” we see that the pool allocation transformation has a significantly bigger
impact on performance than the run-time checks. Four of the programs show significant slowdowns
due to PA: em3d, anagram, ks and yacr2. We believe that these slowdowns are because our
modified pool run-time library has not been tuned at all. We currently use an inefficient bit-vector
implementation of free lists. A more recent version of the pool runtime library used in [46] shows
no slowdown for these four programs. We aim to merge our extensions with this version in the near
future.
We discovered that LLVM uses “loop invariant code motion” to remove an expensive com-
putation out of the timing loop dramatically speeding up the performance of perimeter. This
suggests that SAFECode/LLVM ratio is perhaps the only meaningful way to isolate the overheads
of SAFECode approach. Voronoi benchmark fails at run-time because our pointer analysis is




The last column in Table 4.2 compares the overhead of SAFECode with that of CCured, for the
Olden benchmarks rewritten by the CCured team. We have not tried to compare our results on
other system codes as it involved significant porting effort in writing the CCured wrappers. In all
these programs SAFECode has significantly less overhead than CCured, even though SAFECode’s
pool checks are more expensive than the run-time checks inserted by CCured. The lower overhead
can be attributed to the broad range of static analysis techniques employed by SAFECode for
eliminating garbage collection (GC) overhead, stack safety checks, and many array bounds checks,
and the run-time techniques that eliminate null pointer checks and metadata maintenance overhead.
Note, however, that several of our static and run-time techniques for reducing overhead (except
GC overhead) could be used with CCured as well. We believe that for end-users, any differences
in the overheads of the systems is likely to be less important than the choice between automatic
and explicit memory management and the extra wrappers that may need to be written in case of
CCured.
4.8.3 Effectiveness of Static Analysis
Table 4.3 shows the effectiveness of our static checks and of segregating memory objects into TK
and TU pools. Columns 2 and 3 show the total number of static array accesses and the number
that must be checked at run time. The next two columns show the total number of static loads
and stores and the number of pointers that need to be checked at run time. The last two columns
show the static number of TU and TK pools. We found that our static array safety checks were
successful in eliminating some run-time array bounds checks in most programs. Our static pointer
safety techniques eliminate all other run-time checks (checks involving TU pools), except in the
three programs that have TU pools.
4.9 Related Work
In this section, we compare SAFECode with two previous approaches that provide soundness
guarantees: CCured [52] and Cyclone [29]. A detailed Comparison of SAFECode with several
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Benchmark Static Counts
Total Checked Total Non-array TU TK
array array loads / pointer
accesses accesses checks checks
bh 80 45 708 96 1 3
bisort 2 0 103 0 0 1
em3d 17 14 80 0 0 10
health 3 0 221 0 0 2
mst 4 3 53 0 0 5
perimeter 4 4 233 0 0 1
power 4 4 229 0 0 4
treeadd 2 0 31 0 0 1
tsp 0 0 176 0 0 1
fingerd 13 8 32 11 0 3
ftpd 362 209 1949 285 2 22
telnetd 432 363 1602 0 0 15
anagram 63 47 164 4 1 5
ks 58 52 326 0 0 3
yacr2 302 302 856 0 0 26
Table 4.3: Benchmarks - Effectiveness of Static Checks
other related approaches is provided earlier in Chapter 2.4.
CCured ensures type-safe execution for standard C programs, with some source changes required
for compatibility with external libraries. It uses a conservative garbage collector instead of explicit
deallocation of heap memory. Compared with our approach, the major advantage of CCured is
that it guarantees the absence of dangling pointer references and also performs exact bounds checks
on all memory references. In contrast, a key contribution of our work has been to enable sound
analysis while still retaining explicit memory management. A second difference is that CCured
introduces significant metadata for runtime checks. This metadata is the primary cause of the
porting effort required for using CCured on C programs because it can require wrappers around
some library functions. SAFECode uses no metadata on individual pointer values and provides
better backwards-compatibility than CCured.
There are also minor technical differences between the systems. Our classification of memory
into type-consistent and Unknown is analogous to the wild and non-wild types of CCured, except
that we use a pointer analysis to infer the types of memory objects. We allow Unknown memory
to point to type consistent memory by performing a run-time check as explained in Section 4.1.
CCured uses physical subtyping and RTTI to eliminate some run time overhead on pointer casts.
Our type inference supports limited forms of physical subtyping (only for upcasts and casts from
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void* to other pointer types) but we plan to investigate a more sophisticated version in the future.
Cyclone [29, 35] uses a region-based type system to enforce strict type safety and consequently
enforces alias analysis, for a variant of C. Unlike SAFECode and CCured, Cyclone disallows non-
type-safe memory accesses (e.g., operations that would produce the equivalent of Unknown type or
wild pointers). Cyclone and other region-based languages [8, 27, 9, 12, 62]) have two disadvantages
relative to our work: (a) they can require significant programmer annotations to identify regions;
and (b) either they provide no mechanism to free or reuse memory within a region (e.g., RTJava) or
they allow deallocation of memory within a region only in special cases (e.g., uniqueness annotations
to Cyclone [35] or reset region in ML kit for regions [62]). In all the above systems, data structures
that must shrink and grow (with non-nested object lifetimes) can be put in regions only when
they use a restricted form of aliasing. Often they have to be allocated on the garbage collected
heap. In contrast, we infer the pool partitioning automatically with no annotations, and we permit
explicit deallocation of individual data items within regions without aliasing restrictions or extra
annotations.
4.10 Sound Analysis and Memory Safety: Concluding Discussion
In this chapter, we have described an approach to provide a semantic foundation (a points-to graph,
call graph, and type information) for building sound static analyses for nearly arbitrary C programs.
The approach can be easily added to any C compiler containing a pointer analysis that meets the
specified properties (flow-insensitive, unification-based).
The approach also has some other practical strengths: it is fully automatic and requires no
modifications to existing C programs; it allocates and frees memory objects at the same points as
the original program (minimizing the need to tune memory consumption); and it supports nearly
the full generality of the C language, except for manufactured addresses and some casts from int
to pointers. Finally, our experiments show that the run-time overheads of our approach are quite
small, generally less than a few percent relative to code with pool allocation alone. We believe these
overheads are low enough to be used in production code, especially when security is a significant
concern.
We believe that our approach represents an interesting and useful low overhead alternative to
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techniques that focus on complete soundness with no dangling pointer errors. However, in some
application domains stronger guarantees than given by our current approach are required. We
believe that the right long term approach is to offer a choice to the end user between our current
approach with alternatives that can detect all memory errors or use garbage collection. Towards
this end, we built a framework that includes this work along with our other work that detects
bounds errors (see chapter 6) and dangling pointer errors (see chapter 7).
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Chapter 5
Formal Proof of Soundness
This chapter gives provides a proof of soundness of our approach for providing memory safety
and sound analysis guarantees. First, section 5.1 discusses the invariants that we maintain in our
approach. Section 5.2 then states the soundness theorem and gives its proof.
5.1 Invariants for Well Formed Environments
In the rest of this discussion, by environment we mean the pair (VEnv, L) where VEnv is the
variable environment and L is the live region map in the heap. For an environment (VEnv, L), we
define ||τ ||(V Env,L) to be as follows:
||int||(V Env,L) := Int32
||τ ∗ ρ||(V Env,L) := {Uninit}∪ Dom(L[ρ].RS)
||handle(ρ, τ)||(V Env,L) := { region(ρ)}
||Unknown||(V Env,L) := Int8
||char||(V Env,L) := Int8
From our earlier assumptions, sizeof(int) and sizeof(τ ∗ ρ) is same: four bytes. This means that
Dom(L[ρ].RS) ⊆ Int32.
Intuitively for a well-formed type τ , ||τ ||(V Env,L) represents the set of values that a variable (or
object) of that type can hold under that context and environment. We assume that Uninit ∈ Int.
We treat it as zero in our operations. For a pointer variable (or a memory location of pointer type),
the values it can hold depend on the already allocated values in the region to which the pointer
points to. For a pointer to region ρ only addresses in region ρ (or the uninitialized value) are legal
values.
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The judgment `env stands for a well formed environment. An environment (VEnv, L) is well
formed under a typing context C (denoted by C(= Γ;∆) `env (VEnv, L)) if and only if the following
invariants hold.
Inv1 Dom(Γ) = Dom(VEnv)
All variables in the typing environment are present in the variable environments and vice
versa.
Inv2 Dom(∆) = Dom(L)
All region names in the region type environment are already present in the domain of region
maps and vice versa.
Inv3 ∀x ∈ Dom(VEnv), if C ` x : τ then VEnv[x] ∈ ||τ ||(V Env,L)
If a variable has type τ , then it must contain only valid values of type τ . In particular, a
pointer variable with region attribute ρ, must always point to an object in that region or it
is not initialized.
Inv4 ∀ρ ∈ Dom(L), if C ` ρ : τ then ∀v ∈ Dom(L[ρ].RS), L[ρ].RS[v] ∈ ||τ ||(V Env,L) .
If region ρ is associated with type τ then each memory location in the region store will only
contain values of the correct type.
Inv5 ∀ρ ∈ Dom(L), L[ρ].F ⊆ Dom(L[ρ].RS)
This invariant states that the memory addresses in the free list are a subset of the addresses
of the region
Inv6 ∀ρ1ρ2 ∈ Dom(L), if ρ1 6= ρ2 then Dom((L[ρ1]).RS) ∩ Dom((L[ρ2]).RS) = φ and ∀ρ ∈ Dom(L),
Dom(L[ρ].RS) ∩ H = φ.
A memory address cannot be part of two live regions. Also a memory address cannot be a
part of system heap (i.e., unused by a program) and also a part of live region.
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5.2 Proof
The proof of soundness is composed of two “invariant preservation” theorems — one for expressions
and one for statements of the program. Since we have not included control flow in our formalization,
all evaluations of expressions and statements terminate.
Notation: In the rest of this section, −→∗expr represents the usual reflexive transitive closure of
−→expr and −→∗stmt represents the usual reflexive transitive closure of −→stmt.
In order to prove the “invariant preservation” theorems, we make use of the lemmas listed in
Figures 5.1 and 5.2, which are essentially big-step extensions of some of the small step rules given
in Figures 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9. The proof of each of the lemmas is by straightforward induction on
the number of steps in the derivation of the hypothesis in that lemma. In the Figure 5.1, we give
the complete proof for the first lemma, proofs for the rest are similar and straightforward.
We now present three more lemmas, that are useful in proving the invariant preservation theo-
rems.
Lemma 1 Update Lemma1
If C `env (VEnv, L), and C ` ρ : τ and if v1 ∈ Dom(L[ρ].RS), and v2 ∈ ||τ ||(V Env,L) then
C `env (VEnv, update(L, v1, v2)).
This lemma states that given a well formed environment, if we update a memory location in a
region of the environment with the appropriate type then the resulting environment continues to
be well formed.
Proof: From Inv2 and C ` ρ : τ , we have ρ ∈ Dom(L).
So L = L’ ∪ {(ρ,R)}
We also have v1 ∈ Dom(R.RS).
From the definition of update, we have update(L, v1, v2) = L’ ∪ {(ρ, { R.F ;R.(RS[v1 7→ v2])
}) }
Now all the invariants except Inv4 trivially hold. Inv4 holds since v2 ∈ ||τ ||(V Env,L). q.e.d.
Lemma 2 Update Lemma2
If C `env (VEnv, L), and C ` ρ : Unknown and if [v1, v1 + 3] ∈ Dom(L[ρ].RS), and v2 ∈
||Int||(V Env,L) then C `env (VEnv, update(L, v1, v2, 4)).
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Lemma R2* If (VEnv, L, E) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, E’) then (VEnv, L, x = E) −→∗stmt
(VEnv’, L’, x = E’).
Proof: By induction on the number of steps in the derivation of
(VEnv, L, E) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, E’).
Base case: zero steps. Trivially true.
Induction Hypothesis : True for ’k’ steps in derivation.
For ’k+1’ steps, we have
(VEnv, L, E) −→expr ... −→expr (k steps) (VEnv”, L”, E”) −→expr
(VEnv’, L’, E’).
Using induction hypothesis, we have (VEnv, L, x = E) −→∗stmt
(VEnv”, L”, x = E”).
We also have (VEnv”, L”, E”) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’)
Using R2, we have (VEnv”, L”, X = E”) −→stmt (VEnv’, L’, x = E’).
q.e.d.
Lemma R1* If (VEnv, L, S1) −→∗stmt (VEnv’, L’, S1’) then (VEnv, L, S1 ; S2)
−→∗stmt (VEnv’, L’, S1’ ; S2)
Lemma R4* If (VEnv, L, E) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, E’) then (VEnv, L, store/storec
E, E2) −→∗stmt (VEnv’, L’, store E’, E2).
Lemma R5* If (VEnv, L, E) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, E’) then (VEnv, L, store/storec
v,E) −→∗stmt (VEnv’, L’, store v, E’) .
If (VEnv, L, E) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, E’) then (VEnv, L, storeU/s-
torecU E, E2, E3) −→∗stmt (VEnv’, L’, storeU/storecU E’, E2, E3)
.
Lemma R8* If (VEnv, L, E) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, E’) then (VEnv, L, storeU/s-
torecU v1, E, E3) −→∗stmt (VEnv’, L’, storeU/storecU v1, E’, E3) .
Lemma R9* If (VEnv, L, E) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, E’) then (VEnv, L, storeU/s-
torecU v1, v2, E) −→∗stmt (VEnv’, L’, storeU/storecU v1, v2, E’) .
Lemma R12* If (VEnv, L, E) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, E’) then (VEnv, L, poolfree(E,
E2) −→∗stmt (VEnv’, L’, poolfree(E’, E2) .
Lemma R13* If (VEnv, L, E) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, E’) then (VEnv, L, poolfree(v,
E) −→∗stmt (VEnv’, L’, poolfree(v, E’) .
Lemma R16* If (VEnv, L, S) −→∗stmt (VEnv’, L’, S’) then (VEnv, L, pool{S}pop(ρ)
−→∗stmt (VEnv’, L’, pool{S′}pop(ρ)) .
Lemma R19* If (VEnv, L, E) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, E’) then (VEnv, L, E op E2)
−→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, E’ op E2) .
Lemma R20* If (VEnv, L, E) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, E’) then (VEnv, L, v op E)
−→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, v op E’) .
Lemma R22* If (VEnv, L, E) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, E’) then (VEnv, L, load/loadc
E) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, load E’) .
Lemma R24* If (VEnv, L, E) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, E’) then (VEnv, L, loadU/loadcU
E, E2) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, loadU/loadcU E’, E2) .
Figure 5.1: Lemmas for operational semantics
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Lemma R25* If (VEnv, L, E) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, E’) then (VEnv, L, loadU/loadcU v1,
E) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, loadU/loadcU v1, E’) .
Lemma R29* If (VEnv, L, E) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, E’) then (VEnv, L, castintpointer E,
E2 to τ) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, castintpointer E’, E2 to τ) .
Lemma R30* If (VEnv, L, E) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, E’) then (VEnv, L, castintpointer v,
E to τ) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, castintpointer v, E’ to τ) .
Lemma R32* If (VEnv, L, E) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, E’) then (VEnv, L, poolalloc(E, E2))
−→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, poolalloc(E’, E2)) .
Lemma R33* If (VEnv, L, E) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, E’) then (VEnv, L, poolalloc(v, E))
−→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, poolalloc(v, E’)) .
Lemma R37* If (VEnv, L, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’) then (VEnv, L, &(E, E1)[E2] ))
−→expr (VEnv’, L’, &(E’, E1)[E2] )) .
Lemma R38* If (VEnv, L, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’) then (VEnv, L, &(v, E)[E2] ))
−→expr (VEnv’, L’, &(v, E’)[E2] )) .
Lemma R39* If (VEnv, L, E) −→expr (VEnv’, L’, E’) then (VEnv, L, v, &(v1)[E] ))
−→expr (VEnv’, L’, &(v, v1)[E’])) .
Figure 5.2: Lemmas for operational semantics
Proof: The proof is straightforward extension of above; we just need to prove that byte function
on Int32 gives an integer in Int8, which is true from the arithmetic properties of integers.
Lemma 3 Getvalue Lemma1
If C `env (VEnv, L), C ` ρ : τ and if v1 ∈ Dom(L[ρ].RS), then getvalue(L, v1) ∈ ||τ ||(V Env,L).
Informally, this lemma states that given a well formed environment, if we load from a memory
address in a region, the resulting value should have the type of the objects stored in that region.
Proof: We have ρ in Dom(L) from Inv2.
So L ≡ L’ ∪ {(ρ,R)}
From the definition of getvalue, we have getvalue(L, v1) = L[ρ].RS[v1]. Now from Inv4 we have
getvalue(L,v1) ∈ ||τ ||(V Env,L). q.e.d.
Lemma 4 Getvalue Lemma2
If C `env (VEnv, L), C ` ρ : Unknown and if v1 ∈ Dom(L[ρ].RS), then getvalue(L, v1,4) ∈
||Int||(V Env,L).
Proof: Proof is straightforward extension of above; we just need to prove that the combine function
on Int8 gives an Int32, which is true from the arithmetic properties of integers.
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Lemma 5 (Safe region deallocate Lemma)
If (Γ;∆) ` τ , and x 6∈Dom(Γ), and
ρ 6∈Dom(∆), and (Γ[x 7→handle(ρ, τ ′)];∆[ρ 7→ τ ′]) `env (VEnv ∪ {(x,region(ρ))}, L ∪ {(ρ,R)})
then
||τ ||(V Env∪{(x,region(ρ))},L∪{(ρ,R)}) = ||τ ||(V Env,L).
This lemma states that the set of legal values corresponding to a “well formed type” τ , is
independent of a region on which this type is not dependent. Hence that region can be safely
deallocated if necessary.
Proof: If τ is of the form int or Unknown then it is trivially true.
If τ is of the form handle(ρ′′, τ ′′) then C ` τ only if C ` ρ′′ : τ ′′ (from SS23) and in turn ρ′′ ∈Dom(∆)
from SS20. Since ρ 6∈Dom(∆), ρ′′ 6= ρ. Therefore, ||τ ||(V Env∪{(x,region(ρ))},L∪{(ρ,τ ′)}) = region(ρ′′) =
||τ ||(V Env,L).
The most important case is when τ is a pointer type, i.e. τ is of the form τ ′′ ∗ ρ′′. In this
case, using SS20 and (SS22 or SS21), we get ρ′′ 6= ρ and hence ||τ ||(V Env∪{(x,region(ρ))},L∪{(ρ,τ ′)}) =
{Uninit}∪Dom(L[ρ′′].RS) = ||τ ||(V Env,L).
We now state and prove the invariant preservation theorem for expressions.
Theorem 1 If C ` e : τ and C `env(VEnv, L) then either (VEnv, L, e) −→∗exprError or (VEnv,
L, e) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, v) such that v ∈ ||τ ||(V Env′,L′) and C `env (VEnv’, L’)
This theorem states that given a typing context C, if e is a well typed expression typing to τ then
evaluation of e in a well formed environment either fails because of a run-time check failure or gives
a value of the appropriate type along with another well formed environment.
Proof: The proof of this theorem is by induction on the structure of typing derivation of C ` e : τ .
Based on the last rule used in the typing derivation of e, we have the following (exhaustive) list
of cases:
• SS0
e must be of the form x and x ∈ Dom(Γ).
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Since C `env (VEnv, L), from Inv1 we get x ∈ Dom(VEnv).
Now consider (VEnv, L, x) with x ∈ Dom(VEnv). Rule R18 applies. Hence, (VEnv, L, x)
−→expr (VEnv, L, v) where v is the image of x in VEnv. q.e.d.
• SS1
e must be of the form n.
Trivially, (VEnv, L, e) −→∗expr (VEnv, L, n). q.e.d.
• SS2
e must be of the form e1 op e2 with C ` e1 : int and C ` e2 : int.
Using induction hypothesis, we have (VEnv, L, e1) −→∗expr Error or (VEnv”, L”, v1) with v1
∈ ||int||(V Env′′,L′′) and C `env(VEnv”, L”).
If (VEnv, L, e1) −→∗expr Error then q.e.d.
If not, using induction hypothesis again, we have (VEnv”, L”, e2) −→expr Error or (VEnv’,
L’, v2) with v2 ∈ ||int||(V Env′,L′) and C `env(VEnv’, L’).
If (VEnv, L, e2) −→∗expr Error then q.e.d.
If not,
– Using lemma R19*, we have (VEnv, L, e1 op e2) −→∗expr (VEnv”, L”, v1 op e2)
– Using lemma R20*, we have (VEnv”, L”, v1 op e2) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, v1 op v2)
– Since v1, v2 ∈ Int, using R21 we have (VEnv’, L’, v1 opInt v2). with v1 opInt v2 ∈ Int
and (C `env(VEnv’, L’). q.e.d.
• SS3
e must be of the form Uninit.
Trivially (VEnv, L, Uninit) −→∗expr (VEnv, L, Uninit) and since Uninit ∈ ||τ ||(V Env,L) where
τ 6=handle(ρ′, τ ′) , q.e.d.
• SS4
e must be of the form load e′ and there exists ρ such that C ` ρ : τ and C ` e′ : τ ∗ ρ and
τ 6∈ {Unknown, char}.
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Now using induction hypothesis we have either (VEnv, L, e′) −→∗expr Error or (VEnv”, L”,
v′) such that v′ ∈ ({Uninit}∪Dom(L”[ρ].RS) ) and (VEnv”, L”) is well formed environment.
If v′ = Uninit then by R23, (VEnv”, L”, load v′) −→expr Error and q.e.d.
If v′ ∈ Dom(L”[ρ].RS) then from the load rule R23, we get (VEnv”, L”, load v′) −→expr
(VEnv”, L”, getvalue(L”, v′)).
From the “getvalue” lemma we get getvalue(L”, v′) ∈ ||τ ||(V Env′′,L′′). Now using R22* we
have the result. q.e.d.
Informally, the proof step says that in case of load from type consistent memory, the address
points to a correct object in the region or its uninitialized value, hence it progresses to an




e must be of the form loadU x, e2, τ must be int with C ` e2 : τ ′ ∗ ρ and C ` τ : Unknown
and C ` x :handle(ρ, Unknown).
Using induction hypothesis, we have either (VEnv, L, x) −→∗expr Error or (VEnv”, L”, v1)
with v1 = region(ρ) and C `env (VEnv”, L”).
If not Error, using lemma R24*, we get (VEnv, L, loadU e1, e2) −→∗expr (VEnv” , L”, loadU
region(ρ), e2).
Again from induction hypothesis on e2 we have (VEnv”, L”, e2) −→∗expr Error or (VEnv’, L’,
v2) with v2 ∈ {Uninit}∪ Dom(L[ρ].RS) and C `env (VEnv’, L’).
If (VEnv”, L”, e2) −→∗expr Error then q.e.d.
If not, using lemma R25*, we get (VEnv”, L”, load region(ρ), e2) −→∗expr (VEnv’, L’, load
region(ρ), v2) and v2 ∈ {Uninit}∪ Dom(L[ρ].RS). Now R26 applies and since we check that
v2 + 3 ∈ Dom(L[ρ].RS), we get Error or (VEnv’, L’, getvalue(L, v1, 4).
From “Getvalue” lemma2, getvalue just retrieves the value from the location, and doesn’t





e has to be of form poolalloc(x, e2) and τ of the form τ ′ ∗ ρ and C ` ρ : τ ′ and C `
x :handle(ρ, τ ′) and C ` e2 : int
Using induction hypothesis, (VEnv, L, x) −→expr Error or (VEnv”, L”, v) s.t. v =region(ρ).
If not error, (VEnv”, L”’, e2) −→expr (VEnv”’, L”, n). If n is one then either rule (R34 or
rule R35 applies.
If rule R34 applies, then the value returned is a value from the free list, and from invariant
4 for well-formed environments, we get that the value returned is of the correct type. Since
we just removed an element from the freelist, the Inv5 still holds and we continue to have a
well formed environment.
If R35 applies, then we add an element to the set of addresses of this region and since the new
address is from system heap H, Inv6 continues to hold. Inv4 holds in the new environment
since we have initialized it with Uninit value. Inv5 holds since the free list has not changed.
Hence the well formedness of the environment remains intact.
The case where n is not one is similar by using the array allocation rule. q.e.d.
• SS7
e has to be of the form castintpointer x, e′′ to τ ′ ∗ ρ with τ of the form τ ′ ∗ ρ with C ` ρ : τ ′,
C ` x :handle(ρ, τ ′) and C ` e′′ : int
Using induction hypothesis, (VEnv, L, x) −→∗expr Error or (VEnv”, L”, v′) such that v′ =
region(ρ).
If not error, using lemma R30* we have (VEnv, L, castintpointer e’, e” to τ ′ ∗ ρ) −→∗expr
(VEnv”, L”, castintpointer region(ρ), e′′ to τ ′ ∗ ρ ).
Using induction hypothesis again (VEnv”, L”, e′′) −→∗expr Error or (VEnv’, L’, v′′) such that
v′′ ∈ Int. If not error, using lemma R31* we have (VEnv”, L”, castintpointer region(ρ), e′′
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to τ ′ ∗ ρ ) −→∗expr (VEnv”, L”, castintpointer region(ρ), v2 to τ ′ ∗ ρ ) with v2 ∈ Int.
From ruleR31 from the operational semantics, we get (VEnv”, L”, castintpointer region(ρ), v2
to τ ′ ∗ ρ) −→expr Error or (VEnv”, L”, v2) s.t. v2 ∈ Dom(L”[ρ].RS) or in other words
v2 ∈ ||τ ′ ∗ ρ||(V Env′′,L′′). q.e.d.
• SS8
This is straightforward application of the induction hypothesis and rule R28. None of the
invariants change since the invariants for pointer types depend on the region attribute and
not the actual type (see the discussion of SS8 in section 4.2.2 to understand how we can
support casts between arbitrary pointer types).
• SS9
All array accesses are checked for the pool boundaries and alignment. e is of the form
x,&e2[e3] with C ` ρ : τ , C ` x :handle(ρ, τ), C ` e2 : τ ∗ ρ, C ` e3 : int.
Using induction hypothesis we get, (VEnv, L, x) −→∗expr Error or (VEnv”, L”, region(ρ))
with C `env (VEnv”, L”).
If not error, then using lemma R37* we get (VEnv, L, x,&e2[e3]) −→∗expr (VEnv”, L”,
region(ρ), &e2[e3]).
Using induction hypothesis again we get, (VEnv”, L”, e2) −→∗expr Error or (VEnv”’, L”’, v2)
with v2 ∈ ||τ ∗ ρ||(V Env′′′,L′′′) and C `env (VEnv”’, L”’).
If not error, then using lemmaR38* we get (VEnv”, L”, region(ρ), &e2[e3]) −→∗expr (VEnv”’,
L”’, region(ρ), &v2[e3]).
Using induction hypothesis again we get, (VEnv”’, L”’, e3) −→∗expr Error or (VEnv’, L’, n)
with C `env (VEnv’, L’).
If not error, then using lemmaR39* we get (VEnv”’, L”’, region(ρ), &v2[e3]) −→∗expr (VEnv’,
L’, region(ρ), &v2[m]).
Now R40 applies. If (v2 + m∗sizeof(τ)) 6∈ Dom(L’[ρ]) then Error else (VEnv’, L’, v2 +
m∗sizeof(τ)) with (v2 +m∗sizeof(τ)) ∈ ||τ ∗ ρ||(V Env′,L′) and C `env (VEnv’,L’). q.e.d.
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• SS10
This is straightforward application of the induction hypothesis and rule R28.
Theorem 2 If C `S and C `env(VEnv, L) then either (VEnv, L, S) −→∗stmtError or (VEnv, L,
S ) −→∗stmt (VEnv’, L’, ) and C `env (VEnv’, L’).
Here −→∗stmt represents reflexive transitive closure of −→stmt. This theorem states that given a
typing environment C, if statement S is well typed in that typing environment then evaluation
of S either fails because of a run-time check failure or terminates along with another well formed
environment. To put it differently, it does not get stuck because of type violation (e.g. trying to
access non-existent memory location).
Proof: The proof of this theorem is by induction on the structure of typing derivation of C ` S.
Based on the last rule used in the typing derivation of S, we have the following (exhaustive)
list of cases:
• SS11
S is of the form .
Trivial case.
• SS12
S is of the form S1; S2 with C ` S1 and C ` S2.
Using induction hypothesis, (VEnv, L, S1) −→∗stmt Error or (VEnv”, L”, ).
If not Error, Using R1* (VEnv, L, S1 ; S2) −→∗stmt (VEnv”, L”, S2)
Using induction hypothesis again, we have (VEnv”, L”, S2) −→∗stmt Error or (VEnv”, L”, ).
Using transitivity of −→∗stmt q.e.d.
• SS13
S is of the form x = e with C ` x : τ and C ` e : τ .
Using Theorem 1 on C ` e : τ , we have (VEnv, L, e) −→∗expr Error or (VEnv”, L”, v) with v
∈ ||τ ∗ ρ||(V Env′′,L′′) and C `env (VEnv”, L”).
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Using lemma R2*, we get (VEnv, L, x = e) −→∗stmt (VEnv”, L”, x = v). with v ∈
||τ ||(V Env′′,L′′).
Using R3 we get (VEnv”, L”, x = v) −→∗stmt (VEnv”[x 7→ v], L”, ).
Let VEnv’ = VEnv”[x 7→ v]. Now we need to prove that C `env (VEnv’, L”). Inv1, Inv2,
Inv4, Inv5, Inv6 can be trivially proved from C `env (VEnv”, L”).
We have C ` x : τ and v ∈ ||τ ||(V Env′′,L′′). So v ∈ ||τ ||(V Env′,L′) since VEnv’ differs from
VEnv” differs only in the mapping of x. We also have VEnv’[x] = v. So Inv3 continues to
hold. Hence C `env (VEnv’, L”).
• SS14
S if of the form C ` store e2, e1, with C ` ρ : τ , C ` e1 : τ ∗ ρ, and C ` e2 : τ .
Using Theorem 1, we have (VEnv, L, e2) −→∗expr Error or (VEnv”, L”, v2) with v2 ∈
||τ ||(V Env′′,L′′) and C `env (VEnv”, L”).
If not error, Using R4*, we have (VEnv, L, store e2, e1) −→∗stmt (VEnv”, L”, store v2, e1).
First from Inv2 we have ρ ∈ Dom(L).
Now using theorem 1, we have (VEnv”, L”, e1) −→∗expr Error or (VEnv’, L’, v1) with v1 ∈
||τ ∗ ρ||(V Env′,L′) and C `env (VEnv’, L’).
If not error, Using R5*, we have (VEnv”, L”, store v2, e1) −→∗stmt (VEnv’, L’, store v2, v1).
If v1 is Uninit then using R6 we get (VEnv’, L’, store v2, v1) −→stmt Error and q.e.d.
If not,(VEnv’, L’, store v2, v1) −→stmt (VEnv’, update(L’, v1, v2),  from R6.
Using the Update lemma1, C `env (VEnv’, update(L’, v1, v2).
Similarly we can prove for the SS14char case.
• SS15 and SS15char
same as above
• SS16
S is of the form poolfree(x, e2) and C ` ρ : τ and C ` x : handle(ρ, τ) and C ` e2 : τ ∗ ρ.
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Using Theorem1, we get (VEnv, L, x) (VEnv”, L”, v1) s.t. v1 ∈ ||handle(ρ, τ)||(V Env′′,L′′)
and C `env (VEnv”, L”).
Now using Theorem 1 again, we get (VEnv”, L”, e2) −→∗expr Error or (VEnv’, L’, v2) with
v2 ∈ ||τ ∗ ρ||(V Env′,L′) and C `env (VEnv’, L’).
Using R12* and R13*, we get (VEnv, L, poolfree(x, e2)) −→∗stmt (VEnv’, L’, poolfree(
v1, v2)).
From the definition of ||τ ||, v1 = region(ρ) and
v2 ∈ {Uninit}∪Dom(L’[ρ].RS).
If (v2 == Uninit) then from R14, (VEnv’, L’, poolfree(v1, v2)) −→∗stmt Error.
If not, from Inv2 ρ ∈ Dom(L’) and R14 applies. Let L’ = L” ∪ {(ρ, {F ;RS})}, ρ 6∈Dom(L”).
So (VEnv’, L” ∪ {(ρ, {F ;RS})}, poolfree(region(ρ), v2))−→stmt (VEnv’, L” ∪ {(ρ, {v2F ;RS})}, ).
We just need to prove that C `env (VEnv’, L” ∪ {(ρ, {v2F ;RS})}).
We already have C `env (VEnv’, L’). So for (VEnv’, L” ∪ {(ρ, {v2F ;RS})}) Inv1, Inv2,
Inv3 trivially hold as they are the same for (VEnv’, L’). Inv4 holds since ∀ρ L’[ρ].RS is
unmodified. Inv5 holds since v2 ∈ Dom(L’[ρ].RS). Inv6 holds since ∀ρ L’[ρ].RS and H is
unmodified. Hence C `env (VEnv’, L” ∪ {(ρ, {v2F ;RS})}). q.e.d.
• SS17
S is of the form poolinit(ρ, τ) x { S’ } with C(= Γ,∆) ` τ and Γ[x 7→handle(ρ, τ)],∆[ρ 7→
τ ] ` S′ with x 6∈Dom(Γ) and ρ 6∈Dom(∆).
Rule R15 applies if ρ 6∈ Dom(L). We already have ρ 6∈ Dom(∆) and from Inv2 we have
ρ 6∈ Dom(L). So R15 applies. Hence, (VEnv, L, poolinit(ρ, τ)x { S’ }) −→stmt (VEnv ∪
{(x,region(ρ))}, L ∪ {(ρ, {φ;φ})}, pool { S’ }pop(ρ)).
Let VEnv” = VEnv ∪ {(x,region(ρ))} and L” = L ∪ {(ρ, {φ;φ})}.
Let C’ (Γ′,∆′) = Γ[x 7→handle(ρ, τ)],∆[ρ 7→ τ ]. We first need to prove that C ′ `env (VEnv”,
L”).
– Inv1
From Inv1 of (VEnv, L), we get Dom(Γ) = Dom(VEnv).
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Dom(Γ′) = Dom(Γ) ∪ { x }




From Inv2 of (VEnv, L), we get Dom(∆) = Dom(L).
Dom(∆′) = Dom(∆) ∪ { ρ }




From Inv3 of (VEnv, L) we get ∀y ∈ Dom(VEnv), if C ` y : τ ′ then VEnv[y] ∈
||τ ′||(V Env,L)
Since Dom(V Env′) = Dom(VEnv) ∪ { x }. We just need to prove the invariant for
x. We have C ′ ` x : handle(ρ, τ) and VEnv”[x] = region(ρ), and so the invariant Inv3
continues to hold.
– Inv4
From Inv4 of (VEnv, L) we get ∀ρ′ ∈ Dom(L), if C ` ρ′ : τ ′ then ∀v ∈ Dom((L[ρ′]).RS),
L[ρ′].RS[v] ∈ ||τ ′||(V Env,L) .
∀ρ′ ∈ Dom(L”),
∗ if ρ′ ∈Dom(L), then Inv4 continues to hold because none of the previous regions
changed.
∗ if ρ′ = ρ, then since Dom(L”[ρ].RS) = φ the invariant holds trivially.
Hence Inv4 holds.
– Inv5
From Inv5 of (VEnv, L) we get ∀ρ′ ∈ Dom(L), Dom((L[ρ′]).F) ⊆ Dom((L[ρ′]).RS).
∀ρ′ ∈ Dom(L”),
∗ if ρ′ ∈Dom(L), then Inv5 continues to hold because none of the regions in L are
changed.
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From Inv6 of (VEnv, L) we get ∀ρ1ρ2 ∈ Dom(L), if ρ1 6= ρ2 then Dom((L[ρ1]).RS) ∩
Dom((L[ρ2]).RS) = φ.
∀ρ1ρ2 ∈ Dom(L”),
∗ if ρ1, ρ2 ∈Dom(L), then Inv6 continues to hold because none of the regions in L
changed.
∗ if either of ρ1 or ρ2 = ρ, then since Dom(L”[ρ].RS) = φ, the invariant holds trivially.
Moreover, H does not change so the Inv6 holds.
Hence C ′ `env (VEnv”, L”).
Now using induction hypothesis, we get (VEnv”, L”, S) −→∗stmt (VEnv”’, L”’, ) and C ′ `env
(VEnv”’, L”’).
Using lemma R16* we get (VEnv”, L”, pool { S }pop(ρ)) −→∗stmt (VEnv”’, L”’, pool { 
}pop(ρ)).
Now C ′ `env (VEnv”’, L”’).
So from Inv1 we have x ∈Dom(VEnv”’).
From Inv3 we have VEnv”’[x] =region(ρ).
From Inv2 we have ρ in Dom(L”’).
Let VEnv”’ = VEnv’ ∪ {(x,region(ρ))} and L”’ = L’ ∪ {(ρ,R)}.
Now rule R17 applies.
(VEnv”’, L”’, pool {  }pop(ρ)) −→stmt (VEnv’, L’, ).
Let H”’ be the set of unused system addresses before this operation. and H’ be the set of
unused system addresses after. Then H’ = H”’ ∪ Dom(L”’[ρ].RS).
We need to prove that C `env (VEnv’, L’).
Note that Dom(VEnv”’) = Dom(VEnv’) ∪ {x} where x 6∈ Dom(VEnv’).
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– Inv1
From Inv1 of (VEnv”’, L”’), we get Dom(Γ′) = Dom(VEnv”’).
So Dom(Γ) ∪{x} =Dom(VEnv’) ∪ {x}. but x 6∈Dom(Γ) and x 6∈Dom(VEnv’). So
Dom(Γ) = Dom(VEnv’) . q.e.d.
– Inv2
From Inv2 of (VEnv”’, L”’), we get Dom(∆′) = Dom(L”’).
So Dom(∆) ∪{ρ} =Dom(L’) ∪ {ρ}. but ρ 6∈Dom(∆) and ρ 6∈Dom(L’). So Dom(∆) =
Dom(L’) . q.e.d.
– Inv3
From Inv3 of (VEnv”’, L”’), we get ∀y ∈Dom(VEnv”’), if C ′ ` y : τ then VEnv”’[y]
∈ ||τ ||(V Env′′′,L′′′).
∀y ∈Dom(VEnv’), if C ` y : τ then we have y 6= x and y ∈Dom(VEnv”’).
VEnv”’[y] ∈ ||τ ||(V Env′′′,L′′′). Since y 6= x, VEnv”’[y] = VEnv’[y]. From Well formed
type lemma and Safe region deallocate lemma we have ||τ ||(V Env′′′,L′′′) = ||τ ||(V Env′,L′).
q.e.d.
– Inv4
From Inv4 of (VEnv”’, L”’) we get ∀ρ′ ∈ Dom(L”’), if C ′ ` ρ′ : τ ′ then ∀v ∈
Dom((L”’[ρ′]).RS), L”’[ρ′].RS[v] ∈ ||τ ′||(V Env′′′,L′′′) .
∀ρ′ ∈ Dom(L’), if C ` ρ′ : τ ′ then we know that
ρ′ 6= ρ and ρ′ ∈Dom(L”’).
So we have, ∀v ∈ Dom((L”’[ρ′]).RS), L”’[ρ′].RS[v] ∈ ||τ ′||(V Env′′′,L′′′) .
But ρ′ 6= ρ so ∀v ∈ Dom((L’[ρ′]).RS), L’[ρ′].RS[v] ∈ ||τ ′||(V Env′′′,L′′′′) .
Now using Well formed type lemma and Safe region deallocate lemma we have
||τ ′||(V Env′′′,L′′′) = ||τ ||(V Env′,L′).
q.e.d.
– Inv5
From Inv5 of (VEnv”’, L”’) we get ∀ρ′ ∈Dom(L”’), Dom((L”’[ρ′]).F)⊆Dom((L”’[ρ′]).RS).




From Inv6 of (VEnv”’, L”’) we get ∀ρ1ρ2 ∈ Dom(L”’), if ρ1 6= ρ2 then Dom((L”’[ρ1]).RS)
∩ Dom(L”’[ρ2].RS) = φ.
This trivially holds for (VEnv’, L’) since we have just taken an element out of the map
for L”’.
Also, ∀ρ′ ∈ Dom(L’), ρ′ 6= ρ and Dom(L’[ρ′].RS) = Dom(L”’[ρ′].RS). From Inv6 of
(VEnv”’,L”’) Dom(L”’[ρ′].RS) ∩ H”’ = φ and Dom(L”’[ρ′].RS) ∩ Dom(L”’[ρ].RS) = φ.







The SAFECode approach discussed in chapters 4 and 5, as explaied earlier, may not detect some
array bound violations. In this chapter, we present a novel backwards-compatible bounds checking
technique for C that can be used in conjunction with the earlier solution.
The fundamental difficulty of bounds checking in C and C++ is the need to track at run-
time, the intended target object of each pointer value (called the intended referent by Jones and
Kelly [37]). Unlike safe languages like Java, pointer arithmetic in C and C++ allows a pointer to
be computed into the middle of an array or string object and used later to further index into the
object. Since such intermediate pointers can be saved into arbitrary data structures in memory
and passed via function calls, checking the later indexing operations requires tracking the intended
referent of the pointer through in-memory data structures and function calls. The compiler must
transform the program to perform this tracking and this has proved to be a very difficult problem.
More specifically, there are three broad classes of solutions:
• Use an expanded pointer representation (“fat pointers”) to record information about the in-
tended referent with each pointer : This approach allows efficient look-up of the pointer but
the non-standard pointer representation is incompatible with external unchecked code, e.g.
precompiled libraries. The difficulties of solving this problem in existing legacy code makes
this approach largely impractical by itself. The challenges involved are described in more
detail in Section 6.4.
• Store the metadata separately from the pointer but use a map (e.g., a hash table) from pointers
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to metadata: This solution reduces but does not eliminate the compatibility problems of
fat pointers, because checked pointers possibly modified by an external library must have
their metadata updated at a library call. Furthermore, this adds a potentially high cost for
searching the maps for the referent on loads and stores through pointers.
• Store only the address ranges of live objects and ensure that intermediate pointer arithmetic
never crosses out of the original object into another valid object [37]: This approach, at-
tributed to Jones and Kelly, stores the address ranges in a global table (organized as a splay
tree) and looks up the table (or the splay tree) for the intended referent before every pointer
arithmetic operation. This eliminates the incompatibilities caused by associating metadata
with pointers themselves but current solutions based on this approach have even higher over-
head than the previous two approaches. Jones and Kelly [37] report overheads of 5x-6x for
most programs. Ruwase and Lam [57] extend the Jones and Kelly approach to support a
larger class of C programs but report slowdowns of a factor of 11x–12x, if enforcing bounds
for all objects, and of 1.6x–2x for several significant programs even if only enforcing bounds
for strings. These overheads are far too high for use in “production code” (i.e., finished code
deployed to end-users), which is important if bounds checks are to be used as a security
mechanism (not just for debugging). For brevity, we refer to these two approaches as JK and
JKRL in this work.
Note that compile-time checking of array bounds violations via static analysis is not sufficient
by itself because it is usually only successful at proving correctness of a fraction (usually small)
of array and pointer references [7, 22, 25, 26, 70]. Therefore, such static checking techniques are
primarily useful to reduce the number of run-time checks.
An acceptable solution for production code would be one that has no compatibility problems
(like the Jones-Kelly approach and its extension), but has overhead low enough for production use.
A state-of-the-art static checking algorithm can and should be used to reduce the overhead but we
view that as a way to reduce overhead by a constant fraction, for any of the run-time techniques.
The discussion above shows that none of the three current run-time checking approaches come close
to providing such an acceptable solution, with or without static checking.
In this chapter, we describe a method that dramatically reduces the run-time overhead of Jones
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and Kelly’s “referent table” method with the Ruwase-Lam extension, to the point that we believe
it can be used in production code (and static checking and other static optimizations could reduce
the overhead even further). We propose two key improvements to the approach:
1. We exploit Automatic Pool Allocation (discussed in Chapter 3.4 to greatly reduce the cost of
the referent lookups by partitioning the global splay tree into many small trees, while ensuring
that the tree to search is known at compile-time. The transformation also safely eliminates
many scalar objects from the splay trees, making the trees even smaller.
2. We exploit a common feature of modern operating systems to eliminate explicit run-time
checks on loads and stores, which are a major source of additional overhead in the Ruwase-Lam
extension. This technique also eliminates a practical complication of Jones and Kelly, namely,
the need for one byte of padding on objects and function parameters, which compromises
compatibility with external libraries.
We also describe a few compile-time optimizations that reduce the sizes of the splay trees, by a
large extent in some cases, or reduce the number of referent lookups. As discussed in Section 6.1.4,
our approach preserves compatibility with external libraries (the main benefits of the JK and JKRL
methods) and detects all errors detected by those methods except for references that use pointers
cast from integers.
Section 6.1 briefly describes the Jones-Kelly algorithm with the Ruwase-Lam extension and
then describes how we maintain and query the referent object maps on a per-pool basis. It also
describes three optimizations to reduce the cost of referent object queries. Section 6.3 describes our
experimental evaluation and results. Section 6.4 compares our work with previous work on array
bounds checking. Section 6.5 concludes with a summary.
6.1 Runtime Checking with Efficient Referent Lookup
6.1.1 The Jones-Kelly Algorithm and Ruwase-Lam Extension
Jones and Kelly rely on, and strictly enforce, three properties of ANSI C in their approach: (1)
Every pointer value at run-time is derived from the address of a unique object, which may be a
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declared variable or memory returned by a single heap allocation, and must only be used to access
that object. Jones and Kelly refer to this as the intended referent of a pointer. (2) Any arithmetic
on a pointer value must ensure that the source and result pointers point into the same object or
at most one byte past the end of the object (the latter value may be used for comparisons, e.g., in
loop termination, but not for loads and stores). (3) Because of the potential for type-converting
pointer casts, it is not feasible in general to distinguish distinct arrays within a single allocated
object defined above, e.g., two array fields in a struct type, and the Jones-Kelly technique does
not attempt to do so.
Jones and Kelly maintain a table describing all allocated objects in the program and update
this table on malloc/free operations and on function entry/exit. To avoid recording the intended
referent for each pointer (this is the key to backwards compatibility), they check property (2)
strictly on every pointer arithmetic operation, which ensures that a computed pointer value always
points within the range of its intended referent. Therefore, the intended referent can be found by
searching the table of allocated objects.
More specifically, they insert the following checks (ignoring any later optimization) on each
arithmetic operation involving a pointer value:
JK1. check the source pointer is not the invalid value (-2);
JK2. find the referent object for the source pointer value using the table;
JK3. check that the result pointer value is within the bounds of this referent object plus the extra
byte. If the result pointer exceeds the bounds, the result -2 is returned to mark the pointer
value as invalid.
JK4. Finally, on any load or store, perform checks [JK1-JK3] but JK3 checks the source pointer
itself.
Assuming any dereference of the invalid value (-2) is disallowed by the operating system, the
last run-time check (JK4) before loads and stores is strictly not necessary for bounds checking. It
is, however, a useful check to detect some (but not all) dereferences of pointers to freed memory
and pointer cast errors. The most expensive part of these checks is step (JK2), finding the referent
object by searching the table. Jones-Kelley use a data structure called a splay tree to record the
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valid object ranges, which must be disjoint. Given a pointer value, they search this tree to find an
object whose range contains that value.
If no valid range is found for a given pointer value, the pointer must have been derived from
an object allocated by uninstrumented part of the program, e.g., an external library, or by pointer
arithmetic in such a part of the program (since no legal pointer can ever be used to compute an
illegal one). Such pointers values cannot be checked and therefore, step (JK3) is skipped, i.e., any
array bound violations may not be detected.
One complication in Jones-Kelley’s work is that, because a computed pointer may point to the
byte after the end of its referent object, the compiler must insert padding of one-byte (or more)
between any two objects to distinguish a pointer to the “extra” byte of the first object from a
pointer to the second object. They modify the compiler and the malloc library to add this extra
byte on all allocated objects. Objects can also be passed as function parameters, however, and
inserting padding between two adjacent parameters could cause the memory layout of parameters
to differ in checked and unchecked code. To avoid this potential incompatibility, they do not pad
parameters to any function call if the call could invoke an unchecked function and also they do not
pad formal parameters in any function that may be called from unchecked code. In the presence
of indirect calls via function pointers, the compiler must be conservative about identifying such
functions.
A more serious difficulty observed by Ruwase and Lam is that rule (2) above is violated by
many C programs (60% of the programs in their experiments), and hence is too strict for practical
use. The key problem is that some programs may compute illegal intermediate values via pointer
arithmetic but never use them. For example, in the sequence {q = p+12; r = q-8; N = *r;},
the value q may be out-of-bounds while r is within bounds for the same object as ∗p. Jones and
Kelly would reject such a program at q = p+12 because the correct referent cannot be identified
later (q may point into an arbitrary neighboring object).
Ruwase and Lam extend the JK algorithm essentially by tracking the intended referent of
pointers explicitly but only in the case where a pointer moves out of bounds of its intended referent.
For every such out-of-bounds pointer, they allocate an object called the OOB (Out-Of-Bounds)
object to hold some metadata for the pointer. The pointer itself is modified to point to the OOB
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object, and the addresses of live OOB objects are also entered into a hash table. This hash table
is checked only before accessing the OOB object to ensure that it is a valid OOB object address.
The OOB object includes the actual pointer value itself and the address of the intended referent
(saved when the pointer first goes out of bounds). Any arithmetic on the pointer is performed on
the value in the OOB object. If the pointer value comes back within bounds, the original pointer
is restored to its current value and the OOB object is deallocated.
The extra operations required in the Ruwase-Lam extension are: (1) to allocate and initialize
an OOB object when a pointer first goes out-of-bounds; (2) on any pointer arithmetic operation,
if the pointer value does not have a valid referent and cannot be identified as an unchecked object,
search the OOB hash table to see if it points to an OOB object, and if so, perform the operation on
the value in the OOB object; (3) when an object is deallocated (implicitly at the end of a program
scope or explicitly via free operation), scan the OOB object hash table to deallocate any OOB
objects corresponding to the referent object that is being deallocated.
The first two operations add extra overhead only for out-of-bounds pointers, which would have
caused the program to halt with a run-time error in the JK scheme. The third operation is required
even in the case of strictly correct program behavior allowed by J-K. Perhaps more importantly,
step JK4 of Jones-Kelley, is now necessary for bounds checking since dereferencing OOB objects is
disallowed. In particular, if we wish to combine this approach with other techniques for detecting
all dereferences to freed memory ([71, 20]) or all pointer cast errors ([52, 21]), we would still need
to perform JK4 (or a variant which checks that OOB objects are never dereferenced).
6.1.2 Our Approach
Our approach is based on the Jones-Kelley algorithm with the RL extension but with two key
improvements that greatly reduce the run-time overhead in practice and makes the approach useful
in production level systems. In fact, the improvements are dramatic enough that we are even able
to use our system for checking all array operations (not just strings) and still achieve much lower
overheads than the JK or RL approaches (even compared with the RL approach applied only to
strings). The two improvements are: (1) Exploiting Automatic Pool Allocation [46] for much faster




















Figure 6.1: Sample code before and after bounds checking instrumentation
pointers that eliminates the need for run-time checks on most loads and stores.
The Jones-Kelley approach, and in turn Ruwase-Lam extension, rely on one splay data structure
for the entire heap. Every memory object, except for a few stack objects whose address is not taken,
is entered in this big data structure. This data structure is looked up for almost every access to
memory or pointer arithmetic operation. For a program with large number of memory objects, the
size of the data structure could be very large, making the lookups quite expensive.
The main idea behind our first improvement is to exploit the partitioning of memory created by
Automatic Pool Allocation to reduce the size of the splay tree data structures used for each search
operation. Instead of using one large splay tree for the entire program, we maintain one splay tree
per pool. The size of each individual splay tree is likely to be much smaller than the combined one.
Since the complexity of searching the splay tree for uniform accesses is amortized O(log2n) (and
better for non-uniform accesses), the lookup for each pointer access is likely to be much faster than
in the JK or RL approaches.
A key property that makes this approach feasible is that the pool descriptor for each pointer
is known at compile-time. Without this, we would have to maintain a run-time mapping from
pointers to pools, which would introduce a significant extra cost as well as the same compatibility
problems as previous techniques that maintain metadata on pointers.
Algorithm
The steps taken by the compiler in our approach are as follows:
1. First, pool-allocate the program. Let Pools be the map computed by the transformation
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giving the pool descriptor for each pointer variable.
2. For every pointer arithmetic operation in the original program, p = q + c, insert a run-time
check to test that p and q have the same referent. We use the function getreferent(PoolDescriptor
*PD, void *p) to look up the intended referent of a pointer, p. The pool descriptor, PD, iden-
tifies which splay tree to lookup. For the instruction p = q + c, we compute p, then invoke
getreferent(Pools[q], q), and finally check that p has the same referent as q using the function
call boundscheck(Referent *r, void *p).
3. The correct pool descriptor for a pointer q may not be known either if the value q is obtained
from an integer-to-pointer cast or from unchecked code (e.g, as a result of a call to an external
function). The latter case is discussed in Section 6.1.4. The two cases can be distinguished via
the flags on the target points-to graph node: the former case results in a U (Unknown) flag
while the latter results in a missing C (complete) flag, i.e., the node is marked incomplete. In
the former case, the pointer may actually point to an object allocated in the main program,
i.e., the object has a valid entry in the splay tree of some pool but we do not know which
pool at compile-time. We do not check pointer arithmetic on such pointers. This is weaker
than Jones-Kelly as it might allow bound violations on such pointers to go undetected.
Handling Non-Heap Data
The original pool allocation transformation only created pools to hold heap-allocated data. We
would like to create partitions of globals and stack objects as well, to avoid using large combined
splay trees for those objects. The pointer analysis underlying pool allocation includes points-to
graph nodes for all memory objects, including global and stack objects. We have already extended
pool allocation so that it assigns pool descriptors to all global and stack objects as well, without
changing how the objects are allocated (see chapter 4.4). Pool allocation already created pool
descriptors for points-to graph nodes that include heap objects as well as global or stack objects.
We only had to modify it to also create “dummy” pool descriptors for nodes that included only
global or stack objects. The transformation automatically ensures that the objects are created in
the appropriate function (e.g., in main if the node includes any globals). We call these “dummy”
pool descriptors because no heap allocation actually occurs using them: they simply provide a
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logical handle to a compiler-chosen subset of memory objects.
For the current work, we have to record each object in the splay tree for the corresponding pool.
We do this in main for global objects and in the appropriate function for stack-allocated variables
(many local variables are promoted to registers and do not need to be stack-allocated or recorded).
The bounds checks for operations on pointers to such pools are unchanged.
6.1.3 Handling Out-Of-Bounds Pointers
The Ruwase-Lam extension to handle OOB pointers requires expensive checks on all loads/stores
in the program (before any elimination of redundant checks). In this work, we propose a novel
approach to handle out of bounds values in user-level programs without requiring checks on any
individual loads or stores.
Whenever any pointer arithmetic computes an address outside of the intended referent, we
create a new OOB object and enter it into a hash-table recording the OOB object address (just like
Ruwase-Lam). We use a separate OOB hash-table per pool, for reasons described below. The key
difference is that, instead of returning the address of the newly created OOB object and recording
that in the out-of-bounds pointer variable, we return an address from a part of the address space
of the program reserved for the kernel (e.g., addresses greater than 0xbfffffff in standard Linux
implemenations on 32-bit machines). Any access to this address by a user level programs will cause
a hardware trap1. Within each pool, we maintain a second hash table, mapping the returned value
and the OOB object. Note that we can reuse the high address space for different pools and so
we have a gigabyte of address space (on 32 bit linux systems) for each pool for mapping the OOB
objects.
A load/store using out of bounds values will immediately result in a hardware trap and we can
safely abort the program. However, all pointer arithmetic on such values needs to be done on the
actual out of bounds value. So on every pointer arithmetic, we first check if the source pointer
lies in the high gigabyte and then lookup the OOB hash map of the pool to get the corresponding
OOB object. This OOB object contains the actual out of bounds value. We perform the pointer
arithmetic on the actual out of bounds value. If the result after arithmetic goes back in to the
1If no such reserved range is available, e.g. we are doing bounds-checking for kernel modules, then we will need
to insert checks on individual loads and stores just like the Ruwase-Lam extension.
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bounds of the referent then we return that result. If the result after arithmetic is still out of bounds,
we create a new OOB object and store the result in the new OOB. We then map this new OOB
to an unused value in the high gigabyte, store the value along with the OOB object in the OOB
hash map for the pool and return the value. Note that just like Ruwase-Lam, we need to change
all pointer comparisons to take in to account the new out of bound values.
Step 2 in our approach is now modified as follows:
For every pointer arithmetic operation in the original program, p = q + c, we first check if q is a
value in the high gigabyte. This is an inexpensive check and involves one comparison. There are
two possibilities.
• Case 1: q is not in the high giga byte.
Here we do the bounds check as before but with one key difference. If the result p is out
of bounds of the referent of q, then instead of flagging it as an error, we create a new OOB
object to store the out of bounds value just like Ruwase-Lam extension. Now we map this
OOB object to a value in the high address space and assign this high address space value to
p.
• Case 2: q is a value in the high address space.
We do the following new check (from the discussion above): We first get the corresponding
OOB object for that address using the hash map in the pool. We then retrieve the actual
out of bounds value from the OOB object and do the arithmetic. If the result is within the
bounds of the referent then we assign the result to p and proceed. If the result is still outside
the bounds of the referent, then we create a new OOB object just like in Case 1.
6.1.4 Compatibility and Error Detection with External Libraries
Automatic Pool Allocation transformation may modify function interfaces and function calls to add
pool descriptors. As in the case of other SAFECode work (see chapter 4.5.6) the transformation
and our bounds checking algorithm can be implemented to work correctly and fully automatically
with uninstrumented external code (e.g., external libraries), although a few out-of-bound accesses
may not be detected. First, to preserve compatibility, calls to external functions are left unmod-
ified. Second, if an internal function may be called from external code, we must ensure that the
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external code calls the original function, not the pool-allocated version. This ensures backwards-
compatibility but makes it possible to miss bounds errors in the corresponding function. In most
cases, we can directly transform the program to pass in the original function and not the pool-
allocated version (this change can be made at compile-time if it passes the function name but may
have to be done at run-time if it passes the function pointer in a scalar variable). In the general
case (which we have not encountered so far), the function pointer may be embedded inside another
data structure. Even for most such functions, the compiler can automatically generate a “varargs”
wrapper designed to distinguish transformed internal calls from external calls. When this is not
possible, we must leave the callback function (and all internal calls to it), completely unmodified.
Except in call-back functions, bounds checks can still be performed within the available program
for all heap-allocated objects (internal or external). Like JK, we intercept all direct calls to malloc
and record the objects in a separate global splay tree. For pointer arithmetic on a pointer to an
incomplete node, we check both the splay tree of the recorded pool for that node and the global
splay tree. All heap objects must be in one of those trees, allowing us to detect bounds violations
on all such objects.
Internal global and stack objects will be recorded in the splay tree for the pool and hence
arithmetic on pointers to them can be checked. We cannot check any static or stack objects
allocated in external code since we do not know the size of the objects. The JK and JKRL
techniques have the same limitation.
6.1.5 Errors in Calling Standard Library Functions and System Calls
More powerful error checking is possible for uses of recognized standard library functions and system
calls. Many bugs triggered inside such functions are due to incorrect usage of library interfaces and
not bugs within the library itself. We can guard against these interface bugs by generating wrappers
for each potentially unsafe library routine; the wrappers first check the necessary preconditions on
buffers passed to the library call and then invoke the actual library call. For example, for a library
call like memcpy(void *s1, const void *s2, size t n), we can generate a wrapper that checks
(1) n > 0, (2) the object pointed to by s2 has at least n more bytes starting from s2 and (2) the
object pointed to by s3 has at least n more bytes starting from s3. These checks can be done using
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the same getreferent and boundscheck functions as before.
Note that the wrappers referred to here are not for compatibility between checked code and
library code, and are only needed if extra bug detection is desired. The wrappers are independent
of the program and only need to written once per the library. We have already written the wrappers
for many of the standard C library functions.
6.1.6 Optimizations
There are number of ways to further reduce the overheads of our run-time checks. We briefly
describe three optimizations that we have implemented. The first optimization below is specific to
our approach because it requires a key property of pool allocation. The other two are orthogonal
to the approach for finding referents and can also be used with the Jones-Kelly or Ruwase-Lam
approaches.
First, we observe that a very large number of single-element objects (which may be scalars or
single-element arrays) are entered into the splay trees in all three approaches. Since a pointer to
any such object can be cast and then indexed as a pointer to an array (e.g., an array of bytes),
references to all such objects (even scalars) must be checked for bounds violations. While many
local scalars of integer or floating point type are promoted to registers, many other local and all
global scalars may still stay memory-resident. Entering all such scalars into the search trees is
extremely wasteful since few programs ever index into such scalars, legally or illegally. We propose
a technique to avoid entering single-element objects into search trees while still detecting bounds
violations for such objects.
To achieve this goal, two challenges must be solved: (1) to identify single-element object allo-
cations, and (2) to detect bounds violations even if such objects are not in the splay trees. For the
former, we observe that most pools even in C and C++ programs are type-homogeneous [46], i.e.,
all objects in the pool are of a single type or are arrays of that type. For non-type-homogeneous
pools, the pool element type is simply a byte. Furthermore, all objects in such a pool are aligned
on a boundary that is an exact multiple of the element size. The size of the element type is already
recorded in each pool at pool creation time. This means that the run-time can detect allocations of
scalars or single-element arrays: these are objects whose size is exactly the size of the pool element
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type. We simply do not enter such objects into the splay tree in the pool.
For the latter problem, the specific issue is that a referent look-up using a valid pool descriptor
will not find the referent object in the splay tree. This can only happen for two reasons: (i) the
object was a one-element object, or (ii) the object was an unchecked object or a non-existent object
but the pointer being dereferenced was assigned the same pool during pool allocation. The latter
can happen, for example, with code of the form:
T* p = some_cond? malloc(..) : external_func(..);
Here, the pointer p is assigned a valid pool because of the possible malloc, but if it points to an
object returned by the external function external func, the referent lookup will not find a valid
referent. The same situation arises if the pointer p were assigned an illegal value, e.g., from an
uninitialized pointer or by casting an integer. To distinguish the first case from the second, we
simply use the pool metadata to check if the object is part of the pool. This check is exactly the
poolcheck operation discussed in chapter 4. Thus, we can successfully identify and omit single
element arrays from the splay trees and yet detect when they are indexed illegally.
The next two optimizations are far simpler and not specific to our approach. They both exploit
the fact that it is very common for a loop nest or recursion to access very few arrays (often one or
two) repeatedly. Since all accesses to the same array have the same referent, we can exploit this
locality by using a small lookup cache before each splay tree. We use a two-element cache to record
the last two distinct referents accessed in each pool. When an access finds the referent in the cache,
it reduces overhead because it avoids the cost of searching the splay tree to find the referent (we
found this to be more expensive even if the search succeeds at the root) and also the cost of rotating
the root node when successive references to the same pool access distinct arrays. It increases the
overhead on a cache miss, however, because all cache elements must be compared before searching
the splay tree. We experimented with the cache size and found that a two-element cache provided
a good balance between these tradeoffs and improved performance very significantly over no cache
or a one-element cache.
The third optimization attempts to achieve the same effect via a compile-time optimization,
viz., loop-invariant code motion (LICM) of the referent lookup. We find that the two-element cache
is important even with this optimization because LICM sometimes fails, e.g., within recursion, if
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the loop nest is spread across multiple functions, or the referent lookup does not dominate all loop
exits. Implementing this optimization is easy because the referent lookup is a pure function: the
same pointer argument always returns the same referent object (or none). Therefore, the lookup
is loop-invariant if and only if the pointer is loop-invariant.
6.2 Compiler Implementation
We have implemented our approach using the LLVM compiler infrastructure [45]. LLVM already
includes the implementation of Automatic Pool Allocation, using a context-sensitive pointer anal-
ysis called Data Structure Analysis (DSA). We implemented the compiler instrumentation as an
additional pass after pool allocation. We also run a standard set of scalar optimizations needed to
clean up the output of pool allocation [46]. Because DSA and pool allocation are interprocedural
passes, this entire sequence of passes is run at link-time so that they can be applied to as complete
a program as possible, excluding libraries available only in binary form. Doing cross-module trans-
formations at link-time is standard in commercial compilers today because it preserves the benefits
of separate compilation.
Our implementation includes three optimizations described earlier: leaving out single-element
objects from the splay tree in each pool, the two-element caching to reduce searches of the splay tree,
and moving loop-invariant referent lookups out of loops. We have also implemented an aggressive
interprocedural static array bounds checking algorithm, which can optionally be used to eliminate
a subset of run-time checks (see chapter 9).
We compile each application source file to the LLVM compiler IR with standard intra-module
optimizations, link the LLVM IR files into a single LLVM module, perform our analyses and insert
run-time checks, then translate LLVM back to ANSI C and compile the resulting code using GCC
3.4.4 at -O3 level of optimization. The final code is linked with any external (pre-compiled) libraries.
In terms of compilation time, DSA and Automatic Pool Allocation are both very fast, requiring
less than 3 seconds combined for programs up to 130K lines of code that we have tested. This time
is in fact a small fraction of the time taken by gcc or g++ at -O3 for the same programs) [46]. The
additional compiler techniques for bounds checking described and implemented in this work add
negligible additional compile time.
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6.3 Experiments
We present an experimental evaluation of our bounds checking technique with the following goals:
• To measure the net overhead incurred by our approach.
• To isolate the effect of using multiple distinct splay trees and the associated optimizations,
which is our key technical improvement over the Ruwase-Lam (and so Jones-Kelley) ap-
proaches.
• To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach in detecting known vulnerabilities. For this
purpose, we use Zitser’s suite of programs modeling vulnerabilities found in real-world soft-
ware [76].
It is also interesting to confirm the backwards-compatibility of our approach. In our experience
so far, we have required no changes to any of the programs we have evaluated, i.e., our compiler
works on these programs “out-of-the-box” (all the wrappers required for correct usage of standard
library calls are already generated and need not be written again). This is similar to Jones-Kelly
and Ruwase-Lam but significantly better than other previous techniques that use metadata on
pointers, applied to the same programs, discussed in Section 6.3.3.
6.3.1 Overheads
We have evaluated the run-time overheads of our approach using the Olden [10] suite of benchmarks,
and the unix daemons, ghttpd, bsd-fingerd, and wu-ftpd-2.6.2. We use the Olden benchmarks be-
cause they are pointer-intensive programs that have been used in a few previous studies of memory
error detection tools [71, 52, 73]. We compare our overheads with these and other reported over-
heads in Section 6.3.3. The benchmarks and their characteristics are listed in Table 6.1. The
programs are compiled via LLVM and GCC, as described in the previous section. For the bench-
marks we used a large input size to obtain reliable measurements. For the daemon programs we
ran the server and the client on the same machine to avoid network overhead and measured the
response times for client requests.
The “LLVM (base)” column in the table represents execution time when the program is compiled
to the LLVM IR with all standard LLVM optimizations (including the standard optimizations
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used to clean up after pool allocation, but not pool allocation itself), translated back to C code,
and the resultant code is compiled directly with GCC -03. The “PA” column shows the time
when we run the above passes as well as the pool allocator but without any run-time checks.
Notice that in a few cases, pool allocation speeds up the program slightly but doesn’t significantly
degrade the performance in any of these cases. We use the LLVM(base) column as the baseline
for our experiments in calculating the net overhead of our bounds checking approach because we
believe that gives the most meaningful comparisons to previous techniques. Since Automatic Pool
Allocation can be used as a separate optimization, the PA column could be used as a baseline
instead of LLVM(base), but the two are close enough for the benchmarks in the table that we do
not expect this choice to affect our conclusions.
The “BoundsCheck” column shows the execution times with bounds checking. Here, we have
turned on the three optimizations that we have discussed in Section 6.1.6: caching on top of the
splay tree, loop invariant code motion, and not storing single-element objects in the splay tree. The
“Slowdown” ratio shows the net overhead of our approach relative to the base LLVM. In almost half
of the benchmarks, we found that overheads are within 3% of the base LLVM. Only two programs
(em3d, health) have overheads greater than 25%.
In order to isolate the benefits of smaller splay data structures, we conducted another exper-
iment. The pool allocator pass provides an option to merge all the pools in the program into
one single global pool. This pool uses the same memory allocation algorithm as before but puts
all tracked objects into a single splay tree. This allowed us to isolate the effect of using multiple
splay trees instead of the single splay tree used by JK and JKRL. Note that we cannot use op-
timization one (leaving singleton objects out of the splay tree) because after merging pools, type
information for the pool is lost and we cannot identify singleton object allocations. The other two
optimizations, caching splay tree results and LICM for referent lookups, are used, which is again
appropriate because they can also be used with the previous approaches. Columns “PA with one
pool” and “PA with one pool + bounds checking” show the execution times of this single-global-
pool program without and with our run-time checks, and the last column shows the ratio of the
two. The benchmark health used up all system memory and started thrashing. The main reason



















bh 2053 9.146 9.156 9.138 1.00 9.175 10.062 1.10
bisort 707 12.982 12.454 12.443 0.96 12.425 14.172 1.14
em3d 557 6.753 6.785 11.388 1.69 6.803 11.419 1.68
health 725 14.305 13.822 19.902 1.39 13.618 - -
mst 617 12.952 12.017 15.137 1.17 12.203 28.925 2.37
perimeter 395 2.963 2.601 2.587 0.87 2.547 6.306 2.48
power 763 2.943 2.920 2.928 0.99 2.925 2.931 1.00
treeadd 385 17.704 17.729 17.310 0.98 17.706 21.063 1.19
tsp 561 7.086 6.989 7.219 1.02 6.978 8.897 1.27
AVG 1.12
Applications
fingerd 336 2.379 2.384 2.475 1.04 2.510 2.607 1.04
ghttpd 837 11.405 9.423 9.466 0.83 11.737 12.182 1.03
ftpd 23033 1.551 1.539 1.542 0.99 1.551 1.546 1.00
Table 6.1: Benchmarks and Run-time Overheads. The One-Pool Ratio compared with Our Slow-
down Ratio isolates the benefit of partitioning the splay-tree.
much larger than the combined splay trees in the original code. Comparing the last column with
the column labelled “Our Slowdown Ratio” shows that in at least three cases (health, mst, and
perimeter) the overheads when using multiple search data structures is dramatically better (more
than 100%) than using a single data structure for the entire heap. The benefits are also significant
in tsp and bisort. The remaining programs show little difference in overheads for the two cases.
6.3.2 Effectiveness in Detecting Known Attacks
We used Zitser’s suite of programs modeling real-world vulnerabilities [76] to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of our approach in detecting buffer overrun violations in real software. The suite consists
of 14 model programs, each program containing a real world vulnerability reported in bugtraq. 7
of these vulnerabilities were in sendmail, 3 were in wu-ftpd, and 4 were in bind. This suite has
been used previously to compare dynamic buffer overflow detection approaches [75].
The results of our experiments are reported in Figure 6.3.2. We are able to detect all the
vulnerabilities in all three programs out of the box. In each case, the illegal memory reference
was detected and the program was halted with a run-time error. The four bugs in bind are not
triggered in the main program but in a library routine (e.g. due to passing a negative argument to
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Program No. of vulnerabilities No. of vulnerabilities No. of vulnerabilities
detected detected with std. lib. check
sendmail 7 7 7
bind 4 0 4
wu-ftpd 3 3 3
Figure 6.2: Effectiveness of our approach in detecting known attacks/vulnerabilities
memcpy). These bugs are automatically detected by our approach using the wrappers described
earlier because they are due to incorrect usage of the library functions (and not bugs within the
library).
6.3.3 Performance Comparison with Previous Approaches
Finally, we briefly compare the overheads observed in our work with those reported in other related
work, to the extent possible. We can make direct comparisons in cases where there are published
results for Olden suite of benchmarks. When such numbers are not available, only a rough com-
parison is possible and only in cases where the differences are obviously large. Also, note that some
previous techniques including [71, 54] detect a wider range of bugs than we do in the current work.
Where possible, we try to compare the overheads they incur due to bounds checking alone.
The two previous approaches with no compatibility problems, JK and JKRL, have both reported
far higher overheads than ours, as noted earlier. Jones and Kelly say that in practice, most
programs showed overheads of 5x-6x. Ruwase and Lam report slowdowns up to a factor of 11x–12x
if enforcing bounds for all objects, and up to a factor of 1.6x–2x for several significant programs
even if only enforcing bounds for strings. Their overheads are even higher than those of Jones and
Kelly because of the additional cost of checking all loads and stores and also the cost of checking
for OOB objects that may have to be deallocated as they go out of bounds. While two of our
optimizations (the two-element cache and LICM for loop-invariant referent lookups) might reduce
these reported overheads, it seems unlikely that they would come close to our reported overheads.
Our overheads are dramatically lower than these previous techniques due to the combination of
three factors: using multiple splay trees (whose benefit was shown earlier), not requiring checks on
loads and stores, and the additional optimizations.
Xu. et al [71] have proposed to use metadata for pointer variables that is held in a separate
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data structure that mirrors the program data in terms of connectivity. They use the metadata to
identify both spatial errors (array bounds, uninitialized pointers) and temporal errors (dangling
pointer errors). Their average overhead for Olden benchmarks for just the spatial errors is 1.63
while ours is far less at 1.12. Moreover, their approach incurs some difficulties with backwards
compatibility, as described in Section 6.4.
CCured [52] divides the pointers of the program into safe, seq pointers (for arrays) and wild
(potentially unsafe) pointers at compile-time. At run-time CCured checks that seq pointers never
go out of bounds and wild pointers do not clobber the memory of other objects. While CCured
checking for WILD pointers is more extensive than ours, in the case of Olden benchmarks, they
did not encounter any wild pointers [52]. It is important to note, however, that CCured uses
garbage collection for dynamic memory management and the overhead due to garbage collection is
unknown. The reported average overhead for Olden is 1.28, which is only slightly higher than our
observed overheads. However, they needed to change 1287 lines of code in total to achieve these
results while our technique works out of the box.
Yong et al [73] describe a technique to identify many illegal write references and free operations
via pointers, by identifying a set of pointers that might be unsafe using a pointer-analysis and
tagging the memory corresponding to the objects those pointers may point to. They use a shadow
memory with 1 tag bit per byte of memory, setting this tag bit on allocations and clearing them
on deallocations. They check these tag bits on every write or free of a potentially unsafe pointer,
allowing them to detect a number of potential security attacks and errors such as accesses to a freed
memory that has not been reallocated. They report an average overhead of 1.37x for the Olden
benchmarks (the fraction of overhead due to array references is unknown). Unlike our work and
the previous papers described above, they do not perform any checks on read operations and read
operations are far more frequent than writes.
6.4 Related Work
We focus our comparisons on techniques for run-time bounds checking, and any optimizations
directly related to those techniques. We do not discuss existing compile-time techniques for bounds
checking here (including our own), because these techniques are complementary and can be used
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to eliminate some run-time checks in any of the approaches discussed here.
There are a number of debugging tools like purify and valgrind that use binary instrumen-
tation to detect a wide range of memory referencing errors. Using binary instrumentation allows
these tools to add arbitrary metadata to pointers without the compatibility problems of other ap-
proaches. These tools, however, incur very high run-time overheads, e.g., often greater than a factor
of 10x for purify and valgrind. Also, in case of purify it does not catch some pointer arithmetic
violations if the arithmetic yields a pointer to a valid region [37].
A number of other approaches target debugging but work at the source level. These include
Loginov’s work on runtime type checking [50], Kendall’s bcc [39], and Steffens’ rtcc [60]. All of
these approaches focus on debugging and usually performance is not a serious consideration. For
instance, the reported overheads for Loginov’s work are up to 900%.
Some tools including SafeC [4] and Cyclone [35] use an augmented pointer representation that
includes the object base and size of the legal target object for every pointer value. Such “fat
pointers” require significant changes to programs to allow the use of external libraries, typically
introducing wrappers around library calls to convert pointer representations. Furthermore, writing
such wrappers may be impractical for indirect function calls and for functions that access global
variables or other pointers in memory. Unlike the remaining techniques below, fat pointers have
the major advantage of no cost in finding the metadata for each pointer value.
To reduce the compatibility problems caused by fat pointers, several recent systems store pointer
metadata separately from the pointer variables themselves, at the cost of significantly greater
overhead for finding the metadata associated with each pointer. This approach was used by Patil
and Fisher [54], CCured [52], and Xu et al. [71]. Separating the metadata eliminates the potential
for program failures mentioned above and reduces the need for wrappers on library calls. This
technique does not require wrappers for pointers passed to library functions or pointer values
explicitly returned by such functions. Wrappers are still needed for checked pointers that may be
modified indirectly as a side-effect of a library call because the metadata before the call would be
invalid if the call overwrites the pointer. Such wrappers are likely to be needed less often but if
needed, may be impractical to write for the same reasons as with fat pointers, described above.
The work of Xu et al. is also more restrictive than ours because they restrict pointer casts between
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structures of incompatible types. Finally, and most important from a practical viewpoint, all these
techniques have significantly higher overhead than ours, as discussed in more detail in Section 6.3.3.
As noted earlier, the compatibility problems of both fat pointers and pointers with separately
stored metadata occur because the metadata is associated with the pointer itself and not the object
that is the target of a pointer. The work of Jones and Kelly [37] and Ruwase and Lam [57] asso-
ciate metadata with objects instead of pointers, which greatly reduces the compatibility problem.
However, the overheads of these two approaches are quite high. As the comparison in Section 6.3.3
shows, our approach is able to reduce these overheads greatly; sufficient, we believe, for the tech-
nique to be used in production code.
6.5 Run-time Bounds Checking: Concluding Discussion
We have described a collection of techniques that dramatically reduce the overhead of an attractive,
fully automatic approach for run-time bounds checking of arrays and strings in C and C++ pro-
grams. Our techniques are essentially based on a fine-grain partitioning of memory. They bring the
average overhead of run-time checks down to only 12% for a set of benchmarks we have evaluated.
Thus, we believe we have achieved the twin goals that have not been simultaneously achieved so far:
overhead low enough for production use, and fully automatic checking, i.e., not requiring manual
effort to circumvent compatibility problems or to assist the compiler’s checking techniques.
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Chapter 7
Efficient Detection of All Dangling
Pointer Uses
A major limitation of the SAFECode work described thus far is that it allows references of dangling
pointers to freed memory to go undetected. Detecting these dangling pointer errors is important
from a security stand point since they can also be exploited in much the same way as buffer overruns
to compromise system security [74]. In fact, many exploits that take advantage of a subclass of
these errors (double free vulnerabilities) in server programs have been reported in bugtraq (e.g.,
CVS server double free exploit [23], MIT Kerberos 5 double free exploit [2], MySQL double free
vulnerability [1]). Efficient detection of all such errors in servers during deployment, rather than
just during development, is crucial for security.
Unfortunately, detecting dangling pointer errors in programs has proven to be an extremely
difficult problem. Detecting such errors statically in any precise manner is undecidable. Detecting
them efficiently at run-time while still allowing safe reuse of memory can be very expensive and we
do not know of any practical solution that has overheads low enough for use in production code.
A number of approaches (including [4, 33, 37, 51, 56, 54, 58, 71, 73]) have been proposed that
use some combination of static and run-time techniques to detect several kinds of memory errors,
including buffer overflow errors and some dangling pointer errors. All of these techniques either
have prohibitively high run-time overheads (2x - 100x) or memory overheads (or both) and are
unsuitable for production software. Purify [33] and Valgrind [58], two of the most widely used tools
for debugging memory access errors, often have overheads in excess of 1000% and can sometimes be
too slow even for debugging long-running programs. Moreover, most of these approaches (except
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FisherPatil [54], Xu et al [71] and Electric Fence [56]) employ only heuristics to detect dangling
pointer errors and do not provide any guarantees about absence of such errors. FisherPatil and
Xu et al, detect all dangling pointer errors but perform software run-time checks on all individual
loads and stores, incurring overheads up to 300% and also causing substantial increases in virtual
and physical memory consumption (1.6x-4x). Electric Fence uses page protection mechanisms to
detect all dangling pointer errors but does so at the expense of several fold increase in virtual and
physical memory consumption of the applications.
In this chapter, we present a new technique that can detect dangling pointers in server code with
very low overheads; low enough that we believe it can be used in production code though it is also
useful for debugging. Our approach builds on the naive idea (previously used in Electric Fence [56],
PageHeap [51]) of using a new virtual and physical page for each allocation of the program. Upon
deallocation, we change the permissions on the individual virtual pages and rely on the memory
management unit (MMU) to detect all dangling pointer accesses. This naive idea has two problems
that make it impractical for any use other than debugging: increased address space usage (one
virtual page for each allocation) and increased physical page usage (one page for each allocation).
Our technique is based on two key insights that alleviate both these problems. Our first insight is
based on the observation that even when using a new virtual page for each allocation we can still
use the underlying physical page using a different virtual page that maps to that physical page.
Our approach exploits this idea by using a new virtual page for each allocation of the program
but mapping it to the same physical page as the original program (thus using the same amount
of physical memory as the original program). Upon deallocation, we can change the permissions
on the individual virtual pages but still use the underlying physical memory via different virtual
pages. We rely on the memory management unit (MMU) just like in the naive idea to detect
all dangling pointer accesses without any software checks. If the goal is to guarantee absence of
undetected dangling pointer dereferences, then this basic scheme will not allow us to reuse a virtual
page ever again for any other allocation in the program. Our second insight is that we can build on
a previously developed compiler transformation called Automatic Pool Allocation [46] to alleviate
the problem of address space exhaustion. The transformation essentially partitions the memory
used by the program into pools (sub heaps) and is able to infer when a partition or a pool is no
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longer accessible (using a standard compiler analysis known as escape analysis that is much simpler,
but can be less precise, than that required for static detection of dangling pointer references). We
leverage this information, to safely reuse address space belonging to a pool, when the memory
corresponding to a pool becomes inaccessible.
As our experimental results indicate, our approach works extremely well for server programs.
This is because most server programs seem to follow a simple memory allocation and usage
paradigm: they have low or moderate frequency of allocations and deallocations but do have
many memory accesses. Our approach fits well with this paradigm — we move all the run-time
overheads to allocation and deallocation points (since we require extra system call per allocation
and deallocation), and we do not perform any checks on individual memory accesses themselves.
Our approach has several practical strengths. First, we do not use fat pointers or meta-data
for individual pointers. Use of such meta-data complicates interfacing with existing libraries and
requires significant effort to port programs to work with libraries. Second, if reuse of address space
is not important 1, particularly during debugging, our technique can be directly applied on the
binaries and does not require source code; we just need to intercept all calls to malloc and free from
the program. Finally, we do not change the cache behavior of the program; so carefully memory-
tuned applications can benefit from our approach without having to retune to a new memory
management scheme.
There are two main limitations to our approach. First, since we use a system call on every
memory allocation, applications that do in fact perform a lot of allocations and deallocations will
have a big performance penalty (our approach can still be used for debugging such applications).
However, we expect many security critical server software to not exhibit this behavior. Second,
since each allocation has a new virtual page, our approach has more TLB (“translation lookaside
buffer”) misses than the original program. We are currently investigating simple architectural
improvements that can mitigate both of these problems by changing the TLB structure.
We briefly summarize the contributions of this work:
• We propose a new technique that can effectively detect all dangling pointer errors by making
use of the MMU, while still using the same physical memory as the original program.
1As shown later in Section 7.1.4, on 64-bit systems programs will run for at least 9 hours before running out of
virtual pages
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• We propose the use of previously developed compiler transformation called Automatic Pool
Allocation to reduce the problem of address space exhaustion.
• We evaluate our approach on five unix utilities, five daemons and an allocation intensive
benchmark suite. Our overheads on unix utilities are less than 15% and on server applications
are less than 4%. However, our overheads on allocation intensive benchmark suite are much
worse (up to 11x slowdown).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.1 contains a detailed description
of our overall approach and our implementation. Section 7.2 gives experimental evaluation of
our approach. Section 7.3 discusses related work and Section 7.4 concludes with possible future
directions of this work.
In the rest of this chapter, by dangling pointer errors we mean use of pointers to freed heap
memory, where use of a pointer is a read, write or free operation on that pointer.
7.1 Detecting Dangling Pointers : Our Approach
7.1.1 Overview of the Approach
The memory management unit (MMU) in most modern processors performs a run-time check on
every memory access by looking at the permission bits of each page. Debugging tools like Electric
Fence [56] and PageHeap [51] exploit this check to detect dangling pointer accesses at run-time.
Since the MMU does checks only at page level, these tools allocate only one object per (virtual and
physical) page and change the permissions at a free operation to protect the page. Any dangling
pointer access will then result in a hardware trap, which can be caught. However, allocating only
one object per physical page would quickly exhaust physical memory. Furthermore, changing the
allocation pattern this way would potentially lead to poor cache performance in physically indexed
caches. Our first insight addresses this drawback:
Insight1: Mapping multiple virtual pages to the same physical page enables us to set the permissions
on each individual virtual page separately while still allowing use and reuse of the entire physical
page via different virtual pages.
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With this approach, the consumption of physical memory would be (nearly) identical to the
original program, and the multiple objects could be contiguous within the page, preserving spatial
locality in physically indexed caches. Moreover, as we show later, with a minor increase in memory
allocation (one word per allocation) this scheme can be implemented without requiring any changes
to the underlying memory allocator. In a practical system, this is likely to be significant, since
programs that are already tuned to an existing memory allocation strategy do not need to be
retuned again.
Virtual memory pages, however, still cannot be reused to ensure that any access to a previously
freed object is detected arbitrarily far in the future. As noted previously in chapter 3.4, the
Automatic Pool Allocation transformation provides bounds on the lifetimes of pools containing
heap objects, such that there are no live pointers to a pool after the pooldestroy operation on the
pool. This yields:
Insight2: For a program transformed using Automatic Pool Allocation, it is safe to release all the
virtual pages assigned to a pool at the pooldestroy operation on the pool.
The remaining limitation of this approach is that long lived pools (e.g., pools reachable via a
global pointer, or pools created and destroyed in the main function for other reasons) effectively
live throughout the execution and their virtual pages cannot be reused. In section 7.1.4, we discuss
three strategies to avoid this problem in practice.
Overall, we now have the ability to reuse physical pages as well as the original program does
and reuse virtual memory pages partially. Nevertheless, there are several key implementation and
performance issues that must be considered to make this approach practical for realistic production
software. These issues are addressed as we describe the details of the approach below.
7.1.2 Page Mapping for Detecting Dangling Pointer Errors
The primary mechanism we use for detecting dangling pointer references (i.e., a load, store, or
free to a previously freed object) is to use a distinct virtual page or sequence of pages for every
dynamically allocated object. When an object is freed, the protected bit is set for the page or
pages using the mprotect system call so that any subsequent reference to the page causes an access
violation, which is handled by our run-time system.
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We assume in this subsection that a standard heap allocator is used. The basic approach works
as follows, assuming malloc and free are the interface for the underlying system allocator.
Allocation: An allocation request is passed to malloc with the size incremented by sizeof(addr t)
bytes; the extra bytes at the start of the object will be used to record an address for book-
keeping purposes. Let a be the address returned by malloc , Page(a) = a & ∼ (2p − 1) and
Offset(a) = a & (2p − 1), where p is log2 of the VM page size. The latter two denote the
start address of the page containing a and the offset of a relative to the start of the page. We
then invoke a system call to assign a fresh virtual page (or pages) that share the same phys-
ical memory as the page(s) containing a. On Linux, we do this using mremap(old address,
old size, new size, flags) , with old size = 0 , which returns a new page-aligned block of
virtual memory at least as large as new size .2 If the new page address is Pnew, we return
Pnew(a) + Offset(a) + sizeof(addr t) to the caller.
Note that the underlying allocator still believes that the allocated object was at address a,
whereas the caller sees the object on a different page but at the same location within the page.
We refer to virtual page Page(a) as the canonical page (the one assumed by the allocator) and the
actual virtual page Pnew as the shadow page for the object. We have to record the original page
Page(a) for the object to support deallocation; we do this in the extra sizeof(addr t) bytes we
allocated above. Note that malloc implementations usually add a header recording the size of the
object just before the object itself so we are effectively extending that header to also record the
value of Page(a).
The net result of this approach is that multiple objects can live in a single physical page and the
underlying allocator believes they live in a single virtual page (the canonical page). The program,
however, is given a distinct virtual page (a shadow page) for each object in the physical page.
Deallocation: On a deallocation request for address f , we first look up the canonical page for
this object which was recorded at f−sizeof(addr t) . Note that this read operation will cause a
run-time error if the object has already been freed because the virtual page containing this memory
would have been protected as explained next. We read the size of the object using the metadata
recorded by malloc , use this size to compute how many pages the object spanned, and use the
2This behavior is undocumented in the man page but is described here [64]. On systems where this feature is not
available, we can use mmap with an in-memory file system.
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system call mprotect to set the protection status of the page(s) containing f to the state PROT NONE
. This will cause any future read or write of the page to trap. If the canonical page is PagefC , we
invoke free(PagefC + Offset(f)) to free the object. The allocator marks the object within the
canonical page as free, allowing that range of virtual memory (and therefore the underlying physical
memory) to be reused for future allocations. The shadow page(s) containing the object at f cannot
be reused, at least with the approach as described so far.
7.1.3 Reusing Virtual Pages via Automatic Pool Allocation
In Automatic Pool Allocation, each pool created by the program at run-time is essentially a distinct
heap, managed internally using some allocation algorithm. We can use the remapping approach
described above within each pool created by the program at run-time. The key benefit is that,
at a pool destroy , we can release all (shadow and canonical) virtual memory pages of the pool
to be reused by future allocations. Note that physical pages will continue to be reused just as in
the original program, i.e., the physical memory consumption remains the same as in the original
program (except for minor differences potentially caused by using the pool allocator on top of the
original heap [46]).
The only significant change in the Allocation and Deallocation operations described above is for
reusing virtual pages. This is slightly tricky because we need to reuse virtual pages that might have
been aliased with other virtual pages previously. One simple solution would be to use the unmap
system call to release previous virtual-to-physical mappings for all pages in a pool after a pool
destroy. unmap would work for both canonical and shadow pages because these are obtained from
the Operating System (OS) via mmap and mremap respectively. Canonical pages are obtained
in contiguous blocks from the underlying system (via mmap) and the blocks can be unmapped
efficiently. The shadow pages, however, are potentially scattered around in the heap, and in the
worst case may require a separate unmap operation for every individual object allocated from the
pool (in addition to the earlier mprotect call when the object was freed). This could be expensive.
We avoid the explicit munmap calls by maintaining a free list of virtual pages shared across pools
and adding all pool pages to this free list at a pool destroy . We modified the underlying pool
allocator to obtain (canonical) pages from this free list, if available. If this free list is empty, we
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use mmap to obtain fresh pages from the system as before. For each allocated object, the shadow
page(s) is(are) obtained using mremap as before to ensure a distinct virtual memory page.
A pool free operation works just like the Deallocation case described previously, and invokes
the underlying pool free on the canonical page. A pool destroy operation simply returns all
canonical and shadow pages in the pool to the shared free list of pages.
7.1.4 Avoiding Costs of Long-lived Pools
As noted earlier in Section 7.1.1, the main limitation of our approach as described so far is that
virtual pages in pools with lifetimes spanning the entire execution will never be reused. Our
examination of several Unix daemons in Section 7.2.3 shows that this problem arises in very few
cases.
If it occurs in a specific program, it would impose two costs in practice: (1) A long-running
program may eventually run out of virtual memory. (2) Small operating system resources (the
page table entry) are tied up for each non-reusable virtual page. The page cannot be unmapped
to prevent reuse of the virtual addresses. We propose three solutions to avoid these problems in
practice.
The simplest solution is to start reusing virtual pages when we run out of virtual addresses or
at some regular (but large) interval. A simple calculation shows that on a 64-bit Linux system
(and assuming a maximum of 247 bytes of virtual memory for a user program), even an extreme
program that allocates a new 4K-page-size object every microsecond with no reuse of these pages,
can operate for 9 hours before running out of virtual pages (247/(212× 106× 86, 400)). In practice,
even with no reuse at all, we expect typical servers to be able to operate for days before running out.
The small probability of not detecting a dangling pointer in such situations appears unimportant.
In practice, therefore, the second cost above (tying up OS resources) appears to pose a tighter
constraint than the first. For this reason, real-world applications would likely choose to reuse
memory after a shorter (but still infrequent) interval.
An alternative approach is to run a conservative garbage collector (GC) at the same infrequent
intervals (based on the same criteria above) to release the tied-up virtual addresses. This is much
simpler and less expensive than using garbage-collection for overall memory management for two
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enscript 8514 1.135 1.077 1.177 1.143 1.238 1.15 1.09
jwhois 10702 0.539 0.534 0.539 0.535 0.534 1.00 0.99
patch 11669 0.174 0.176 0.177 0.179 0.179 1.02 1.03
gzip 8163 4.509 5.419 5.01 4.91 4.943 0.91 1.10
Servers
ghttpd 6036 4.385 4.507 4.398 4.461 4.486 1.00 1.02
ftpd 23033 2.236 2.293 2.267 2.318 2.291 1.00 1.02
fingerd 1733 1.238 1.285 1.277 1.278 1.285 1.00 1.04
tftpd 880 2.246 2.281 2.289 2.293 2.287 1.00 1.02
Table 7.1: Runtime overheads of our approach. Ratio 1 is the ratio of execution time of our
approach with respect to base LLVM, Ratio 2 is the ratio of execution time of our approach to
native code. (Two other applications, telnetd and less, are discussed in text)
reasons. Most importantly, since the actual physical memory consumption is not an issue and GC
only needs to ameliorate the two problems above, we can run garbage collection quite infrequently
(e.g., once every few hours) and when there is a light load on the server. Second, we only need
to use GC to collect memory from the long-lived pools, which are known to the pool allocation
transformation. We already have a very simple facility in our system for each run-time pool
descriptor to record exactly which currently live pools point to it, i.e., a “dynamic pool points-to
graph” [47]. By knowing which pools need to be collected, the collector can use this information
to traverse only a subset of the heap.
If the first solution is not acceptable for some reason and conservative GC is not available or
unattractive, a third alternative is that the programmer could modify the application so that fewer
heap objects are reachable from global pointers. This is similar to (but a subset of) the tuning
needed to reduce memory consumption of applications that use GC for memory management, since
the latter also requires resetting local and global pointer variables to null as data structures are
freed.
Overall, we believe that with one or more of these techniques, the potential costs of lack of
reuse in globally live pools is likely to be unimportant in real-world systems.
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7.1.5 Implementation
We have implemented the techniques described in this chapter in the pool allocation run-time
system developed as a part of SAFECode.
We used the LLVM compiler infrastructure [45] to apply Automatic Pool Allocation to C pro-
grams, using the existing version of this transformation with no changes. We modified the pool
allocator run-time in minor ways to implement the techniques described earlier. We modified
pooldestroy to return all pages to a shared free list of pages. We also modified poolfree so it
did not return unused blocks to this free list. We modified poolalloc to try to obtain fresh pages
from the free list first when it needs fresh pages (and falling back on mmap as before, if the free
list is empty). Finally, we wrapped the calls to poolalloc and poolfree to remap objects from
canonical to shadow pages and vice-versa, as described earlier.
7.2 Experimental Evaluation
We present an experimental evaluation of our approach for unix utilities, server applications and
few allocation intensive applications. The goal of these experiments is to measure the net run-time
overhead of our approach, a breakdown of these overheads contributed by different factors, and the
potential for unbounded growth in the virtual address space usage incurred in our approach. Note
that our physical memory consumption is almost exactly the same as the original program (except
for minor differences when using the pool allocation runtime library) and we do not evaluate the
physical memory consumption experimentally.
7.2.1 Run-time Overheads for System Software
We evaluated our approach using few commonly used unix utilities and five server codes – ghttpd-
1.4, wu-ftpd-2.6 , bsd-finged-0.17, netkit-telnet-0.17, and netkit-tftp-0.17. The characteristics of
these applications are listed in Table 7.1. We compiled each program to the LLVM compiler in-
termediate representation (IR), performed our analyses and transformations, then compiled LLVM
IR back to C and compiled the resulting code using GCC 3.4.2 at -O3 level of optimization. We
performed our experiments on a (32-bit) Intel Xeon with Linux as the operating system. For each
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of the server applications, we generated a list of client requests and measured the response time for
the requests. We ran the server and the client on the same machine to eliminate network overhead.
We conducted each experiment five times and reported the median of the measured times. In case
of utilities, we chose a large input size to get reliable measurements. We successfully applied our
approach to two interactive applications netkit-telnetd and unix utility less and did not notice
any perceptible difference in the response time. We do not report detailed timings for these two
applications.
The “native” and “LLVM (base)” columns in the table represent execution times when compiled
directly with GCC -O3 and with the base LLVM compiler (without pool allocation or any of our
mmap system calls) using the LLVM C back-end. LLVM uses a different set of optimizations from
GCC so there is a minor difference in the two execution times. Using LLVM (base) times as our
baseline allows us to isolate the affect of the overheads added by our approach. The “native”
column shows that the LLVM (base) code quality is comparable to GCC and reasonable enough to
use as a baseline. The “PA” column shows the time when we only run the pool allocator and do
not use our virtual memory technique, i.e., it shows the effect of pool allocation alone on execution
time.
As noted earlier, overheads in our approach could be due to two reasons: (1) use of a system
call on every allocation (mremap) and deallocation (mprotect) (2) TLB miss penalty because we
use far more virtual pages than the original program. The “PA + dummy syscalls” column shows
the execution time when we do a dummy mremap system call on every allocation and a dummy
mprotect system call on deallocation. This allows us to isolate the overheads due to system calls
from that of TLB misses. The “Our approach” column gives the total execution time with our
approach.
Ratio 1 gives the ratio of execution time of our approach to that of LLVM (base). Ratio 2
gives the ratio of execution time of our approach to that of native code.
As we can see from column Ratio1, our overheads are negligible for most applications. Only
one application, enscript, has a 15% overhead. These overheads are much better than the any
one of the previous approaches for detecting dangling pointers [56, 71, 54]. Enscript does many
allocations and deallocations. In fact, when used with electric fence, enscript runs out of physical
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Benchmark Execution time (Secs) Slowdown ratios
Our Valgrind Our Valgrind
approach slowdown slowdown
enscript 1.238 29.931 1.15 26.37
jwhois 0.534 1.336 1.00 2.48
patch 0.179 1.461 1.02 8.40
gzip 4.943 94.483 0.91 20.95
Table 7.2: Comparison with Valgrind. Our slowdown ratio is Ratio 1 from Table 7.1
.
memory. From the “PA + dummy syscalls” column, we can see that the overhead in enscript due
to system calls is about 6%. We attribute the remaining component of the overhead (around 9%) to
TLB miss penalty. Automatic Pool Allocation transformation can sometimes speedup applications
(e.g., gzip) because of better cache performance [46].
Overall, we believe our low overheads are due to the patterns of memory allocation and use
that servers seem to obey: there are relatively few allocations/deallocations (keeping our system
call overheads low) but potentially many uses of the allocated memory (we do not incur overheads
due to hardware checks).
7.2.2 Comparison with Valgrind
We compared the overheads of our approach with Valgrind [58] (a widely used open source de-
bugging tool) on the four Unix utilities. The servers are spawned off the xinetd process for every
client request and we are unable to run them under Valgrind. The results are shown in Table 7.2.
Valgrind attempts to detect both spatial errors and few dangling pointer errors. We cannot isolate
Valgrind overhead for temporal errors, so the comparison is only meant to give a rough indication
of the magnitude of difference in overhead. It is worth noting that Valgrind uses a heuristic to
detect dangling pointer errors (see Section 7.3 for more discussion) and does not guarantee the
absence of undetected dangling pointer accesses. The overheads for Valgrind range from 148%
to 2537%, which is orders-of-magnitude worse than ours. In contrast, our approach detects only
dangling pointer errors,; our overheads are negligible for three of the applications and 15% for one
application.
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7.2.3 Address Space Wastage due to Long-lived Pools
We studied the usage (and wastage) of virtual address space incurred by our technique by tracing
three of the server programs (ftpd , telnetd , ghttpd ) using gdb. We found that a common
programming model used by these servers is to fork a new process to service each new connection.
Although we did not trace fingerd and tftp, it is clear from the comments in the source code that
these codes follow exactly the same programming model; in fact, in case of tftpd every command
from the client (e.g, get filename) forks off a new process. This model of forking a new process to
service requests fits well with our approach. Any wastage in address space in one connection is not
carried over to the other connections handled by the server. We expect each individual connection
to be of short duration even though all the servers themselves are long running.
We then measured the usage of virtual address space within each individual connection for the
three servers.
Ghttpd is a webserver designed for small memory foot print and performs only one dynamic
allocation per connection. Consequently, there is no virtual memory wastage when we use our
approach.
In case of ftpd , we found that in a few cases the pool allocation transformation helps in reuse
of address space. For example, the fb real path function in ftpd , which resolves sym links,
first creates a pool, allocates some memory out of the pool, does some computation, frees the
memory, and finally destroys the pool. Any virtual addresses used by this pool are reusable after
the pool destroy. However, there are other allocations in ftpd that are out of global pools and
since global pools get destroyed only at program exit, they do not benefit from the pool allocation
transformation. We found that for each command given by the ftp client (e.g, get filename) there
are 5-6 allocations from global pools, which tie up that many virtual pages. Thus virtual memory
usage increases at the rate of 5-6 pages per command. Although this problem could be alleviated
using the techniques described in Section 7.1.4, this problem is unlikely to be important for ftpd
because the process is killed at end of a user connection.
Telnetd performs 45 small allocations (and deallocations) before giving control to the shell
in each session (process). It does not do any more (de)allocations and just waits for the session
to end. Using our approach, we just use 45 virtual pages for each session. In all these cases, we
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native LLVM PA + Our Ratio 3
(base) dummy approach
sys call
bh 15.090 9.723 11.035 12.127 1.25
bisort 2.803 2.641 4.740 8.495 3.22
em3d 9.774 6.830 7.366 7.801 1.14
health 0.319 0.305 2.355 3.429 11.24
mst 0.285 0.166 1.040 1.582 9.53
perimeter 0.187 0.210 1.428 2.188 10.42
power 5.698 2.903 2.959 3.168 1.09
treeadd 0.277 0.293 0.455 1.0777 3.68
tsp 1.753 1.637 3.647 6.749 4.12
Table 7.3: Overheads for allocation intensive Olden benchmarks, Ratio 3 is the slow down of our
approach with respect to LLVM base.
guarantee the absence of any undetected dangling pointer accesses.
7.2.4 Overheads for Allocation Intensive Applications
We measured the run-time overheads of our approach when applied to allocation intensive Olden
benchmarks. These benchmarks have high frequency of allocations and represent the worst case
scenario for our approach. While the overheads for three of the Olden benchmarks were less than
25%, the overheads for the remaining six are high (slowdowns from 3.22 to 11.24). As can be noted
from several programs, including bisort, health, and mst), the overheads can be attributed to
both the system call overheads and TLB misses. Our approach can be used for such allocation
(and deallocation) intensive applications during debugging.
7.3 Related Work
Detecting memory errors in C/C++ programs is a well researched area. A number of previous
techniques focus only on spatial memory errors ( buffer overflow errors, uninitialized pointer uses,
arbitrary type cast errors, etc). As explained in Section 3.1, detecting spatial errors is comple-
mentary to our approach. In this section, we compare our approach to only those techniques that
detect or eliminate dangling pointer errors.
One way to eliminate dangling pointer errors is to use automatic memory management (garbage
collection) instead of explicit memory allocation and deallocation. Where appropriate, that solution
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is simple and complete, but it can significantly impact the memory consumption of the program
and perhaps lead to unacceptable pause times. For C and C++ programs that choose to retain
explicit frees in the program, an alternative solution is required. We focus here on comparing those
approaches that detect dangling pointers in the presence of explicit deallocation.
7.3.1 Techniques that Rely on Heuristics to Detect Dangling Pointer
References
A number of systems have been proposed that use heuristic run-time techniques to detect heap
errors, including some dangling pointer errors [73, 58, 37, 33]. These techniques do not provide
any guarantees about the absence of such errors. The limitation is indeed significant: in fact, these
techniques can detect dangling memory errors only as long as the freed memory is not reused for
other allocations in the program. Furthermore, all of them rely on heuristics to delay reuse of freed
memory, which can increase the physical memory consumption.
7.3.2 Techniques that Guarantee Absence of Dangling Pointer References
SafeC [4] is one of the earliest systems to detect (with high probability) all memory errors including
all dangling pointer errors in C programs. SafeC creates a unique capability (a 32-bit value) for
each memory allocation and puts it in a Global Capability Store (GCS). It also stores this capability
with the meta-data of the returned pointer. This meta-data gets propagated with pointer copying,
arithmetic. Before every access via a pointer, the pointer’s capability is checked for membership in
the GCS. A free operation removes the capability from the global capability store and all dangling
pointer accesses are detected. FisherPatil [54] and Xu et. al [71] propose improvements to the
basic scheme by eliminating the need for fat-pointers and storing the meta-data separately from the
pointer for better backwards compatibility. To be able to track meta-data they disallow arbitrary
casts in the program, including casts from pointers to integers and back. Their overheads for
detecting only the temporal errors on allocation intensive Olden benchmarks are much less than
ours – about 56% on average (they do not report overheads for system software).
However, the GCS can consume significant memory: they report increases in (physical and
virtual) memory consumption of factors of 1.6x - 4x for different benchmarks sets [71]). For servers
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in particular, we believe that such significant increases in memory consumption would be a serious
limitation.
Our approach, on the other hand, provides better backwards compatibility: we allow arbitrary
casts including casts from pointers to integers and back. Furthermore, our approach uses the
memory management unit to do a hardware runtime check and does not incur any per access penalty.
Our overheads in our experiments on system software, with low allocation frequency, are negligible
in most cases and less than 15% in all the cases. However, for programs that perform frequent
memory allocations and deallocations like the Olden benchmarks, our overheads are significantly
worse (up to 11x slowdown). It would be an interesting experiment to see if a combination of these
two techniques can work better for general programs.
7.3.3 Techniques that Check using MMU
As mentioned earlier, Electric Fence [56] and PageHeap [51] are debugging tools that make use of
the memory management unit (MMU) to detect dangling pointer errors (and some buffer overflow
errors) without inserting any software checks on individual loads/stores. However, both the tools
allocate only one memory object per virtual and physical page, and do not attempt to share a
physical page through different virtual pages. This means that even small allocations use up a
page of actual physical memory. This results in several fold increase in memory consumption of the
applications. In turn, the applications exhibit very bad cache behavior increasing the overheads of
the tools. These overheads effectively limit the usefulness of the tools to debugging environments.
In contrast, we share and reuse physical memory, and use automatic pool allocation to reuse virtual
addresses.
7.4 Detecting Dangling Pointer References: Concluding
Discussion
In this chapter, we have presented a novel technique to detect uses of pointers to freed memory that
relies on two simple insights: (1) Using a new virtual page for every allocation but mapping it to the
same physical page as the original allocator. (2) Using a compiler transformation called automatic
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pool allocation to mitigate the problem of virtual address space exhaustion. We evaluated our
approach on several Unix utilities and servers and we showed that our approach incurs very low
overhead for all these cases – less than 4% for the server codes and less than 15% for the utilities.
These overheads are low enough to be acceptable even in production code (although our techniques
could be very effective for debugging as well). We believe this is the first time such a result has
been demonstrated for the run-time detection of dangling pointer errors.
For C or C++ programs that have frequent allocations and deallocations, two main perfor-
mance problems remain — the system call overhead for allocations and deallocations, and the TLB
miss overhead. As an extension to this work, we plan to investigate simple OS and architectural
enhancements that can reduce both these kinds of overheads and make our approach applicable to
these other kinds of software.
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Chapter 8
SAFECode for Embedded Systems
In application domains like embedded systems any memory safety solution that imposes perfor-
mance overheads is unattractive. For this reason, the SAFECode approach described thus far
though has low overheads, may not be directly suitable for embedded systems. In this chapter,
we present a new mode of SAFECode by including some restrictions on the language usage that
enable complete static checking for memory safety 1. We believe that our restrictions are not too
onerous in the context of embedded systems and show that for a fairly large subset of embedded
benchmarks, memory safety can be guaranteed without run-time checks or garbage collection.
In the next few sections, we describe the language restrictions that we impose for static checking
and the (new) compiler techniques that enable static checking for the restricted language.
8.1 Language Restrictions
We define a subset of C which can be completely statically checked for memory safety. The key
restrictions are (a) no casts to a pointer type from any other non-equivalent type; (b) a union must
not contain types that are illegal to cast to each other; (c) local variables must be initialized before
being referenced; (d) no structure type could be larger than the size of the reserved address range
(or if it were, references to such an object would incur null pointer checks); (e) the address of a
stack variable must not be stored in the heap or in a global variable, or returned from a function;
and (f) a collection of rules requiring that array index expressions must have an affine relationship
with the corresponding extent expression (we rejected programs that violated this rule, instead
1The work presented in this chapter is joint work with Sumant Kowshik, Chris Lattner
112
of introducing runtime checks); and (g) all functions of the program must be available, except
a collection of trusted library routines with enforced preconditions and assumed postconditions.
Programs that violated these rules are simply rejected.
Rules (a-d) above are easy to check with simple type checking and dataflow analysis. Rules
(e-g) and our static safety checking techniques required more analysis and transformations. More
specifically, we exploited three new compiler techniques and two new runtime techniques to achieve
memory safety statically. These are described briefly below.
8.2 Uninitialized Pointers
References to uninitialized scalar variables are identified through a simple dataflow analysis (Rule
c). For pointer fields in aggregate types, we follow the SAFECode strategy described earlier in
Chapter 4.6.2: we initialize them to the base of reserved address and exploit hardware checks to
perform the uninitialized pointer checking.
8.3 Stack Safety
Here, we follow a variant of the strategy used in the SAFECode approach for stack safety. In the
original SAFECode, described in chapter 4.4, all stack objects that may potentially escape the
function in which they are allocated, are actually moved to the heap. SAFECode in embedded
mode simply reject programs for which it is unable to prove stack safety (i.e, the stack object does
not escape the allocated function).
8.4 Dangling Pointers to Freed Memory
Here again, we follow the same approach as outlined in chapter 4. We use automatic pool allocation
and then rely on the type homogeneity of pools to ensure that any dangling pointer reference can
only access objects of the same type. Just like earlier, we restrict that memory from a pool may
not be released until the life time of the pool ends.
Restricting memory from being released could eliminate some reuse of memory between two
different pools (“cross-reuse”), and so increase memory consumption. We therefore perform an
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additional interprocedural flow analysis to identify cases when this can happen and report them to
the programmer. Such cases can be profiled to identify if the memory increase is significant (we
expect this is quite unlikely because most pools are either short-lived or have significant internal
reuse), and to restructure the program if necessary to avoid the increase. We found that very
few pools actually have potential cross-reuse, at least across a wide range of simple embedded
benchmarks.
Note that our language restrictions ensure that there are no non type homogeneous (TU) pools.
Specifically, we reject programs that have these TU pools. We found in our experiments that most
embedded programs do not have TU pools or if they do can be easily modified to not have TU
pools.
Benchmark Lines of Lines of Code Lines of Code Heap and Stack Array
Code Modified Modified Pointer safety safety safety
for type safety for array safety
control
Pendulum 300(Average) 0 0 Yes Yes Yes
Pendubot 1300(Average) 0 31 Yes Yes Yes
TinyOS apps 300(Average) 0 0 Yes Yes Yes
automotive
basicmath 579 1 3 Yes Yes Yes
bitcount 17 5 0 Yes Yes Yes
qsort 156 0 1 Yes Yes Yes
susan 2122 1 0 Yes Yes No
office
stringsearch 3215 0 3 Yes Yes Yes
security
sha 269 0 1 Yes Yes Yes
blowfish 1502 1 5 Yes Yes Yes
rijndael 1773 3 6 Yes No Yes
network
dijkstra 348 0 0 Yes Yes No
telecomm
CRC 32 282 0 1 Yes Yes Yes
adpcm codes 741 0 0 Yes Yes No
FFT 469 0 0 Yes Yes No
gsm 6038 0 0 Yes Yes No
multimedia
g721 1622 11 0 Yes Yes No
mpeg(decode) 9839 0 0 Yes Yes No
epic 3524 7 0 Yes Yes No
rasta 7373 25 0 Yes Yes No
Totals: 20 41769 70 53 20 19 11
Table 8.1: Benchmarks, code sizes, and analysis results
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8.5 Array Safety and String and I/O Libraries
We developed an interprocedural constraint propagation algorithm (described in detail in Chap-
ter 9), that symbolically performs array bounds analysis on the input program. The algorithm
propagates affine constraints on integer variables from callers to callees (for incoming integer argu-
ments and global scalars) and from callees to callers (for integer return values and global scalars).
It then perform a symbolic bounds check for each index expression using integer programming (we
use the Omega Library from Maryland [38]) to symbolically prove the safety of the array access.
The algorithm uses the result of the call graph to find callers of each function and callees of each
call site.
8.6 Summary of Results
We implemented the compiler for this restricted language as different mode in the SAFECode
framework. We evaluated the applicability and the memory overhead of our system on a diverse
collection of embedded programs from two widely used benchmark suites, MiBench [30] and Me-
diaBench [48], as well as some control and sensor applications, shown in Table 8.1 and Table 8.2.
Our results show that we are able to ensure the safety of pointers and dynamic memory usage
in all these programs without incurring any run-time overhead. This is due to a combination of
our technique for preventing null pointer dereferences using a run-time hardware check and the
pool allocation technique for ensuring safe dereferencing of dangling pointers, both of which work
successfully for all the programs. Our compiler analysis identifies specific data structures in three
of these programs where our memory management strategy could lead to some potential increase in
memory consumption and we found that in all the three cases, the actual increase is not significant.
The static technique for checking the lifetimes of stack-allocated data works successfully for 19 of
the 20 codes tested. The static array bounds checking analysis, however, is completely successful
for only 11 out of the 20 codes. The other codes would require some run-time software checks.
Overall, these results show that with the exception of array bounds checks, the set of compiler
techniques in this work are able to achieve memory safety without garbage collection and without
run-time software checks, for a language that is essentially a “type-safe” subset of C, including
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programs with complex pointer-based data structures and extensive heap usage.
Benchmark Execution Time (secs) Memory Usage (bytes)
Orig time heap safety exec ratio Orig mem pool alloc mem pool alloc mem
time usage mem usage ratio 1 + safety ratio 2
restriction
automotive
basicmath 1.667 1.672 1.00 16384 16384 1 16384 1
bitcount 0.710 0.727 1.02 16384 16384 1 16384 1
qsort 0.405 0.404 1.00 24576 24576 1 24576 1
susan 0.670 0.675 1.01 253952 253952 1 253952 1
office
stringsearch 0.024 0.024 1.00 16384 16384 1 16384 1
security
sha 0.145 0.138 0.95 24576 24756 1 24576 1
blowfish 0.713 0.722 1.01 24576 24756 1 24576 1
rijndael 0.340 0.366 1.07 24576 24576 1 24576 1
network
dijkstra 0.340 0.349 1.02 32768 32768 1 32768 1
telecomm
CRC 32 1.463 1.53 1.04 16384 16384 1 16384 1
adpcm codes 1.255 1.252 1.00 0 0 - 0 -
FFT 0.495 0.478 0.96 540672 540672 1 540672 1
gsm 1.979 1.959 0.98 24576 24576 1 24576 1
multimedia
g721 0.354 0.355 1.00 24576 24576 1 24576 1
mpeg(decode) 0.331 0.320 0.97 385024 401408 1.04 401408 1
epic 0.126 0.128 1.01 671744 681616 1.01 779920 1.14
rasta 0.124 0.125 1.01 147456 212992 1.44 212992 1
Table 8.2: Execution time and memory usage for heap safety approach. exec ratio is the ratio of
execution time after pool allocation to the original time. (A ratio of 2 means the program runs
twice as long as the original). mem ratio 1 is the ratio of the memory usage of program after pool
allocation to that of the original program. mem ratio 2 is the ratio of the memory usages of pool
allocated program with our safety restriction to that of just the poolallocated program
8.7 SAFECode for Embedded Systems: Concluding Discussion
In this chapter we have discussed a different mode of SAFECode that places semantic restrictions on
the language usage and then statically proves memory safety of programs in the restricted language.
Using several benchmarks, we showed that our restrictions are not too onerous for embedded system
software. To our knowledge, ours is the first system that achieves 100% static checking for memory
safety for any non-trivial subset of C.
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Chapter 9
Static Array Bounds Check Analysis
In general, array operations are one of the most expensive to check for memory safety at run time.
In this chapter, we present an interprocedural array bounds checking algorithm that can be used in
SAFECode to reduce some of the run-time checks for arrays. The algorithm uses the call graph but
not points-to-graph and does not track values through loads/stores. It could not be safely applied
with out the guarantees provided by SAFECode regarding the call graph.
For ensuring safety of array accesses statically, the compiler must prove (symbolically) that the
index expressions in an array reference lie within the corresponding array bounds on all possible exe-
cution paths. For each index expression, this can be formulated as an integer constraint system with
equalities, inequalities, and logical operators used to represent the computation and control-flow
statements of the program. Unfortunately, satisfiability of integer constraints with multiplication
of symbolic variables is undecidable. A broad, decidable class of symbolic integer constraints is
Presburger arithmetic, which allows addition, subtraction, multiplication by constants, and the
logical connectives ∨ , ∧, ¬, ∃ and ∀. (For example, the Omega library [38] provides an efficient
implementation that has been used for solving such integer programming problems in compiler re-
search.) By exploiting static analysis based on Presburger arithmetic we can prove safety of array
accesses whose index expression is provably affine interms of the size of the array.
Checking for safe array usage requires the following three steps:
• generating constraints from each procedure
• interprocedural propagation of constraints
• verifying whether each array access is safe
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Constraints ::= AffineConstraint // affine equality or inequality interms of program variables
| Constraints && Constraints // conjunction of two constraints
| Constraints || Constraints //disjunction of two constraints.
//Helper Functions
isSatisfiable(Constraints c) : returns true if c is satisfiable, false if not. //uses Omega
ControlDependentConditions(var v) : returns a list of Conditions on which v is control dependent.
def(v) : definition of the variable v
VarsUsed(Variable v) : returns a list of variables used in the def of v
CollectConstraintsAtAllCallSitesOfThisFunction() : merges constraints from all call sites of this function
CollectConstraintsOnReturnValue(Function f) : returns the constraints on return value of f
in terms of its arguments (if affine).
stepfn(v) : if v is an induction variable in a loop, it returns the step value of the loop.
// The following tries to check if array access A[i] is safe
AnalyzeArrayAccess(A, i)
begin
Constraints c = generateConstraints(A);
c = c && generateConstraints(i); //We merge the constraints of A and i
c = c && ((A.size < 0) || (i >= A.size))
if (isSatisfiable(c)) return false //Access is unsafe
else return true //Access is safe
end




if v is in cache return constraints from cache;
//First check if the definition of v is an affine expression
if def(v) is affine arithmeticOperation
c = def(v); //generate constraints for simple arithmetic operations
c = c && generateConstraints(VarsUsed(def(v)));
//check def(v) is a malloc or alloca of an array
else if def(v) is (non char) array allocation of size d
c = (v.size = d)
else if def(v) is char array allocation of size d
c = (v.size = d - 1) //This is because of A5
else if def(v) is formal argument
c = CollectConstraintsAtAllCallSitesOfThisFunction();
else if def(v) is return value of a function call
c = CollectConstraintsOnReturnValue(callee(def(v));
c = c && generateConstraints(VarsUsed(args(def(v))))
else if def(v) is a PHI(x1,x2) and def(v) is induction variable of a loop
and x2 is coming through backward edge of the loop
if stepfn(def(v)) is positive c = c && ((v >= x1) || (v <= x2))
else if stepfn(def(v)) is negative c = c && ((v <= x1) || (v >= x2))
//We now add the control dependent conditions and their definitions
ConditionList = ControlDependentConditions(v);
foreach (Condition k in ConditionList)
c = c && k && generateConstraints(VarsUsed(k));
store constraints of v as c in cache
return c;
end
Figure 9.1: Algorithm for Array bounds checking
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9.1 Generating the Constraints
We generate a set of constraints for each array access in a program, including only those constraints
that affect the array access. The algorithm is described in Figure 9.1. We use a flow-insensitive
algorithm that exploits the SSA representation in LLVM. The LLVM instruction set distinguishes
registers (which are in SSA form) and memory, and allocates to registers all local scalar variables
(including pointer variables) whose address is not taken. Global variables, heap-allocated data,
and address-taken local variables are kept in memory, and are not in SSA form. All instruction
operands are SSA registers and memory locations are accessed only via load and store instructions.
To get constraints for an array access, A[i][j], we traverse def-use chains backwards from the
definitions of the SSA variables holding &A, i, and j respectively. These constraints are simply
inequalities on integer SSA variables that can be inferred from the program statements. For most
program statements, generating the constraints is straightforward. For example, from a simple
statement like i = (x + z) * 5, we would generate an affine constraint i = 5x+5z (our examples
use C syntax, although such a statement would internally require three LLVM instructions and two
temporaries, not shown here). No constraints are generated for any non-affine expression including
a load instruction. Not generating a constraint for a variable makes it unconstrained and the safety
checker treats the array access as unsafe, unless the variable is irrelevant. We recursively traverse
the def-use chains for each variable (e.g., x and z), stopping only if we encounter a non-affine
operation, a formal argument, a return value from a call, or an instruction whose constraints have
already been computed and cached. We cache the final constraints on each instruction we traverse
so that they can be reused.
In order to speed up our analysis we provide a set of trusted routines with pre-defined constraints
listed in Figure 9.1. Finally, to ensure that string routines will not read beyond the size of the
array, we always initialize the last character in any array of characters to be null and make sure
that the last character is not modified by excluding it in the array size expression in our static
analysis.
We explain the basics of our approach with the help of the example in Figure 9.2.
For array access A[i] in Figure 9.2, the constraints we generate are a conjunction of the fol-
lowing:
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Library Call Return Value Safety Pre-
Constraints conditions
n = read(fd, buf, n <= count buf.size
count) >= count
n = puts(s) - -
p = memcpy(p1, p2, p.size = p1.size p1.size
n) >= n
fp = fopen(p,m) - -
n = getc(s) - -
n = strlen(s) n <= s.size -
p = strcpy(s1,s2) p.size = s1.size s1.size
>= s2.size
p = strdup(s) p.size = s.size -
p = strncpy(s1, s2, p.size = s1.size s1.size >= n
n)
Table 9.1: Some Trusted Library Routines with Implied Constraints and Preconditions
char A[51]; // last character is set to null
...
k = read(fd, A, 50); // requires A.size >= 50; implies k <= 50
if (k > 0) {
len = strlen(A); // implies len <= A.size
for (i=0; i < len; i++)
if (A[i] == ’-’)
break;
... // use A and i
}
Figure 9.2: Array Usage Example
• (A.size = 51-1) generated using the def-use edges from the array declaration with the last
character excluded from the size for character arrays as explained earlier.
• (len <= A.size && k <= 50) generated using the def-use edges and return value constraints
on library functions strlen and read.
• (i < len && k > 0) generated from the control dependence graph using the
ControlDependentConditions procedure in the algorithm.
For an SSA φ node, x3 = φ(x1,x2), we check if it represents an induction variable, using an
existing induction variable analysis [5, 6]. If the φ node is not an induction variable, we simply
ignore the constraints on the φ node since this cannot lead to affine constraints. If the φ is an
induction variable, we know it merges values from a back edge and a forward edge. If the step
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function of the variable is positive, we add the constraint ((x3 ≥ x1) ∨ (x3 ≤ x2)), where x1 comes
from a forward edge and x2 comes from a backward edge. If it is negative, we add the constraint
(x3 ≤ x1) ∨ (x3 ≥ x2). An induction variable with an unknown step function cannot produce affine
constraints and will simply be ignored.
Overall, induction variable recognition allows us to generate useful constraints about index vari-
ables (e.g., i >= 0), and (together with the renaming of variables in SSA form) avoids generating
inconsistent equalities like i = i + 1 for both induction variables and ordinary variables.
The complete set of constraints we generate for the example reference are (A.size = 50 &&
len <= A.size && k <= 50 && i < len && k > 0 && i >= 0).
9.2 Interprocedural Propagation
In many cases, size expressions for an array or constraints on variables used in index expressions
must be propagated interprocedurally. For this purpose, we have developed an algorithm for
interprocedural constraint propagation. The interprocedural algorithm consists of two passes on
the call graph. First, a bottom-up pass gets constraints on return values in terms of procedure
arguments. A top down pass then merges constraints on arguments coming in to a procedure from
different call sites and then tries to prove safety for all array accesses and safety preconditions in
that procedure. Our current implementation cannot prove the safety of accesses which depend
on recursive functions. Our experiments have shown that array accesses that depend on recursive
functions are very rarely provably affine.
The algorithm has a worst case exponential time complexity. In practice, however, we have
found that, for most applications, a simple heuristic like collecting all the constraints for each of
the different arrays passed to the procedure and then merging and simplifying them removes many
redundant constraints and greatly increases efficiency.
Our static checking algorithm assumes that there will be no overflows and underflows in the in-
teger arithmetic involved in index or array size computations. Statically verifying this is extremely
hard and furthermore, once verified, does not allow us to perform many traditional compiler opti-
mizations that reorder computations (unless we also verify that there is no overflow/underflow for
any possible reordering of the computations). Fortunately, many modern processors, though not
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all, have the ability to raise exceptions on overflow or underflow on arithmetic operations. In the
embedded world, most processors derived from the MIPS instruction set (e.g., MIPS32, MIPS64,
R4300i ) have such an ability. Among the general purpose processors, DEC Alpha, VAX, and IB-
M/S 360 descendants provide such a feature. The x86 and sparc architectures do not automatically
raise hardware exceptions upon overflow/underflow but set some flags in condition code register.
However, they do provide special “trap on overflow” instructions like INTV in x86 and tcc in sparc,
which when inserted after an arithmetic operation would check the overflow/underflow flag and
raise an exception if the flag is set. To guarantee safety on these processors, we would need to in-
sert the corresponding “trap on overflow” instruction after every arithmetic operation that affects
an array access.
9.3 Proving Array Safety
We use the Omega integer set library [38] to test each array index expression for safety. Once we
generate constraints for an array reference, we add conditions representing array bounds violations
for the reference (such as (i < 0 || i >= A.size) in the earlier example). We then use the Omega
library to check if the resulting constraint system is satisfiable. If the system is not satisfiable (as we
have here), the constraints have been proven inconsistent and the array access is safe. Otherwise,
the access is potentially unsafe and we retain the run-time check.
9.4 Checking Safety Preconditions
To verify the preconditions for each trusted library call (e.g., the call to read above), we simply
need to check if the negation of the precondition ((A.size >= 50)) along with known constraints
on variables in the argument expressions (buf.size and count) result in an inconsistent system.
Here, (A.size < 50 && A.size = 50) is trivially inconsistent. In this manner, we generate and
check the preconditions for every trusted library call used by the program. If a safety precondition
fails, we have to insert a run-time check before the trusted call (or include the source of the trusted




This thesis has described SAFECode, a system that guarantees memory safety, provides error
detection capabilities, and provides a semantic foundation (a points-to graph, call graph, and type
information) for building sound static analyses for nearly arbitrary C programs.
SAFECode approach has several practical strengths: it is fully automatic and requires no
modifications to existing C programs; it allocates and frees memory objects at the same points as
the original program (minimizing the need to tune memory consumption); and it supports nearly
the full generality of the C language, except for manufactured addresses and some casts from int
to pointers.
SAFECode operates in three modes:
• In the first mode, SAFECode imposes semantic restrictions on the language usage that enable
static checking for memory safety without any performance overhead. This mode is useful
for embedded systems where the restrictions are not too onerous.
• In the second mode, SAFECode provides memory safety guarantees and sound analysis guar-
antees but does not detect few errors. In particular, it doesn’t detect dangling pointer errors.
This mode of SAFECode has very low overhead and can be used for all production systems.
• In the final mode, SAFECode provides memory safety guarantees, sound analysis guarantees,
and complete error checking. This mode is useful for development, debugging, and testing.
If the overhead is less, this mode can even be used for production code.
In this thesis, we showed that the analysis guarantees provided by SAFECode enable many
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sophisticated static checking algorithms. We briefly discussed how one such system (ESP) can take
advantage of SAFECode guarantees.
We evaluated SAFECode on two sets of benchmarks and server applications and showed that
the overhead incurred by SAFECode is less than that of other existing approaches that guarantee
memory or type safety.
We believe SAFECode is an interesting, useful, and practical alternative to existing techniques
for providing memory safety and sound analysis gurantees.
10.1 Future Work
There are many possible future directions for the SAFECode work. We discuss some of them below.
10.1.1 Applying SAFECode to Operating System Components
In this thesis, we focussed on techniques that provide safety guarantees to applications. We found
that applying the same techniques to operating system components (e.g. Linux kernel components)
is non trivial. This is because of two main reasons: (1) Linux kernel uses a memory management
scheme that is different from ordinary applications (2) some of the kernel components use inline
assembly that is unanalyzable in the current framework.
The first issue arises, as Linux kernel uses a pool based memory management scheme instead
of the normal malloc/free. However, the pools in Linux kernel, in general, do not satisfy the
property of automatically generated pools that SAFECode relies on. In particular, we found that
it is often the case that there are multiple pools that correspond to the same alias node unlike the
automatically generated pools. Moreover, the pool(s) for a given pointer is embedded in the source
and somehow needs to be extracted out to do the necessary SAFECode analysis. In an ongoing
work, we are working on extracting the pool information automatically from the kernel code. We
are also developing new techniques that can reconcile the difference in properties of the manually
written kernel pools and the pools that would have been inferred by the Automatic Pool Allocation
scheme.
The second problem could be solved by either (1) converting the inline assembly to external
C functions and making conservative assumptions about what they modify or (2) using a virtual
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instruction set and porting Linux kernel to that instruction set. For example, LLVA [17] work ports
the Linux kernel to a typed virtual instruction set based on LLVM’s intermediate representation.
In an ongoing work, we are considering the use of LLVA to analyze the Linux kernel.
10.1.2 More Precise Type Inference
SAFECode inserts several run-time checks on pointers read from TU pools. The number of TU
pools in the program depend on two factors: (1) use of type unsafe features of C (2) imprecision in
the pointer analysis that infers the type for the pools. While we cannot reduce the number of TU
pools due to (1), it is certainly possible to reduce the number of pools due to (2). For example,
C programmers commonly use casts to void* to implement the subtyping in object oriented style
of programming. Some of these casts will result in TU pools since the pointer analysis that we
use currently recognizes only a limited form of upcasts. Other approaches like CCured [52] have
recognized both upcasts and downcasts and have eliminated many unncessary run-time checks.
We plan to extend the pointer analysis used in SAFECode to recognize downcasts like CCured to
further improve the performance.
10.1.3 Non-unification based Pointer Analysis
One of the limitations of the SAFECode approach is that it supports only unification based pointer
analysis. As explained in chapter 4.5.3, extensions to non-unification based pointer analysis are
possible and require meta-data on individual pointer values.
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